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REVELATHA AND CHRISTIAN LEARNING 	 David Heywood
Abstract
The subject of the thesis is the relation between the mechanisms
of human learning and the appropriation of divine revelation. Its
conclusion is that while revelation may be understood in the
traditional sense as a definitive divine disclosure, the means by
which such a disclosure is received and understood are those of the
ordinary processes of human learning.
The study draws on the full range of disciplines integral to
Christian education, particularly the philosophy and psychology of
perception and learning and the theological doctrines of humanity and
revelation. In the first chapter, a methodological framework is offered
by which to relate these disciplines.
The conclusions of the thesis are as follows: Learning is an
interactive process of "assimilation and accommodation", in which a
psychological "world-model" is gradually developed. Such world-models,
whose basic units are termed "schemata", consist of "tacit" rather than
explicit knowledge. They are affectively or evaluatively structured,
reflecting the fact that their formation is the result of the
development of a sense of coherent identity. Revelation takes place by
means of the gift of a new identity, characterised by a relation to
God in Jesus Christ mediated by the Holy Spirit. Christ is the
"exemplar", or concrete pattern of Christian identity, knowledge of
whom is available as an historical figure interpreted by the
indwelling Holy Spirit. Christian learning is the development and
maintenance of that new identity. In revelation, God acts by his Holy
Spirit in such a way as to preserve both human autonomy, which is
itself a gift of God in creation, and the active character of the
learning process.
A final chapter investigates some of the implications of the
paradigm presented here against a wider philosophical background.
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Revelation and Christian Learning
mrrRoDucTlaff
This thesis is intended primarily as a contribution to the field
of Christian education. The expression, "Christian education" is
currently used in a number of ways, which may be summarised as
follows:
1. Christianity as "curriculum content" in the context of public
education. The usual reference is to the teaching of religious
education in schools, but it may be extended to include adult education
courses.
2. A Christian approach to or philosophy of education, taken as a
whole.
3. All that educational activity which takes place within the
context of Christian commitment, the means by which Christians grow
in the understanding of and commitment to their faith.
These three senses of the term "Christian education" may legitimately
be distinguished, and in discussions of a practical nature it is
usually clear which sense is intended. From a theoretical point of
view, however, the distinction is less helpful, because similar issues
arise in each context. In particular, both senses 1 and 3 are vitally
affected by the major issue which arises from sense 2, whether a
distinctively "Christian" approach to education is possible or
legitimate.
It has been argued, in particular by Paul Hirst, that the idea of
a "Christian education" is a "contradiction in terms".' Education,
Hirst believes, has its own, rationally derivable criteria, independent
of any particular belief system, such as that expressed in Christian
theology. The methods of teaching and learning a particular concept
are determined by the inherent and autonomous rationality of the
subject area in question, and cannot be affected by criticism from the
standpoint of theology.2 If Hirst's view is accepted then not only is
a Christian philosophy of education excluded, but the idea of
educational activity within the context of Christian commitment
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becomes problematic. Either such education takes place according to
rationally definable and publicly recognisable norms and values,
unaffected by the Christian context, or something other than
"education" is taking place. This view appears to drive a wedge
between "education" and "Christian nurture" or formation, which must be
regarded as less than educational, and possibly as indoctrination.
Against Hirst's "secular" point of view, with its distinction
between public, rationally-based values, such as those expressed in
his definition of education, and the "private" values of religious
belief, the argument of this thesis is that theological criteria are
applicable to every area of life, including education. A Christian
philosophy of education is one in which the concepts of the teacher,
the learner and the teaching-learning relationship, the aims of the
curriculum as a whole and the values expressed in the choice of
material are all informed by theological criteria. In particular, it is
shown that the study of the way people learn is informed by
philosophical anthropology, in the development and criticism of which
theology has an important role to play.3
Although a Christian critique of education taken as a whole is to
be understood as valid and possible, the best way of describing such
an exercise is probably as "theology of education". The term "Christian
education" is to be used in this thesis in the third of the senses
listed above. Christian education is defined as the educational
activity which takes place within the sphere of Christian commitment,
that is to say, within the Church.4 Its main task is the facilitation
of the growth to Christian maturity of adult believers. It also
includes the initiation of children and adult converts into the beliefs
and practices of the Christian faith and the training of men and
women for Christian ministry in all its many forms. Christian
education is both "formative" and "critical". It is formative insofar
as its aim is to "nurture" Christians in the understanding of,
commitment to and ability to practise their faith. Its critical task is
to enable Christians to reflect on the grounds for and consequences of
their beliefs.5
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While Christian education defined in this way applies mainly to
those areas of the Church's ministry particularly concerned with
teaching and training, there is also a sense in which Christian
education has to do with the whole life of the Church. Every other
aspect of the Church's life, such as worship, evangelism and political
and social involvement, has an educational aspect. Christians learn
their faith not only in formal educational contexts but informally
through the whole of the shared life of the community. As John
Vesterhoff in particular powerfully argues, efforts to enable Christian
men and women to reflect on the practice of their faith are likely to
be of little value if these are undermined by the "hidden curriculum"
expressed in the actual practices of the community.e The deliberate
attempt of the Christian educator to facilitate learning in formal
settings must be matched by deliberate and sustained efforts to ensure
that the practices of the church in every other area of its corporate
life adequately express the ideals it professes to believe:7
The task of the theoretical side of Christian education is to
reflect upon the Church's ministry of teaching and training. Like the
wider field of education, to which it is related, Christian education
is a "practical discipline". A practical discipline is one, like
medicine and civil engineering, which, in contrast to theoretical
disciplines such as physics, economics or history, is defined by its
relation to a particular field of activity. A practical discipline
draws on a number of theoretical disciplines relevant to its task.
Those relevant to the field of education include psychology, sociology,
ethics and philosophy. As a discipline which takes place in the
context of Christian commitment, Christian education must include
theology as an additional and vitally important elemente
There are three main requirements for the effectiveness of
Christian education:
1. It must be securely grounded in those areas of theological
understanding relevant to the Church's ministry of teaching, such as
the nature of man, the nature of revelation and the nature and task of
the Church.
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2. It must be securely grounded in the various disciplines
contributory to the study of education. The theological understanding
of the Church, for example, must be supplemented by an account of the
Church as an organisation with a social context. The description of
man, from a theological standpoint, as creature and as the object of
divine grace must be supplemented by an account of man as a learner
and as a social being.
3. The work in these two areas must issue in a viable theory of
educational practice.
Unfortunately, however, these requirements ha yed proved difficult
to meet, with the result that Christian education currently faces
something of a crisis of identity. In 1978, a collection of articles on
the discipline and methods of Christian education was published with
the title, Who are Ve?9 Seymour and Miller's book, Contemporary
Approaches to Christian Education, published in 1982, lists five
separate approaches, each with contrasting understandings of scope,
aims and methods. 1 ° One of the problems underlying these differences
of approach is a failure to resolve the basic question implicit in the
nature of Christian education as a composite discipline, the relation
between the theoretical disciplines on which it draws. In Christian
education, the practices of education and theology meet. What is to be
the relationship between them?
One of the reasons for this failure is the division between a
"theological approach" to Christian education and an alternative
"social science" approach. Advocates of the theological approach argue
that since Christian education takes place within the context of
Christian commitment, it is to be understood as a branch of practical
theology." In the words of Randolph Crump Miller, theology is the
"clue" to Christian education.' 2 Advocates of the social science
approach, on the other hand, reject what they see as "theological
imperialism". In their view, Christian education is a type of
education, to be governed by the complex of disciplines relevant to
the educational task, particularly the social sciences.'2
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The argument between the two approaches centres around the
relation of theology to education on the one hand and the relation
between social science and education on the other, with the question
at issue, which discipline has the most valid claim to dictate the
norms for education in a Christian context. What neither side has
attempted, however, is a systematic enquiry into the relationship
between theology and the social sciences. But if the three
requirements for Christian education, listed above, are to be
adequately met, some account of the relationship between its principal
constituent disciplines is necessary. Accordingly, as an attempt at a
genuinely interdisciplinary approach, the thesis begins with a second-
level argument, whose purpose is to establish a theoretical foundation
for Christian education by setting out in general terms the
relationship between the various disciplines upon which it draws,
theology, philosophy and the social sciences, and in particular to
demonstrate both the possibility and the propriety of bringing the
study of learning within a theological perspective.
The second main aim of this initial argument is to establish the
meaning of the term "revelation" from the theological, philosophical
and indeed the social science points of view. Revelation stands in a
peculiar relationship to theology. Although expressed as a doctrine, it
is not an ordinary part of dogmatic theology. Theological doctrines
are usually tested by their conformity to revelation. The doctrine of
revelation itself, however, cannot be brought within this test. Nor is
revelation a part of philosophy. The idea of revelation refers to
something which, although decisive for human self-understanding, could
not have been discovered in the course of philosophical enquiry. The
God of revelation is something more than the ideas of transcendence
thrown up by philosophical speculation. 14 Revelation has a status
which it is difficult accurately to pin down. It stands at the
boundary of both philosophy and theology, circumscribed by neither.
The attempt to delineate the relationships between the component
disciplines of Christian education serves as a useful platform from
which to explore the meaning, in philosophical as well as theological
terms, of the concept of revelation.
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The doctrine of revelation is an essential part of the
theological foundation of Christian education. It deals with the
availability of the knowledge of God. Christian learning may be
validly understood as the "subjective dimension" of revelation, that
aspect of the doctrine of revelation which deals with how revelation
is received.' Traditional approaches to Christian education have been
based on a highly transmissive view, in which revelation has been
understood as a set of propositions which form a "deposit of faith" to
be handed on from one generation to the next. On the other hand, from
the point of view of what is often called an "experiential approach",
the idea of definitive content is rejected and revelation can come
near to being treated as any experience which contributes to a
person's full humanity.' s Neither of these accounts is adequate.
Revelation is to be understood as a process in which the knowledge of
God, while historically and definitively given in Jesus Christ,
requires continual appropriation and reappropriation in the life of the
Christian believer. Christian education is the name of the field in
which this process of appropriation takes place. It is, in the words
of D.Campbell Wyckoff, "An enquiry into teaching and learning as modes
and means of response to revelattma."7
This being the case, Christian education has an important
contribution to make to theology. The "subjective" and the "objective"
dimensions of revelation are correlative. "If revelation is really
encounter," writes Emil Brunner, "then we cannot understand it without
knowing something of him to whom it is made." e Brunner's argument is
that man is created for revelation. That being so, revelation is to be
understood as laying hold of man in his natural state. Revelation is
given in such a way as to meet the capacity of man to understand it.
Earlier in the same work, Brunner writes,
Revelation is always a mystery, but it is never magic,„Revelation
always passes through a process of understanding by man, Even if
revelation creates a new understanding, it does not create this
without laying claim upon the natural understanding,19
In revelation, something is learned. A new understanding is created,
but not by setting aside the way understanding is normally gained.
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What is learned in revelation is learned by means of the normal
processes of the understanding. This is the key to the contribution
made by Christian education to theology. If revelation is given in
such a way as to lay hold of the capacity of man to learn, then the
study of human learning plays a vital role in the theology of
revelation.
The purpose of the thesis is to establish the position that it is
Christian learning which constitutes the subjective dimension of
revelation. In particular, it is my concern to show that there is no
discontinuity between the appropriation of revelation and the learning
processes involved in "ordinary learning". This involves an enquiry
into the relationship between revelation and the natural processes of
human learning, in order to show that it is these processes which are
involved in the reception of revelation. In particular, it must be
shown that revelation does not override the proper autonomy of
mankind which is expressed in and through the processes of learning.
The natural processes of learning which are to be the subject of
investigation are the psychological changes, cognitive, affective and
attitudinal, which take place in learning and the social context in
which learning takes place and which affects its course. These two
aspects of learning, the psychological and the social, are united by
the development of a sense of personal identity.2° It is the unity
Inherent in personal identity which gives coherence to a person's
understanding of the world he encounters with all its diversity. It is
personal identity which brings cohesion to the wide range of social
roles demanded of him. The construction and maintenance of identity is
the principal motivation for the psychological changes involved in
learning. It is identity which provides the connection between
learning and revelation. The process of revelation involves the gift of
a new identity which can be understood in a variety of ways, including
"disciple of Jesus Christ", "citizen of the Kingdom of God", or "son or
daughter of a heavenly Father". Christian learning consists of the
establishment, maintenance and development of that new identity, the
original of which is Jesus Christ, who, as the image of God, is the
12
INTRODUCTION
pattern of redeemed humanity. The goal of Christian education,
therefore, is individual and corporate conformity to Christ.
The argument as a whole traces a course through a wide variety
of topics and involves conclusions each of which is potentially the
subject of a thesis in itself. These include the nature of the social
sciences, the nature of perception, the relationship between the
cognitive and affective aspects of learning, the mechanisms of
socialisation, the nature and significance of human subjectivity and
agency, the sphere of man's proper autonomy in relation to both his
creatureliness and his fallen nature, the work of the Holy Spirit in
revelation and in relation to the human spirit, and the way in which
the relation between Christ and the believer is to be understood. In
dealing with each of these subject areas, it has been necessary to
draw heavily on the conclusions of others, and it is recognised that
if the position put forward in any one section of the thesis were to
be revised, the argument as a whole would be affected. At the same
time, however, it is maintained that the cumulative force of the
argument adds weight to each of its individual sections. The thesis
represents the outline of an approach to Christian education developed
as a result of attention to one of its most fundamental questions, the
relation between learning and revelation.
13
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CHAPTER ONE
Revelation and Human Self—Understanding
It is evident that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human
nature; and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still
return back by one passage or another, Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy and
Natural Religion are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN; since they
lie under the cognisance of men, and are judged by their powers and faculties, It
is impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might make in these sciences
were we thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding, and
could explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform
in our reasonings,
David Hume'
The problem of indicating the character of the human species is quite insoluble,
Immanuel Kant2
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1. Theory and Observation in Science
As a branch of practical theology, Christian education must be
securely based in theology. As a branch of education, it must be
securely based in educational theory. Until now, discussion of
theoretical foundations has centred largely around the relation of
theology to education on the one hand and the relation between social
science and education on the other, with the main question at issue,
which discipline has the most valid claim to dictate the norms for
education in a Christian context. It is intended, in what follows, to
leave the practice of education out of account for the time being, and
to enquire directly into the relation between theology and social
science.3
The first step is to examine the relationship between two related
fields, philosophy and the natural sciences. Although in the course of
the argument it will become necessary to modify this initial position,
theology can be defined chiefly as a conceptual subject, allied to
philosophy, while the social sciences are chiefly empirical, and in
that respect comparable to natural science. No science, however, can be
independent of conceptual, or philosophical, considerations. The
progress of a given science has two complementary aspects. These are:
a) observation,
B) the development of concepts and categories by which to unify
and comprehend observations.
It is the error of positivism to assume that the scientist can begin
with "raw" observation and move on at a relatively late stage to the
interpretation of his or her observations.'" Observation, the search for
new facts, requires a fairly clear idea of the sort of thing one is
looking for, and this requires a framework of concepts. Like the
infant, the trainee scientist is a novice in a new world. He or she
must learn to "see" the objects of that new world. The doctor
examining an X-ray photograph, the biologist looking into a
microscope, the astronomer through a telescope, are using not only
their eyes and their technological aids, but also the knowledge they
have acquired as a result of their scientific training to interpret
17
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what they see. It is the framework of interpretation which the
scientist brings to the task of observation which determines what is
found significant and what is ignored. It is that framework also which
helps to formulate questions and suggest fruitful directions for
research.e Stephen Toulmin gives the following examples of the
importance of conceptual revision for the advance of the physical
sciences:
The arguments by which Galileo, Descartes and Newton launched the
science we know as 'mechanics' were certainly as such conceptual - and
even philosophical - as they were empirical„,Nor could the basic
conceptions of modern dynamics - matter, force, momentum and the rest
- ever have been established by empirical investigations alone; in
actual fact they were quite as much the result of careful conceptual
analyses.
Einstein's initial work on the theory of relativity rested, likewise,
at least as much on a refined reanalysis of our concepts of space,
time and simultaneity as it did on empirical observations„,As
Einstein emphasised himself, he was led to his ideas about relativity,
not least by philosophical considerations derived from Hume and Nach,6
All data is, in the words of URJEanson, "theory-laden". 7 There
are no neutral, independently observable facts waiting for a theory to
explain them. Empirical work takes place within a framework of
concepts. It is within a given theoretical framework that discoveries
are made and knowledge of the subject-matter of the particular science
gradually expanded. It is the theory, moreover, which suggests which
of the possible research problems is likely to be most fruitful, the
theory which influences the design of the research and the theory
which tends to control the way the results are interpreted.e There is
no neutral standpoint from which all the facts appear, "value-free", no
privileged level of observation "uncontaminated" by a given theoretical
framework. To accept a given fact as significant involves the
acceptance of a whole framework within which its significance is
explained and by which it is related to all the other relevant facts.
But the theoretical or conceptual framework is not to be seen as a
strait-jacket, incapable of modification. It is possible for empirical
18
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observation to throw up "anomalies", findings which the theory is
incapable of explaining. If enough of these anomalies accumulate, the
adequacy of the theory may itself be called in question, and the
search for a new theory, which can explain not only the accepted facts
but also the anomalous observations, may begin.
The distinction implicit here between the gradual accretion of
verified observations within a given theoretical framework and the
rejection of a theory and its replacement by another is similar to
that made by Thomas Kuhn between "normal" and "revolutionary" science.
The main problem with Kuhn's theory was that his distinction was
introduced as an historical one, and "revolutionary" science reserved
for a few outstanding individuals, an example of the "great man"
school of historical writing. Subsequent argument has established that
the distinction between "normal" and "revolutionary" science is not
primarily an historical but a philosophical one, with practical and
historical implications. Minor conceptual revision is taking place all
the time. Scientific revolutions which capture the historical headlines
are merely outstanding examples of what is, in fact, a regular part of
the scientific enterprise. Familiarity with and acceptance of a given
theoretical framework is, moreover, the precondition for conceptual
revision.9
Kuhn's theory helps to resolve the apparent paradox between the
theory-laden nature of scientific observation and the impressive unity
of the scientific community, not only its unity of purpose, but the
unity of its interpretation. Science is not a field in which "anything
goes", in which one person's interpretation is as good as any others.
Scientific data are public and scientific observations replicable and
quantifiable. One scientist can request the results of anothees
experiments for independent analysis. One scientist can build upon
another's results. Science progresses by taking as certain the results
of previous series of experiments, by establishing reliably tested
laws and axioms. The unity of the scientific community is achieved by
the acceptance by its members of a shared conceptual framework. It is
not the case that the dependence of fact upon theory means that one
19
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person's theory is as good as any other. Science is the enterprise of
a community, which defines itself by the acceptance of a "paradigm",
or common theoretical framework.
It is the shared paradigm which specifies the precise meaning of
all the terms which fall within it. For scientists who share the
paradigm, every term and every observation has a definable, public,
quantifiable meaning. When Einstein put forward his theory of
relativity, part of what he was proposing was that many of the most
important terms in physics, such as force,  mass and velocity, should
be understood in a different way. For this theory to be accepted, it
had to cease to be simply Einstein's theory and become the generally
accepted "language" of physicists. Acceptance of a scientific paradigm
Is a more thoroughgoing and methodologically demanding example of
what we all do all the time in order to communicate with one another.
No one can be a Humpty Dumpty, for whom words mean whatever he wants
them to mean. We all share a common framework of agreement about
meaning, a framework within which we understand one another.'°
Agreement within a scientific paradigm is agreement about what
can be taken for granted. According to Sir Karl Popper, the
investigation of a scientific theory always terminates in a collective
decision to accept some "basic statement" as a valid description of
reality. These basic statements, which depend on scientific consensus,
are like "piles driven into a swamp". They do not reach the solid
bottom of indisputable fact, but are sufficient for the time being to
support the structure." The "paradigm", or shared conceptual
framework, must be taken for granted so that the work of empirical
investigation can proceed.
But if the work of empirical observation is dependent on
theoretical frameworks, the work of conceptual analysis cannot proceed
Independently of empirical observations. Science does not proceed by
deductions from first principles. There is no axiom which can be taken
with confidence as the "rock bottom", from which deduction may begin.
Rather, what can be proposed is a "model", a best possible
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approximation, to be understood as closely analogous to reality. The
task of the scientist is to discover, by experiment and analysis, how
far the particular model is applicable, and what are its limitations.
Such a model or fundamental analogy is termed by Imre Lakatos a
"research programme". 12 A "research programme" is much broader than
any one particular project. The example Lakatos gives is Newton's
gravitational theory. There is a similarity in scope to Kuhnian
"paradigms", but Lakatos concentrates on the logical features of
research programmes, rather than the effects of the social context in
which they arise. A research programme consists of a set of
methodological rules for studying a given aspect of reality. It
involves a "negative heuristic" or hard core of laws or axioms which
must be regarded for the sake of the programme as being irrefutable,
in the case of gravitational theory, the three laws of dynamics and
the law of gravity itself. It also involves a "positive heuristic", a
set of standard methods for solving problems and eliminating
anomalies. The research programme is a "way of seeing", which suggests
new avenues of research, new problems requiring solution, and
generates a series of progressively more adequate subsidiary models.
As these avenues are followed up, however, the inherent limitations of
the programme begin to become apparent, anomalies which cannot be
avoided arise, and the programme gradually runs out of steam, to be
replaced by a new and more powerful analogy.13
We are now in a position to attempt a preliminary conclusion
about the relationship between science and philosophy, as a first step
in the attempt to gain an understanding of social science and
theology. Science and philosophy are to be understood as
interdependent. Science is primarily the work of empirical
investigation; it is what takes place within a given paradigm or
conceptual framework. Philosophy is primarily the work of conceptual
analysis. It is what takes place when the theoretical framework is in
the process of revision. Science and philosophy are not two
independent spheres. Their work is related. The scientist works within
a conceptual framework, the analysis of which for coherence and
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logical implication is a philosophical task. On the other hand, logical
systems and conceptual frameworks, which are the subject of
philosophy, cannot be isolated from the world of empirical experience.
So long as philosophy is an attempt to describe the conditions which
govern our understanding of the world we live in, philosophers must
make statements capable of empirical investigation and possible
refutation. Science and philosophy are not only complementary but
inter-relatNL1 4
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2 Theology and Social Science
To turn from the analysis of the natural sciences to that of the
social sciences is to introduce additional levels of complication. In
the first place, the social scientist is attempting to explain the
behaviour not of the natural world but of people. Unlike the phenomena
of the natural world, from electrons right through to animals, people
are not simply the passive objects of observation. People can answer
back!
There are some extremely influential schools of social science in
which people's own explanations for their behaviour are treated as
unimportant. A truly scientific explanation, it is held, requires a
detached point of view. In behaviourism, for example, it is axiomatic
that any statement about the mind, one which refers to such activities
as "thinking", "expecting", "desiring" or "hoping", must be treated as
unscientific, since they are incapable of observation. All such
statements are to be "translated" into a neutral, "objective"
observation-language.'S
Behaviourism and other similar approaches stand in a well-
developed tradition, based on the inductivist or positivist ideal of
science. 16
 One of the earliest, greatest and most influential attempts
to explain the phenomena of human behaviour in terms reducible to
scientific generalisations was that of Thomas Hobbes. The basis of
Hobbes' philosophy was "materialism", the doctrine that all the
operations of the mind can be understood in terms of bodily motions.
All thought, he believed, originated in sensation, which is the result
of the operations of external objects. Sensation gives rise to
imagination, imagination to passion, and passion to "voluntary motion".
Human action, therefore, has its origins in physical causation. The
study of human action involves the same principles as those applicable
to the study of natural phenomena. In fact, Hobbes believed, all human
reason could be explained in terms of the principles of geometry."
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Hobbes is the intellectual ancestor of David Hume. In the Enquiry
concerning Human Understanding, Hume declared his intention of
discovering the "secret springs and principles by which the human
mind is actuated." 18 His method was to attempt to examine the
mechanisms of human intelligence from the point of view of a detached
observer, a method which involves the implicit assumption that thought
and action can be understood, in the same way as any natural
phenomenon, as the effects of some external cause.' The ideal of the
"unity of science", implicit in Hume, was summed up a century later in
John Stuart Mill's System of Logic, in which he expressed his
confidence in the applicability of the scientific method to the study
of man.2° The relative intractability of social phenomena as the
object of this method was due not to any difference in kind but solely
to the degree of difficulty involved.
The positivist approach to social science depends on the
assumption that it is possible to discover a level of observations and
a language with which to describe such observations which is "neutral"
or "value-free". Such a language describes the facts and nothing but
the facts, and theory arises simply as a summary statement of those
facts without any additional content by way of explanation. Even for
the natural sciences, however, this view is extremely problematic. In
the social sciences, the fact that the object of study is the human
subject makes it entirely untenable. As Kant observed,
The fact that man can have the idea 'I' raises him infinitely above
all the other beings living on earth, By this he is a person; and by
virtue of his unity of consciousness through all the changes he may
undergo, he is one and the same person - that is a being altogether
different in rank or dignity from things, such as irrational animals,
which we can dispose of as we please,2'
In this statement, Kant refers to several of the factors involved
in the common-sense conception of the difference between human beings
and other objects, including continuity of identity and the idea of
"dignity". He also expresses a characteristic view of the relation
between humanity and the environment, which he takes to be at man's
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disposal. But the most important factor mentioned here is the self-
consciousness characteristic of human beings. Because of human self-
consciousness, it is impossible for the student of mankind to ignore
the agenVs point of view. This idea has two important aspects:
1. It is a point of view unique to the individual subject. The
environment each person inhabits is not simply physical or
geographical, but psychological, consisting of his own interpretation
of the objects and people with whom he comes into contact, based upon
his own unique self-consciousness.22
2. The psychological environment is the creation of an agent. It
is not the result of impersonal causal factors. Perception and thought
are to be construed as activities.23
Even in the study of natural phenomena, interpretation is an
indispensable part of theory construction. In the social sciences, in
addition, persons' everyday explanations for what they do cannot be
Ignored. The explanation of human behaviour is a hermeneutical
exercise. It consists not simply of the attempt to test one given
framework of explanation, that of the scientist, against observed
events, but involves interaction between the scientists' explanation
and the various common-sense, everyday explanations of the people
under observation •24
Nor do the complications end here. People's explanations and
understandings of their own behaviour typically arise in a given
cultural context. They depend on shared frameworks of understanding,
which may be implicit in the institutions of a given society. What
people actually say and believe is only part of the story. Explicit
beliefs rest on a deeper level, the implicit intersubJective agreement,
without which society itself could not exist. The social scientist
cannot ignore this aspect of social life. As Alfred Schutz remarks of
the empiricist approach,
Intersubjectivity, interaction, intercommunication and language are
simply presupposed as the unclarified foundation of these theories,
They assume, as it were, that the social scientist has already solved
his fundamental problem before scientific enquiry starts,"
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The proper method of the social scientist is described, in the
term coined by Dilthey, as verstelien.26 Dilthey's term was taken up by
Max Weber, who, in opposition to Durkheim, insisted that "behaviour"
must be defined as meaningful action. The agent's own interpretation
of his action is not merely its subjective accompaniment, but an
inseparable element in that action, and essential to its correct
understanding.27 In everyday life, verstehen is that experiential,
common-sense knowledge, capable of penetrating the subjectivity of
another and interpreting the meaning for the other of her actions. As
such, it poses a range of philosophical problems, related to the
possibility of the knowledge of the mind of another and the nature of
agency.2e But it is, in addition, the proper method of the social
scientist. The social scientist is not simply an external observer. She
is a member of society, whose own basic assumptions are in dialogue
with those of the people under observation. In the natural sciences,
the theoretical framework can be taken for granted for the purposes of
empirical investigation, but in the social sciences certain implicit
understandings of the phenomena in question, those of the people who
are the subject of the investigation, are internal to the investigation
and cannot be ignored without a distortion of the nature of the
object.23 In the method of verstehen, empirical investigation and
conceptual analysis are combined. If she is to be true to her task, the
social scientist is required to do both science and philosophy at the
same time, a combination which lies at the heart of a genuine
hermeneutical methad.3°
At what point and in what way does the theoretical framework of
the social scientist interact with the implicit assumptions of the
agent or the society in question? The fundamental analogy or "research
programme" of any particular school of social science is a certain
"image of man".91 The image of man behind behaviourism has been
described as "man the sophisticated rat".32 In the new and growing
field of cognitive science the model is that of "man the information
processor".33 In social psychology it is "man the actor". Like all
paradigms, these images of man are models or analogies, the extent of
whose applicability is limited. When pushed too far, they become
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inappropriate and tend to break down. In cognitive science, for
example, problems are encountered when attempting to apply the
information-processing model to the study of attitudes. Application to
the affective domain reveals its limitations. In particular, problems
arise when a potentially useful heuristic begins to acquire
metaphysical status. The study of stimulus and response has a proper
place as one of the varied aspects of human behaviour. But in
behaviourism, this model of human functioning has assumed
disproportionate importance.
Not only is the scientists' theoretical framework based on an
implicit "image of man", but the implicit foundation of intersubjective
understanding which makes society possible also consists of an "image
of man". It consists, in the words of Charles Taylor, of a particular
definition of "man, human motivation, the human condition," a
particular "vision of the agent and his society." 34 We may contrast
the aggressive individualism of the United States and many Western
societies, for example, with the equally aggressive collectivism of
Marxism, the tribalism of many parts of Africa, or the corporatism of
Japan. We may contrast the philosophy of self-fulfilment or self-
realisation typical of Western society with the self-negation of
Eastern religion, in particular of Buddhism. The vision of the human
condition, the goal of human striving, may be explicitly expressed in
such documents as the American Constitution or the works of Marx and
Lenin, or they may be implicitly present, expressed in the institutions
or traditions of a given society. There may also be a significant
difference between the ideals officially expressed and those more
powerful covert elements of tradition, or of changing consciousness.
The applicability of the "images of man", which constitute the
fundamental models of the social sciences, is a subject for both
empirical investigation and for philosophical discussion. The empirical
work involved in the gathering of information must take place against
the background of continuous conceptual analysis and reappraisal, of
ongoing dialogue between the scientists' points of view and those
present in the society in which the research is being carried out. In
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this dialogue, there is a role for the theologian. Theology criticises
the images of man used by the social scientists and contributes to the
conversation models such as "man in revolt", man as creature, man in
the image of God. In particular, the theologian meets the image of man
as autonomous agent required by the approach to social science based
on human self-consciousness with an image of man constituted in his
autonomy by a creator God, to whom he is responsible.36
The theologian contends that his images offer potentially greater
explanatory power over a wider range of experience than do those
proposed by the social scientist. But the applicability of the images
of social science is not denied. Within a given sphere, such as social
relationships or cognitive functioning, images such as man the "actor"
or man the "information processor" may be valid and useful. The
theologian predicts, however, that these images will eventually reveal
their intrinsic limitations and perhaps be replaced.
The source for theological anthropology is the wider area of
theology as a whole. Behind the images of man proposed by the
theologian are further areas of theological understanding such as the
nature of God, particularly as revealed in Christ. But the application
of theological statements about mankind to experience, of selecting
and appraising the evidence by which such statements are to be
validated, requires the active co-operation of the social scientist,
albeit a theologically aware social scientist. To a very large extent,
this kind of empirical work remains to be done.
If theology and social science meet in a dialogue over their
respective images of man, it is with respect to the image of the
learner that the theological and social science approaches to
Christian education come together. Whereas for the theological
approach, the aims and methods of Christian education are based on a
theological understanding of the learner, perhaps as a sinner in need
of divine grace or as a person in relationship to God, for the social
science approach these aims and methods are dictated by "the way the
learner learns".36 If, however, theology and social science meet at the
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point of the understanding of mankind, then "the way the learner
learns" becomes a topic for theology. Learners learn in a particular
way because of the way in which they have been constituted by God as
people. Not only can theological anthropology assist in the approach
to learning theory by acting as a guide through the maze of sometimes
inadequate and frequently contradictory images of man encountered in
the various fields of social science, but the study of learning can
provide important empirical evidence as a contribution to the
theological discussion of the nature of human beings.
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3. The Possibility of Revelation 
"Nearly all the wisdom we possess," wrote John Calvin, "that is
to say, true and sound wisdom, consists in two parts: the knowledge of
God and the knowledge of man. But while joined by many bonds, which
one precedes and which one brings forth the other is not easy to
discern."37
 True knowledge of God, Calvin observed, requires true self-
knowledge. It is in contemplation of our sinful state that we are led
to a consideration of God's perfection. On the other hand, true self-
knowledge only arises in the light of and as a result of knowledge of
God. Until we know God, we cannot know ourselves truly. It is difficult
to decide which comes first, the knowledge of God or the knowledge of
man and his sinful state.
Behind both the paradigms of the social scientist and the
consciousness of the member of society lie certain "images of man",
interpretations of the human condition, the nature and destiny of man,
which provide an account for the scientist of the significance of his
research and undergird for the "man in the street" his concept of his
place in society and his relationships with others. Certain explicit
formulations which include a definition of the goal of human striving
and thus implicitly of the nature of mankind, such as the constitution
of the United States or Marxist doctrine, exercise considerable
influence by expressing overtly the shared vision of a society. But
explicit statements such as these, as well as systems of ethics, are
themselves interpretations of a tacit or implicit awareness of that
which is proper to a human being, which it is impossible adequately to
formulate .°
This common-sense understanding of the nature of mankind is
"tacit" or pre-theoretical. The hermeneutical baseline from which the
interpretation of human nature begins is incapable of reduction to
specific explicit formulation. This brings us into the realm of "tacit
knowledge", the term used by Michael Polanyi for the knowledge which
lies "below the surface, upon which explicit knowledge is based. In
Polanyi's words, "Tie know more than we can tell."39
 Certain problems,
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such as the basis for our belief in the reality of the external world
and of the minds of others, as well as the way we are able to infer
the feelings of others from their behaviour, defy analysis in explicit,
logical terms.4° These are cases, it is argued, in which tacit
knowledge plays an important role. Explicit knowledge, Polanyi
maintains, is always based on and takes for granted a significant
amount of tacit knowledge which cannot itself be formulated.
While tacit knowledge can be possessed by itself, explicit knowledge
must rely on being tacitly understood or applied, Hence all knowledge
is either tacit or else rooted in tacit knowledge,'"
The "images of man" which are expressed, explicitly or implicitly, in
the "research programmes" of the social scientist, the institutional
fabric of societies and in philosophical and theological anthropology
all emerge from and give expression to some part of the tacit
foundation of human awareness.42
Behind the social scientist's quest for understanding, and even
behind that of the natural scientist, 43 lies the fundamental question,
"What is man?" The formulations in which the natural scientist
attempts to answer this question themselves arise from the ubiquitous
yet elusive common-sense awareness of the human condition. Emil
Brunner describes this "characteristic wisdom of the num in the
street" in the following way:
It is aware of man's freedom and also of man's bondage; of the higher
element in man and also of his pitiful need; of the unity of his
personality and also of the contradiction it contains, It is aware of
man's eternal destiny, and yet also that man dies, and that all his
life is in some way determined by the fact of death, and tends toward
death, ,It is aware of the peculiar character of each individual, and
also of the common element which binds all individuals together, This
'wisdom' knows all these things, but it cannot be grasped at any
particular point, The more eagerly we try to seize it, the more
elusive it becomes, this extraordinarily reflective, and yet at the
same time superficial and incomplete kind of knowledge„,Before and
behind all scientific, philosophical and theological anthropology
there lies this ordinary, universally human, naive, prereflective
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understanding of man, very variously interwoven, concealed, enriched
and distorted by those other views, and yet independent of thea,44
Science, philosophy and theology, Brunner believes, represent both a
deepening and a distortion of this sensus communis. By means of
systematic enquiry, the scientist, theologian or philosopher draws out
and gives explicit expression to a particular aspect of common human
understanding. But this very process introduces the risk of distortion
through undue emphasis on one feature of a reality which is complex
and paradoxical.46
"The problem of indicating the character of the human species,"
concluded Kant, "is quite insoluble." 6 The reasons he gave were, first,
that since man is the only rational species, there is nothing to which
he can be compared, and second, that because man is "his own final
end", it is the species itself which determines its own character. 47 To
this we may add a third reason, implicit in Kant's epistemology: man
is the interpreter of the world, so who is there to interpret the
interpreter? All philosophical systems remain open-ended. All must
concede the insolubility of their fundamental question, the question of
man. It is at this point that revelation becomes significant to
philosophy. In relation to philosophy, the subject of revelation is
man. Revelation is a potentially definitive hermeneutical baseline, a
final solution to philosophy's fundamental problem. Revelation is
decisive for human self-understanding in that it fills the gap left by
philosophical systems. It offers a standpoint, not available within
human experience, from which human experience may be definitively
comprehended, an "image of man" to serve as the governing paradigm
for the philosopher and for the social scientist.48
In revelation, then, knowledge of God and knowledge of man is
given together. The revelation of the nature of God is at the same
time a revelation of the reality of the human situation. 49 However,
although potentially revelation provides a definitive hermeneutical
baseline from which to begin the interpretation of human life, in
practice it proves impossible to establish conclusively the nature of
the "image of man" conveyed in revelation. Revelation is not itself
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theology. In order to be understood and communicated, revelation must
be expressed in concepts, and thus give rise to theology. Theology,
moreover, takes place within a social and conceptual framework, which
Includes as a basic component a shared vision of man in community,
his character, significance and destiny.s° Theology is the product of
members of a given society, whose ability to appropriate the
revelation will reflect the conditions of the society in which their
Intellectual formation has taken place.'" The challenge of liberation
theology to what are perceived as the effects of Western culture on
European and Anglo-Saxon theology provides a contemporary
illustration of the fact that theclog3 is, in "prricatplA, iuc:Npe.Mte cot
entirely outgrowing the constraints of its cultural context.52 As
Brunner comments,
Even if revelation creates a new understanding, it does not create
this without laying claim upon the natural understanding„,6enuine
theology is always a conversation between God and man in which the
human partner in the conversation is not ignored, but, even though he
is entirely receptive, he is apprehended with his whole natvre3
Not only does man remain a responsible subject in the process of
revelation, but in this process the content of revelation becomes
subject to the conditions of natural knowledge, including the
possibility of error. It is a mistake for theologians to go beyond
their own province by proclaiming as a divinely revealed truth what
may be only an erroneous human conception of divine truth. 54 There is
a hermeneutical movement within theology itself. While theology is a
reflection of and attempt to understand what has been given by
revelation, it includes within its province the enquiry into both the
content and method of revelation. Revelation itself is a theological
doctrine, the proper methods of whose articulation include the tools
of philosophy.ss
The distinction between revelation and theology is a reflection
of that between tacit and explicit knowledge. While the doctrines of
theology are explicit formulations of the faith, revelation itself is
not explicitly but tacitly understood. The "images of man" which
underlie the theoretical frameworks within which and by means of
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which men and women arrive at their understanding of the world and
their own place in it exist at a tacit, pre-theoretical level. If
revelation conveys a definitive understanding of the human condition,
then it is to be appropriated not at the level of concepts but at that
of man's pre-conceptual awareness of his identity. In revelation, God
deals directly with the essential subject, the "I" behind the empirical
self, the person behind the "persona", whose real nature is known only
to God h1mse1f,s6 Revelation is a personal encounter, in which the
Initiative is that of the sovereign God. While from the point of view
of philosophy the content of revelation is anthropological, the
provision of a definitive image of man, from the point of view of
theology its content is God. The understanding of the human condition
which results from it is a reflection of what is revealed about the
nature of God.57
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is closely related to the study of ideology, There, however, the emphasis seems to
be upon the limitations imposed upon the scientist by the ideology within which he
works, In the hermeneutical approach to social science, the emphasis is on the
opportunity offered by the encounter between societies for the transcending of
ideology,
26, See the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol 1-2, p,405
27, Weber, Theory, p,87f, See also Interpretation, p,77-89 and p,28f of the
"Introduction" by J,E,T,Eldridge; also R,Aron, 'The Logic of the Social Sciences',
in Wrong, Veber, p,77-89,
28, See below, p,113f„ on verstehen,
29, Schutz, 'Theory Formation"; Ryan, Philosophy, p,127-170; Shotter, Selfhood,
0-50; See also Harre and Secord, Explanation, esp,p,1-27,
30, The relationship between social science and philosophy is thus a close one,
Winch has even suggested that social science is little different from philosophy,
consisting of the conceptual examination of "forms of life", This claim is balanced
by the position implicit in Berger and Luckman's Social Construction of Reality,
that philosophy is, in fact sociology, Both aspects of social science, the
conceptual and the empirical, need to be held in tension,
See Ryan, Social Sciences, p,127-170 for an account of the status of the social
sciences,
31, See, for example, Bandura, 'Behaviour Theory"; Sampson, "Paradigms"; Sampson,
"Ideology"; G,A,Miller, "Human Welfare"; Shotter, Images of Ran,
32, Schlenker, Impression Management, p,9,
33, Barber and Legge, Perception,
34, C,Taylor, "Interpretation", p,182,193,
35, See further p,146-152 below,
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36, For R,C,Miller, for example, it is the fact that the learner is in relationship
with God which guarantees the legitimacy of the theological approach, Theology
provides the learner's authentic self-understanding, a sinner in need of
reconciliation, Theology defines the dynamic of the "1-Thou' situation in which the
learner is involved, Theology specifies the need for teaching techniques to be
relationship-centred, (Theory, p,166-164)
For J,M,Lee, on the other hand, it is the learner as learner which is the
relevant anthropology for religious instruction, and an understanding of how the
learner learns is not to be found within the province of theology, 'Religion,' he
maintains, ' is learned according to the way the learner learns and not after the
manner of its own existence,"(Row, p,68) Religious instruction is to be person-
rather than content-centred,
John Westerhoff believes that the metaphors of 'production' and 'growth"
implicit in the 'schooling' approach to education need to be challenged, The
methods of curriculum development, involving stated objectives, the choice and
organisation of learning experiences and evaluation of their outcome, have
sufficient truth behind them, he believes, to warrant their use, but they are
insufficient for the education of persons, A better model for religious education
is the pilgrimage, in which the religious educator plays the role of fellow-pilgrim
as well as guide, (faithful Church, p,298)
37, Calvin, Institutes, 1,1,1,
38, See Dreyfus, "Holism and Hermeneutics', and the examples quoted there,
39, Polanyi, Tacit Dimension, p,4,
40, Stace, "Unreasoned Beliefs", gives an extensive list of such beliefs,
41, Polanyi, "Logic', p,7; knowing anot him p,144,
42, A distinction is to be made between "tacit knowledge' in a broad sense as
knowledge derived from experience and used to provide a framework for comprehension
in new learning, and the much narrower sense used here, in speaking about those
foundational elements in human cognition which, although operative only in
experience, can not be said to be derived from experience, These elements
constitute a particular, highly significant, type of tacit knowledge, It is
elements of this kind to which Kant drew attention in proposing his concept of the
sythetic a priori, although Kant's own list of such foundational categories was far
too extensive, Pylyshyn, in a very interesting article, 'Computation and
Cognition', refers to such elements as "functional architecture", In terms of the
computing analogy, they constitute the basic programme, without which no other
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programme can be made to work, It is difficult to be certain about exactly which
elements of tacit knowledge belong in this narrower class,
43, Polanyi, Study of flan,
44, Brunner, Man in Revolt, p,46-47,
45, ibid, p,47f, It is to be noted that this passage is taken from the
introduction to a Christian anthropology, In some respects, therefore, it
anticipates the conclusion of the argument, However, the connection between
Brunner's description of common-sense anthropology, Polanyi's concept of tacit
knowledge and the idea of 'images of man' as fundamental to the human sciences
should be noted,
46, Kant, Anthropology, p,183,
47, 'bid, p,3f„183f,
48, The possible implication of this position, namely that theology become a kind
of universal science is noted by Brunner in an Appendix to Man in Revolt, p,544f,
In order to avoid this implication, Brunner uses his argument of the varying degree
of relevant Christian influence over various subjects, There is no distinctly
Christian mathematics, This is a science whose correct development lies within the
capacity of the natural man, But the nearer one comes to the centre of personality,
the greater the distortion of natural human understanding, and the greater the
relevance of theology, See also Revelation and Reason, p,383, This argument is
different from the one used in the text, but related to it, The centre of tacit
knowledge, it is argued, is the personality, while mathematics is the science most
capable of complete explicit expression,
49, One of the main problems about the relationship between the knowledge of Sod
and of man in revelation is the problem of authority, Is revelation to be its own
authority or is it to be validated by means of existing human knowledge, the power
of reason? If the former, the part played by human knowledge in its reception
appears to be minimal, If the latter, then the authority by which revelation is
received is that by which it is validated, namely human reason, and the concept of
authoritative revelation becomes impossible, Positions in the debate tend to be
polarised, Reinhold Neibuhr, for example, argues,
Religious faith cannot be simply subordinated to reason or made to
stand under its judgement„,When this is done, the reason which asks
the question whether the God of religious faith is plausible has
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already implied a negative answer to the question, because it has made
itself God, and naturally cannot tolerate another,
(Nature and Destiny of Man, vol,1,p,165-166)
The principle proponent of this position is Karl Barth, who writes,
God's revelation has its reality and truth wholly and in every
respect„, within itself, Only by denying it can we wish to ascribe it
to a higher or deeper ground„, The adoption of revelation from the
vantage of such a ground, different from it and presumably superior to
it„, can only be achieved by denying revelation,
(Dogwatics, I/1, p,350)
Plat is denied in the position taken in this thesis is the either/or nature
of Barth's argument, If revelation is to come to man and be appropriated by him it
cannot be allowed that its truth be wholly and in every respect within itself,
There must be some aspect of its truth corresponding to the human ability to
understand it, Again, it is incorrect to suppose that some other ground" than
revelation from which it can be understood is necessarily superior to it, Precisely
the opposite is being argued here, namely that revelation supplies what is lacking
in that other ground, On Barth's position, see further notes 55 and 57 below,
The opposite position, that "revelation" is to be understood in terms of
human capacity has been taken to be an implication of the highly subtle position of
Schleiermacher, He rejected the idea that revelation could be understood as
doctrinal, that is as given to the understanding, for the reason given above,
namely that if revelation can be understood in cognitive terms there can be nothing
supernatural about it, The ability to know God, he believed, was a natural human
capacity, but a capacity not of man's thinking nature, but of feeling,
'God," he argued, "is given to us in feeling in an original way; and
if we speak of an original revelation of God to man and in man, the
meaning will always be just this, that along with the absolute
dependence which characterises not only man but all temporal
existence, there is given to man also the immediate self-consciousness
of it, which becomes a consciousness of God,"
(Christian Faith, §4,p,17-18)
However, Schleiermacher did allow that in Jesus Christ God had done something
decisive which stood outside outside the chain of historical causation,
"Revelation", he said, could be used to refer to the "originality" of the fact
which begins religious communication, Since our awareness of God is related not to
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our thinking but to our 'feeling" capacity, however, the impression of Jesus is not
cognitive, but that of "A being who works upon us directly as a distinctive
existence by means of his total impression on us," (Christian Faith, 110, p,50)
For those theologians who deny the propriety of understanding Jesus' life or
any other divine action as a supernatural intervention into what they take to be a
closed continuum of cause and effect, this latter part of Schleiermacher's position
is abandoned and revelation is reduced to "religious receptivity', See, for
example, Wiles, 'Revelation",
50, Although the knowledge of God is given from beyond theology, it is appropriated
within the "complex situation involving our cognition of the world around us and of
ourselves along with it," (Torrance, Theological Science, p,32)
51, See below, in particular p,89-90, for the pattern of assimilation and
accommodation characteristic of human learning, If revelation is received in ways
appropriate to the normal human processes of understanding, then this pattern
applies also to the understanding of revelation,
52, Gutierrez, Liberation; esp,p,1-14; Segundo, Liberation,
53, Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p,15-15, It is doubtful if the recipient of
revelation can be said to be "entirely receptive' in every sense, It will be
argued, not only that the appropriation of revelation does not involve the
suspension of human autonomy, but also that the recipient is in some sense active
in its understanding, See note 49 above,
54, Brunner, Man in Revolt, p,70,
55, This position was strenuously resisted by Karl Barth, Barth believed that
theology was based solely on revelation, which provided all the tools needed for
its own understanding and articulation, To bring philosophical analysis to the task
of theology, he argued, is to look for rules by which to fit the Church and
Christianity into some broader and more inclusive overall scheme,
The possibility of this solution stands or falls with the answer to
the question whether there really is a nexus of being superior to the
being of the Church, and consequently a nexus of scientific problems
superior to dogmatics, (Dogmatics, 1,1,p,38)
Barth expresses the conventional, positivist views of his time on the status of
science, The methods of science, he wrote, consist of observation and inferences,
Exact science, when it avoids philosophising and laying down a "world view', is in
fact "pure knowledge", (Dogmatics, 111,2, p2) Barth believed that science, being
empirically based, is capable of pursuing its object independent of philosophy, or
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"speculation", In relation to anthropology, he separates the empirical study of man
in nature from philosophical or "speculative" anthropology, discerning no
connection between them, (Dogmatics, III,2,p,21-26) While scientific anthropology
pursues its course independent of philosophy and without threatening theology,
speculative anthropology is the enemy of theology, whose only source is revelation,
The effect of revelation is not to reform human speculation but to replace it,
Theology has no conception of itself as knowledge in common with the world,
Theology "cannot think of itself as a link in an ordered cosmos, but only as a
stop-gap in a disordered cosmos," (Dogmatics, I,l,p,8)
This concept of the relationship between philosophy, science and theology,
which underlies his theology, is one of the most significant differences between
Barth and his contemporary, Emil Brunner, Unlike Barth, Brunner accepts the
interdependence, which we have demonstrated, between philosophy and science, As
attempts to describe the way things are, philosophical statements contain an
implicit metaphysical commitment, They must, then, be capable of being earthed in
experience by supplying hypotheses which can be put to the test, This "principle of
empirical criticism" applies equally to theological statements, even though they
originate with revelation, Even as statements of faith, they must be capable of
application to experience, (Nan in Revolt, p,60-63) Theology, then, stands in the
same relation to science as does philosophy, The difference is that the images of
man which it brings to the criticism of scientific research originate with
revelation,
56, Paul Tournier writes, "The personage I put on in ordinary life is no longer of
any avail to me: God does not stop at the personage - he goes straight to the
person," /leaning of Persons, p,167, For the distinction between the 'I" and the
empirical self, see below, p,130-131, 146-148, 164, For the nature of revelation as
addressed to the person, see p,159-160, 174-176,
Thus, although definitive, in that it consists of a definite content, the
Person of Jesus Christ, revelation is not propositional, To be propositional, it
would need to consist of explicit information, Rather, it is argued here,
revelation is given at the tacit level,
57, It is, therefore, correct to maintain, with Barth, not only that revelation is
something that only God can do, whose only condition is his grace, but also that
for the person in receipt of revelation it constitutes a regrounding of one's
subjectivity, Knowledge of an object, argues Barth, changes the knower, It makes
him a responsible witness to the truth of that object, (Dogmatics, 1,1, p,188) In
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knowing, the truth of the object, "becomes a determination of the existence of the
man who has knowledge," Thus, "By the experience of God's Word, which is possible
for men on the presupposition of its reality, we understand this determination of
their existence as men by God's Word," (ibht,p,198-199) The knowledge of God
differs from that of ordinary objects in that God is unique,
When man enters into that uniting and distinguishing relationship to
an object, his subjectivity is opened up to an objectivity and he is
grounded and determined anew, But in faith the same thing happens
quite differently, This difference consists in the difference and
uniqueness of God as its object„,This knowledge is a special
knowledge, distinct from the knowledge of all other objects,
outstanding in the range of all knowledge,(Dopalirs, 11,),p,14-15)
This difference consists chiefly in the fact that God cannot become an object for
us in the same way as other objects, God is always and only Subject, Man cannot
enter into a relationship with God by his own volition, It is God who creates the
relationship with man, Thus, Barth argues, the possibility of revelation depends
upon its prior actuality and not on anything to do with the conditions of human
life,
All this can be accepted, however, without affecting the main argument of
this section that there exists a "point of contact', to use Brunner's rather
unsatisfactory phrase, at which revelation may enter what Barth calls the 'nexus°
of philosophical thought, This point of contact is the inexpressible tacit
awareness of human being, Nothing about this observation guarantees that there must
actually be a revelation to resolve the question of the nature of mankind, The fact
that there is a revelation, and that in that revelation God himself is known, is
entirely due to God's grace,
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CHAPTER TWO
Interaction: Mechanism and /Waning
Now the sum of all that is merely objective we will henceforth call nature,
confining the term to its passive and material sense, as comprising all the
phaenomena by which its existence is made known to us, On the other hand, the sum
of all that is subjective we may comprehend in the name of the self or
intelligence, Both conceptions are in necessary antithesis, Intelligence is
conceived of as exclusively representative, nature as exclusively represented; the
one as conscious, the other as without consciousness, Now in all acts of positive
knowledge there is required a reciprocal concurrence of both, namely the conscious
being and of that which is itself unconscious, Our problem is to explain this
concurrence, its possibility and its necessity,
Samuel Taylor Coleridge'
Perception is where cognition and reality meet,	 Ulric Neisser2
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1 The Complementary Roles of Philosophy and Psychology 
The aim of the next three chapters is to present an account of
the way human beings learn. The study of learning immediately
presents a problem of orientation. It is necessary at the outset to
establish the relationship between the two main components of such an
undertaking, the psychology of learning and the philosophy of
knowledge. Learning involves a wide range of psychological changes,
the acquisition of new skills, the development of changed attitudes
towards oneself and others, a change in the capacity to experience and
tolerate emotion, the attainment of new social skills, and so on. The
investigation of learning can be said, therefore, to lie principally
within the field of psychology. All types of learning, however, involve
the cognitive component, the acquisition, retention, reorganisation and
deployment of knowledge. The study of knowledge involves conceptual
questions which fall principally within the field of philosophy. The
study of learning, therefore, cannot take place independently of
philosophical epistemology.
According to the school of educational theory currently most
Influential in this country, a clear distinction is to be made between
the respective fields of philosophy and psychology.3 While
psychological study may concentrate, for example on those factors
which contribute to the effectiveness of learning, the conceptual
analysis of the acquisition of knowledge falls within the field of
philosophical epistemology. 4 Knowledge, argues Paul Hirst, may be
divided into a number of publicly specifiable "forms of understanding",
achieved over the course of generations. Each form of understanding
has its own distinctive logic. Learning, he argues, consists of
initiation in the understanding of the different types of logical
relationships appropriate to the various forms of understanding. These
logical relationships which characterise the structure of the various
forms of understanding are to be distinguished from the psychological
processes by which the learner arrives at his or her understanding.3
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The distinction between the logical structure of a particular
"form of knowledge" and the psychological processes involved in the
acquisition of such knowledge reflects a particular type of
epistemology, one based on the belief in the solidity, even objectivity
of knowledge based on secure logical relationships, in contrast to the
shifting sands of psychological association. The search for objective
foundations has given rise in philosophy to what Stephen Toulmin
calls the "City of Truth" metaphor.° According to empiricist
epistemology, the foundations of the city of truth consist of certain,
objective, empirical observations. The architectural principles by
which the superstructure is erected are those of logical analysis.
Empirical observation and logical analysis are, moreover, independent
of one another. Philosophical or scientific certainty is to be achieved
by a combination of value-free observation and logically guaranteed
inference. These principles are those which W.V.O.Quine calls the "two
dogmas" of empiricism:
'Modern empiricism,' he writes, "has been conditioned in large part by
two dogmas, One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between
truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of
matters of fact, and truths which are synthetic, or grounded in fact,
The other dogma is reductionism the belief that each meaningful
statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which
refer to immediate experience,"
Quine concludes that these dogmas are, in fact, unsupportable.
Analytic and synthetic truths cannot be conveniently isolated from one
another for the purposes of analysis. There are, as demonstrated in
the previous chapter, no observations of fact "uncontaminated" by
theoretical assumptions. Empirical observation takes place in the
context of assumptions based on previous experience and learning. New
knowledge is inevitably assimilated, at least in part, to the structure
of existing knowledge and belief.° An epistemology based on the "two
dogmas" fails to take into account the contribution of the subject in
perception, comprehension and learning. Its effect is to separate fact
and value, external "reality" from the contribution of the perceiver.
Knowledge is to conform to the logical structure of objective facts.
47
INTERACTION: MECHANISM AND MEANING
The result is to reduce meaning to description, and thereby to confuse
the two. It involves the assumption that any meaningful statement can
be expressed as an empirically verifiable description of some state of
affatrs.9
The best modern example of this confusion is logical positivism,
as expressed in the "verification principle", according to which the
meaning of a statement is equivalent to the method of its
verification. According to this principle, all meaning other than that
of analytical statements is descriptive or factual, and the criteria
for meaningfulness in any given realm of discourse is the extent to
which its statements can be translated into simple descriptions
capable of empirical and/or logical verification. All types of
discourse in which this is impossible, including aesthetics, morals
and, the main target, metaphysics, are thereby rendered meaningless.
Logical positivism is thus a modern attempt to put into practice the
programme advocated by Hume on the last page of his Enquiry
Concerning the Human Understanding:
If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics,
for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning
concerning quantity or number? No, Does it contain any experimental
reasoning concerning matter of fact or existence? No, Commit it then
to the flames; for it can contain nothing but sophistry and
illusion, '°
Beyond these basic principles of classical empiricism, however,
the logical positivists were able to achieve no very substantial
agreement. In particular, they were unable to agree on what constituted
observation, on what status was to be assigned to "sense-data". They
also failed to agree on the form of the logically pure language in
which verified empirical statements should be expressed, so that there
were almost as many proposals for a logical language as there were
philosophers in the field.
In practice, it is not difficult to see that an epistemology
which depends on the interpretation of such things as "sense-data"
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involves implicit psychological assumptions. The same is true for a
large number of philosophers. Descartes' Meditations is a particularly
good example. His epistemology is dependent on the analysis of data
received by the senses, on considerations as to the reliability of the
sense organs and, notoriously, on his conceptualisation of "mental
substance" as separate from and interacting with "physical substance".
Locke, Hume, Berkeley, Kant, Price and Ayer, to name but a few, all
make use of psychological generalisations. Such expressions as ideas,
impressions, imagination, sensible manifold, sense data and so on are
all empirical, psychological terms. Even some modern philosophers,
however, fail to recognise the need for adequate experimental
grounding of these basic expressions of empirical reference.
Take, for example, A.J.Ayer's Foundations of Empirical Knowledge.
The context of his use of empirical examples is the development of the
"argument from illusion", whose conclusion is that what we perceive
may be unreliable or illusory. The inference Ayer draws is that we do
not perceive "material objects" but only "sense data". "Sense data", he
maintains, are the basic level of perception, the "foundation of
empirical knowledge", and, as such, they are "incorrigible", in
contrast to material objects, whose existence is simply an inference
from the experience of sense data. The examples Ayer gives in support
of the argument from illusion include the experience of mirages or
hallucinations, the perception of a coin which, although circular,
appears elliptical for some observers, and that of a straight stick
which appears to bend when put into water, due to refraction. Ayer's
assumption is that the use of these examples is unproblematical, that
they can all be taken at "face value. He fails to see the need for a
process of interpretation involving careful empirical investigation
before they can be used to provide evidence for his theory. "When I
look at a straight stick, which is refracted in water and so appears
crooked," he writes, "my experience is qualitatively the same as if I
were looking at a stick that really was crooked." This example, like
all the others Ayer uses, is anecdotal. He has performed no tests to
establish the regularity of or the conditions for the experiences he
describes. Nor does he bother to define in terms which could be
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experimentally verified what is meant by the phrase "qualitatively the
same". Moreover, there are several factors which Ayer has failed to
take into consideration. The fact that along with the "bent stick" we
also see the surface of the water makes a significant difference. Most
people are familiar with the effect from past experience, and past
experience, with or without a theoretical understanding of refraction,
prevents virtually every intelligent observer from interpreting their
perception as a "bent stick"."
It is important for the philosopher to be aware of the
psychological generalisations underlying his assumptions. There can be
no a priori self-validating theories independent of the need for
confirmation by reference to empirical evidence. If the tendency to
Ignore the philosophical dimension leads to the impoverishment of
psychology, the tendency of philosophy to become an independent,
self-generating area of enquiry is equally misconceived. Typical of
this approach is the "logical behaviourism" of Gilbert Ryle's
Influential Concept of Kind. Ryle attempts to derive the principles of
behaviourism by deduction from a priori premises with virtually no
empirical reference. The actual scientific practice of behaviourism is
barely considered. Interestingly enough, Ryle's book is in turn
virtually ignored by behaviourist psychologists, most of whom are
unaware or dismissive of the philosophical foundations of their own
empirical work. 12 Rather than admit an interdependence between
empirical and conceptual questions, between the work of philosophy and
psychology, many philosophers insist on a one-way logical dependence
of the study of "learning" upon that of "knowledge". The result is a
tendency to ignore the implications of the results of psychological
research and a resistance to any "psychological idiom" in
philosophy.12
It is equally important, however, that psychologists recognise
the philosophical premises implicit in their own work. The question as
to the relation of philosophy and psychology is a particular instance
of the more general question dealt with in the previous chapter, the
relation between conceptual and empirical factors in scientific
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enquiry. Underlying any field of empirical investigation are a number
of philosophical assumptions, which, although they may be taken for
granted for the purposes of a particular experiment or series of
experiments, critically affect the way in which the results of those
experiments are interpreted. Until recently, the situation in the
various branches of psychology has suffered from a general failure to
appreciate this aspect of its work. Psychology has been, and remains
to a large extent, divided, with little cross-fertilisation between
separate areas of research or awareness of the possible implications
of even the basic theoretical assumptions of one branch for those of
another.'' In cognitive psychology, for example, Ulric Neisser critises
the lack of "ecological validity', or contact with everyday reality, of
the theoretical approaches prevailing up to the mid-1970s. Even more
important, he noted the lack of awareness of the need for a new
philosophical anthropology to undergird the picture of man as
information-processor generated by the growth of the cognitive
orientation.' s Conceptual progress is hindered, however, by the
continuing influence of positivism. Like behaviourism, cognitive
science tends to be dominated by the assumptions of Humean
empiricism, both in its methodology and its epistemological
assumptions. "Information" tends to be treated as if it consisted of
individual, self-defining units, and mental processes understood as
effects of environmental causes. 16 Even in social psychology, it is
rational processes which constitute the preferred explanation even for
the factors behind the development and maintenance of attitudes or
relationships."
The "cognitive orientation" is a means of approaching the study
of knowledge in which due regard is paid to both dimensions, the
empirical and the analytical, the psychological and the philosophical.
It is a development in the field of cognitive science from the
information processing approach, based on the recognition of the
necessity of a fundamental change in the basic paradigm required by
the role of "mental events" expressed in "internal structures". Marc de
Hey summarises as follows:
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The central point of the cognitive view is that any such information
processing, whether perceptual (such as perceiving an object) or
symbolic (such as understanding a sentence) is mediated by a system of
categories or concepts which for the information processor constitutes
a representation or model of his world,18
De Mey traces four stages in the development of the cognitive view.
The first is the monadic, in which information is treated, in the
manner of behaviourism and its underlying philosophy, as composed of
separate, self-defining entities. The next is the structural stage, in
which the attempt is made to define more complex structures. In the
third, the contextual stage, it is recognised that meaning depends on
the provision of a suitable context. In the "cognitive" stage, however,
the "context" for the interpretation of new information is recognised
to be the whole of the processor's existing knowledge, or world
model.'s
The fact that scientific observation and experimentation takes
place within a framework of shared assumptions is a reflection of the
universally applicable conditions of perception. There is no "bird's
eye view", from which it is possible to develop a system of concepts
which match the pattern of reality. Our conceptual world forms a lens
through we which we observe the "real" world and there is no
possibility of guaranteed "objective" knowledge. It is possible to
distinguish between the empirical and the conceptual aspects of the
study of learning and knowledge, but not to treat them independently.
Empirical observation of the psychological processes by means of
which knowledge is acquired takes place within a framework of
philosophical assumptions. This framework, in its turn, includes an
implicit psychology of perception. Framework and observation interpret
and correct one another. In the course of the investigation as a whole
there is a dialectical succession of priority between the two aspects
of the study, the empirical and the conceptual. 2° Neither philosophy
nor psychology is capable unaided of supplying a solution. They are
complementary and correlative aspects of a single field, the study of
cognition.
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2.The Contribution of the Knower 
The study of learning involves a number of cognitive processes,
including perception, recognition, comprehension and memory. While all
these processes are related, it is perception which is fundamental.
Perception is the point of contact between the mind and the outside
world. As Ulric Neisser puts it, "Perception is where cognition and
reality meet."21
In psychology, the study of perception consistently demonstrates
the active contribution of the perceiver to play a crucial and integral
role. In the words of Sir Frederic Bartlett, perception can be shown
to involve an "effort after meaning". 22 In his experiments, Bartlett
made use of a piece of equipment known as a tachistoscope. This is
used to present subjects in an experiment with a variety of images for
small fractions of a second. Usually, the exposure is repeated until
the subject recognises the image correctly, and the number of
exposures required noted. The tachistoscope parallels the condition of
uncertainty of which we are sometimes aware in everyday life, in
situations such as hallucination or the "bent stick" in water, and is
thus particularly well suited to demonstrate the way subjects react to
this kind of uncertainty.
In his experiments, Bartlett found a consistent tendency by
subjects to assimilate the information presented to their twn
expectations or preconceptions. A particular pattern of lines so
readily evoked an aeroplane that practically all the participants
overlooked the "error" in the accompanying words: "An Airoplaxe",
reporting them as "An Aeroplane". The only subject who did not make
this error was a man who failed to recognise the drawing as
representational in any way. A picture of a notice board by a gate
suggested to 80% of observers the words, "Trespassers Will Be
Prosecuted", although in practice the lettering was too small to be
distinguishable. This almost universal tendency for subjects to assign
meaning to an image on the basis of a global impression or salient
detail and to reconstruct the image on the basis of the meaning thus
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assigned, Bartlett called the "effort after meaning". He concluded
that, "a great amount of what is said to be perceived is in fact
inferred," that the report of a perception is, in fact, most likely to
be an inferential construction.
The "effort after meaning" is also regularly observed in studies
in which subjects are presented with words and letters. If the image
consists of about 25 random letters, only four or five are usually
recalled after a short exposure. If the 25 letters are arranged into
four or five words, what is recalled is usually two or three words, or
about 10-15 letters in total. If 25 letters are presented in the form
of a meaningful phrase then it is likely that the whole phrase will be
successfully recalled. The explanation for these results is that
subjects bring to the experimental task a large amount of "tacit
knowledge", remembered information previously derived from experience
and organised for the comprehension of new experience. In the case of
this experiment, it is the ability to read which enables participants
to absorb more information from the meaningful presentations than
from the random letters. The average printed page contains, in fact,
an enormous amount of redundant information. The skill of effective
reading consists of the ability to extract the important cues, the key
words and sentences, and use these to reconstruct the sense of the
rest 23
A similar situation has been observed in studies using chess
players. De Groot and, following him, Chase and Simon discovered that
the difference between a master, a good player and a beginner consists
not in the ability of the better players to see further ahead nor to
consider more possible moves. In fact, the masters frequently
considered less moves. The difference in ability was not related to
logical, deductive processes, but to perceptual familiarity. The only
significant difference was found to be the ability of the master to
reconstruct a given state of play from memory after an exposure of 5-
10 seconds far more effectively than either the good player or the
beginner. The explanation is analogous to Bartlett's "effort after
meaning". For the master, the game situation is more easily reducible
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to a coherent pattern of meaning on
amount of tacit, stored information
information presented in the form of
master both perceives and is able to
who is in turn more effective than
the basis of the vastly superior
derived from his experience. The
a chessboard is the same but the
recall more than the good player,
the beginner. This conclusion is
strengthened by the fact that in randomly arranged, meaningless
situations all three performed equally wel1.24
One of the most instructive experiments in this field was
performed as long ago as 1949 by Jerome Bruner and Leo Postman.25
Bruner and Postman's experiment demonstrates the importance of "set"
or expectancy on perception. They demonstrated not only that observers
are attentive, actively looking for meaning, but also that observers
typically resist the contradiction of their expectations, though not to
the point of irrationality. The experiment involved the presentation,
using a tachistoscope, of a number of playing cards, included amongst
which were a number of "trick" cards, a black 3 of hearts, a black 4
of hearts, a red 2 of spades, a red 6 of spades, a black Ace of
diamonds and a red 6 of clubs. Following the usual procedure in such
experiments, subjects were presented with the cards one by one in
exposures of increasing duration until they correctly recognised each
one. Not surprisingly, it took much longer, that is more exposures of
longer duration, for subjects to recognise the trick cards.
The most interesting outcome of this experiment, however, is the
different forms of failure to recognise the trick cards exhibited. One
common form was a dominance reaction in which either colour or, more
often, shape was dominant. Faced with a black 4 of hearts, subjects
would report seeing a 4 of spades or, more often a (red) 4 of hearts.
Another type of failure was the compromise reaction. A red 6 of spades
was reported, for example, as purple, brown, black on a reddish card,
rusty colour or "black but with redness somewhere".
It is a frequent experience that on coming across a mis-spelled
word one often struggles to remember the correct spelling. This type
of recognition failure, disruption, was also exhibited in the
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experiment. Not only did some subjects fail to recognise the anomalous
cards, but their expectations of normality were thrown into disarray.
One subject was reported as saying, "I can't make the suit out,
whatever it is. It didn't even look like a card that time. I don't know
what colour it is now or even whether it's a spade or a heart. I'm not
even sure now what a spade looks like!" When correct recognition did
take place, it was usually quite sudden. Previous expectations were
overturned and replaced by a new "set" in which anomalous cards were
allowed for and consequently recognised much more quickly.
The conclusion to be drawn from this and the other experiments
is that perception is an active as well as a passive process. There is
an "effort after meaning" by which observers utilise tacit knowledge
derived from previous experience in order to comprehend the present.
As Bruner and Postman put it, "Perceptual organisation is powerfully
determined by expectations built upon past commerce with the
environment."26 Where these expectations are violated, peception is
hindereNL27
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While Hume and, following him, the empiricists understood
perception largely as the passive contemplation or reception of
information from the environment, the experiments described in the
previous section have shown the importance of the active element in
perception. The problem is how these two apparently incompatible
viewpoints can be reconciled. As Neisser puts it,
There is a dialectical contradiction between these two requirements:
we cannot perceive unless we anticipate, but we must not see only what
we anticipate,"
How is the relation between the active and the passive elements in
perception to be understood?
Let us begin by viewing perception at its most basic level,
namely as a physical process. Human beings are dependent for the use
of their five senses on physical mechanisms, the eyes, ears, nose,
tongue and skin. In addition to these, there is a "sixth sense" of
great importance to perception, kinesthetic sense, or the ability to
monitor the position of the body. The use of this sense in
interpreting perceptual data is familiar from the experience of
travelling in a lift, or when on a train slowly leaving a station, it
is the platform or adjacent train which appears to be moving until the
sensation of acceleration is registered.
To take sight as an example of the physical aspect of perception,
information is received by the eye in the form of light waves.
However, the eye is not a kind of video-camera, passively recording a
constantly moving picture. The task of the eye is as an encoder. What
it does is to convert information in the form of light waves into
neural signals to be relayed to the brain. These signals are not sent
back in a constant stream, but in a series of impulses, and they are
then recoded by the brain to give the impression of an image.29
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The main problem for the mechanisms of perception is the problem
of limited capacity. This does not refer to the limitations of memory.
Of the capacity of long-term memory there is no known limit. The
bottleneck in capacity occurs in the area of short-term or working
memory. There is a limit to the amount of incoming information to
which we can actually attend at any given time. An example of the use
of short-term or working memory is when dialling an unfamiliar
telephone number. Most people can remember a number long enough to
dial it, but often the number is forgotten straight away and the need
to redial means we have to look it up once more (an inconvenience
catered for in the most recent models of telephone). This is because
longer-term storage requires extra effort.3° It has been recognised
for some time that the capacity of working memory is limited to about
seven items, but that these items can be of any size. For example, an
Isolated letter or digit makes up a single unit of memory, but so also
does a word, a phrase, a sentence even a whole narrative. A unit of
memory may be of any size so long as it contains within itself the
key to recovering all the information included in it.31
The organs of perception are being continually bombarded with
Information, far too much to make sense of at any one time. In the
face of this potential information overload, the brain is forced to be
selective, to attend to one thing and not another. To further assist
In the task of comprehension, the brain is able to maximise its
capacity by "chunking" or "unitising", storing information in the
largest possible meaningful units, in order to comprehend as much as
possible of the outside world. What the brain is looking for in
Incoming information is meaning, readily comprehensible units, not the
uninterpreted "red patch", but the bus, or even the No.57 bus.
Let us now return to the consideration of perception from the
psychological point of view, with the physical mechanisms in the
background. Perception involves two types of information processing,
data-driven and concept-driven processing. Data-driven processing is
what is involved in receiving the incoming information. This is
essentially an automatic physical and, to that extent, passive process.
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Light strikes the eye and causes a certain neural reaction. The
information acts as a stimulus, to which the organs of perception and
the brain respond. Concept-driven processing involves the deployment
of tacit knowledge in such a way as to generate a "set" or
expectation. In other words, it is essentially active, involving the
"effort after meaning". Incoming information acts not as a stimulus
but as a cue, to which the brain responds by offering an
interpretation. A complete act of perception must involve both active
and passive, both data-driven and concept-driven processes. Perception
is not simply a process of passive absorption; people frequently fail
actually to see what is there, as the playing card experiment makes
abundantly clear. But neither is perception simply active. This would
result in a sort of "controlled hallucination" in which perception was
governed entirely by expectation. What is required is a balance
between data-driven and concept-driven processing, in which perceptual
meaning is neither exclusively derived from external stimuli nor
totally supplied by the subject but arises as a result of interaction
between the active and passive side of the process.32
As long ago as 1951, Jerome Bruner proposed that perception be
understood as a process of "hypothesis" and confirmation. Els theory
was intended to "make room for the perceiver", that is, to allow for
the active contribution of the perceiver and to account for individual
differences, the fact that very rarely do individuals perceive the same
situation alike. Bruner's theory explained perception as the outcome of
three steps:
1. The preformed "set" of the observer, governed by a series of
task demands. This generates a "hypothesis", or broad range of
expectations about what is likely to be perceived.
2. Input of information, understood not as stimulus, but as cue.
3. The checking, confirmation or modification of the original
hypothesis, or expectation.33
Bruner's "hypothesis" is a determining tendency or cognitive
predisposition, a generalised state of readiness for a range of
responses, related to a broad range of expectations. The hypothesis
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will vary in "strength" according to a number of factors, including
the frequency of past confirmation, the number of possible
alternatives and the possible consequences for other strong
expectations and for the particular goals of the perceiver of its
being upset. The stronger the hypothesis, the less the information
needed to confirm it. It requires less mental readjustment to recognise
a bus coming round the street corner than, for example, an elephant.
The role of tacit knowledge in perception is thus as a generator of
expectations, of readiness to respond in certain ways. But it is the
environment itself which is the final arbiter of the validity of the
perceptual hypothesis.
More recently, Ulric Neisser, in a departure from his earlier
views, has put forward a theory of perception very similar to
Bruner's.34 Neisser uses the term "schema", following Bartlett, Who in
turn derived it from the work of Sir Henry Head. Bartlett describes
schemata in the following way:
'Schema" refers to an active organisation of past reactions, or of
past experiences, which must always be supposed to be operating in any
well-adapted organic response, That is, whenever there is any order or
regularity of behaviour, a particular response is possible only
because it is related to other similar responses which have been
serially organised, yet which operate, not simply as individual
members coming one after another, but as a unitary mass, Determination
by schemata is the most fundamental of all the ways in which we can be
influenced by reactions and experiences which occurred in the past,
All incoming impulses of a certain kind, or mode, go together to build
up an active, organised setting; visual, auditory, various types of
cutaneous impulses and the like, at a relatively low level; all the
experiences connected by a common interest; in sport, in literature,
history, art, science, philosophy, and so on, on a higher level,"
The function of schemata in Neisser's theory is similar to that of
Bruner's hypotheses. They serve as predispositions, or organised
expectations, directing exploration of the environment and modified by
the information received. The schema directs exploration of the
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environment, samples the information available and is modified in turn
in order to respond to what is found.
Tacit knowledge is to be understood as organised in the form of
"schemata". A schema provides the setting or context for the
comprehension of incoming information. It is, therefore, as the playing
card experiment nicely demonstrates, predisposed toward certain
expectations, based on the regularity of previous experience in a
given area. The "settings" which form the content of a given schema
are extremely varied. Bartlett speaks of a number of levels, from
types of perceptual organisation to common interests, such as history
or art. A schema might represent a situation or task, such as one's
route to work, or a visit to the dentist. Earlier, we spoke of the
ability to read as a unit of tacit knowledge, a schema, and this
suggests that the ability to speak a given language is also to be
understood as a schema. In any particular situation, a number of
schemata are likely to be found operating together. One's route to
work, for example, may involve the skill of driving a car and the
ability to read the road signs as well as the knowledge of how to get
there. In addition, one may be listening to the car radio, deploying
one's schemata for the understanding of music, drama or news events,
and performing the other tasks, semi-automatically. Finally, the theory
of interaction makes it clear that schemata are continually modified.
One may think of the normal individual as continuously looking for
information to make a given schema more effective. All experience is
potentially a lesson for the future. It becomes so by incorporation
into the active settings by which the past is organised and the
present comprehended.
One of the most important features of the process of perception
so described is its intentional nature. The deployment of schemata is,
for the most part, entirely unconscious. It becomes conscious in cases
of ambiguity, such as the attempt to make sense of a Gestalt figure,
or in cases of consciously directed attention. But the unconscious
processes of the "perceptual cycle" are nevertheless intentionally
deployed, toward the extraction of potential meaning from the
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situation and the achievement of the goals of stability, coherence and
comprehensibility of the environment. 36 These unconscious processes
take place within a matrix of more or less conscious orientations, the
choices of goal and plans for action by which we live our lives. The
interaction of data-driven and concept-driven processes reflects the
ongoing dynamic interaction between organism and environment, person
and world.
If perception is to be understood as interaction, learning must
be understood in the same way. Another important feature of schemata
Is that they are learned. Perception does not take place in isolation
from other cognitive processes. Interaction supplies a broad framework
in which the tension between active and passive elements in perception
Is resolved. It does so by linking perception with all the other
cognitive processes, including recognition, comprehension and memory,
in such a way as to make them all part of one continuous process of
response to the environment, the outcome of which is learning.
Interaction requires intentionality as the origin of the active
contribution of the perceiver. This is to say that perception and
learning are to be understood in the context of the realisation of
particular goals and purposes.
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Cgeaning and Intentionality
The theory of interaction proposed here involves two assumptions:
1. The cognitive processes involved in learning, including
perception, recognition, comprehension and memory, are dependent in
some way on physical mechanisms, those of the brain and the organs of
perception.
2. The way these processes are employed demonstrates purpose or
intentionality, whether conscious or unconscious.
In this section, it will be necessary to consider further the
relationship between intentionality and physical processes.
The first point to be made is that intentionality can be
effectively modelled by physical processes. The simplest model of an
intentional world-view, that is an arrangement of tacit knowledge
geared to a specific purpose, is a thermostat. This is to say that a
thermostat exhibits "behaviour" based on the interpretation of specific
information. The minimum requirements for the physical modelling of
purposive behaviour are:
1. a transducer, to convert the particular information required,
in this case the temperature of the environment, into a signal (ie. a
model of perception).
2. short-term memory, the ability to hold the information on
which the response is to be based.
3. long-term memory, which processes the information held in
short-term memory.
4. output - "communication" or "behaviour".
The thermostat is designed to "perceive" the temperature of its
environment and to represent this information in terms of the state of
the mechanism. Its long-term memory consists of the programme, which
specifies the temperature at which it is to operate, and its
"behaviour" is to switch on and off at the appropriate state of the
mechanism. A thermostat, therefore, exhibits purpose, namely to keep
its surroundings at a given temperature, mediated through a world-
model represented by the physical mechanism.37
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If the thermostat is an example of a simple physical model of a
world-view, the computer is probably the most sophisticated, and
capable of comparison with the human mind. Artificial Intelligence, the
modelling by computer of mental processes, in which the focus of
attention is on the performance of the computer, has led rapidly to
Cognitive Science, in which computational models are used to
understand human cognitive functioning. It is at this point that the
problem of the relationship of intentionality to physical systems, the
old mind-brain problem, occurs in its most acute form. Can
Intentionality be completely explained in terms of physical processes?
Can the mind be "reduced" to the status of epiphenomenon of the
working of the brain?
Like the computer, the mind is a processor of information. And,
like the computer, the information to be processed exists in two
forms, or can be described at two levels. At one level, "information"
describes the physical state of the mechanism - the pattern of
neurons in the brain or the state of the electrical connections in the
computer. At another level the information exists in the form of
symbols which represent elements of the outside world. In psychology,
the two levels are brain and mind; in computing they are the levels of
"hardware" and "software". The relationship of brain and mind is thus
analogous to that between hardware and software in computing. This
relation is also analogous to that between description and meaning.
Information fed into the machine is a description of something. At the
software level, it is a symbolic description of the same kind as an
ordinary language. But if the software may be said to represent that
of which it is a description, so also may the state of the machine.
The electrical state of the machine also constitutes a "model" of the
state of affairs described in the programme. e The question, "Is the
phenomenon of the mind to be understood in terms of the physical
functioning of the brain?" can also be expressed, "Is there a level of
meaning expressed in the software or semantic level of a computer
which cannot be reduced to the terms of the physical syntax of the
machine?"39
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It was the programme of logical positivism which attempted to
reduce meaning to description by proposing the idea of an ideal
language in which the logical relation between states of affairs would
be exactly reflected. The effect of the success of this programme
would have been to reduce the experience of meaning to grammatical
syntax in much the same way as it is proposed, by the proponents of
"strong Al", to reduce it to the physical relations of the computer.
The conclusion already reached is that this programme has failed.40
 It
is, ironically, Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-allosophicus, one of
the chief inspirations of logical positivism, which demonstrates its
impossibility.
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein put forward his "picture theory" of
meaning, in which he maintained that language is to be understood as
picturing reality. Language is made up either of "logical atoms" which
have a one-to-one correspondence with the reality they describe or
else, as in the normal state of affairs, of complex statements, which
need to be analysed into logical atoms. Thus, the Tractatus was a
perfect expression of Quine's "two dogmas". The logical atoms were
intended to refer to immediate experience, and the relationships
between them to picture the logical structure of reality. Despite the
enthusiasm with which the Tractatus was received, however,
Wittgenstein soon began to have his doubts about it. He was, in fact,
unable to produce a single example of a logical atom, but perhaps more
important than this practical failure to implement the programme, the
Tractatus contains within it the seeds of its own destruction. On the
last page of the book, Wittgenstein writes:
Anyone who understands my propositions recognises them as nonsensical,
when he has used them - as steps - to climb up beyond them, (He must,
so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it,)
He must transcend these propositions and then he will see the world
aright,4'
What Wittgenstein means by these enigmatic statements is that
although it is possible to assume that language pictures reality, it is
impossible for language to picture this assumption, to picture the
relation between language and reality. His statements are meaningless,
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therefore, because, like morals and metaphysics, they all fall within
the area which it is impossible to express in the ideal language. It
has to be conceded that there remains in the province of meaning a
tacit element, namely the relation between propositions and the reality
to which they refer, which it is impossible to reduce to explicit
description.
There is in the experience of meaning more than can be
represented in language or symbolic relations. To return to the
comparison with the computer, the ability to understand the programme
requires an element of tacit knowledge, the experience of the relation
between symbols and the reality to which they refer, which is itself
irreducible to explicit description. On the analogy of this argument,
therefore, intention is more than can be exhausted by the working of a
physical system. Intentionality may be dependent on a physical
mechanism or organism for its expression, but it is not reducible to
the working of that mechanism or organism. The mind may be dependent
on the brain, as the computer's software is dependent for its correct
functioning on the set-up of the hardware. Moreover, the failure of the
underlying physical system in some way will impair the ability to
function meaningfully. But the characteristic of the psychological
level over against the physical is intentional representation, the
reference of symbols to reality. The relationship of representation to
reality is an element of tacit knowledge, irreducible to explicit
description.
The computer model of mental functioning is valid, therefore,
up to a point. It is valid to the extent that both computers and human
beings exhibit two levels of information processing, the syntactic,
dependent on physical causation, and the semantic or representational.
But in neither case can the two levels be simply equated or the one
reduced to the other. 42 Human intentionality is not reducible to its
physical base. To take an example once again from Wittgenstein, this
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time from his second philosophy, in the Philosophical Investigations
he asks,
If I raise my arm, what is left over if I subtract the fact that my
hand went up?"
The answer is, "The intention to raise my arm," "The fact that my arm
goes up" is a description of movement which has a variety of possible
causes. But "I raise my arm" is the description of an action. In
action, the intention to perform replaces the causal explanation.
Whereas movement may be explained by means of a chain of past causes,
the explanation for an action is the purpose in view; it lies in the
realm of meaning. If asked, "What are you doing?", a person normally
responds in terms not of the movements he is carrying out, but of the
purpose involved, not, "I am moving my arm," but, "I am hailing a
taxi." "What are you doing?" becomes, "What are you trying to achieve?"
As Stuart Hampshire points out, it is characteristic of agents that we
always know what we are doing. Even if immobile, we still direct our
thoughts."
To say that cognitive processes are intentional, therefore, is to
maintain that they cannot be adequately described in the Language of
physical causation appropriate to physical systems. The language
appropriate to the description of cognitive processes is the language
of action and intention. The understanding of cognitive processes is
dependent, therefore, on the concept of agency, a concept which will be
treated at a later stage,46
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CHAPTER THREE
Personal Knowledge
If understanding in general is to be viewed as the faculty of rules, judgement will
be the faculty of subsuming under rules; that is, of distinguishing whether
something does or does not stand under a given rule, General logic contains, and
can contain, no rules for judgement, For since general logic abstracts from all
content of knowledge; the sole task that remains to it is to give an analytical
exposition of the form of knowledge (as expressed] in concepts, in judgements and
in inferences, and so to obtain formal rules for all employment of
understanding„,And thus it appears that, though understanding is capable of being
instructed, and of being equipped with rules, judgement is a peculiar talent which
can be practised only, and cannot be taught, It is the specific quality of so-
called mother-wit and its lack no school can make good,„
A physician, a judge or a ruler may have at command many excellent
pathological, legal or political rules, even to the degree that he may become a
profound teacher of them, and yet, none the less, may easily stumble in their
application, For although admirable in understanding, he may be wanting in natural
power of judgement, He may comprehend the universal in abstract°, and yet not be
able to distinguish whether a case in concrete comes under it, Or the error may be
due to his not having received, through examples and actual practice, adequate
training for this particular act of judgement, Sharpening of the judgement is
indeed the one great benefit of examples, Correctness and precision of intellectual
insight, on the other hand, they more usually somewhat impair„,Examples are thus
the go-cart of judgement; and those who are lacking in the natural talent can never
dispense with them,
Immanuel Kant'
understanding a sentence means understanding a language,
Ludwig 4'ittgenstein2
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1:The Physical Basis of Tacit Knowledge
Learning is the outcome of a process of interaction between the
Individual and his environment. The information of all kinds with
which the individual is constantly bombarded as a result of his
transaction with the environment is comprehended by means of an
Interpretative setting in the form of "tacit knowledge", which is
itself the result of accumulated experience. Tacit knowledge is divided
into "schemata", of which there are a great variety, consisting of
areas of knowledge which "belong together", such as interests, tasks
or common situations. At the level of psychological process, therefore,
"learning" always involves the modification of schemata. It is this
process which is the subject of the present chapter.
Tacit knowledge may be understood at different levels or from
different points of view, the physical, the psychological and the
philosophical. Knowledge cannot be studied from a philosophical point
of view without reference to the psychological processes by which it
arises, and these psychological processes cannot be fully understood
without reference to their physical base. It is necessary, then, to
have in mind the physical basis of perception and knowledge. The term
"schema", which Bartlett used to describe the way tacit knowledge is
organised, was drawn from the work of Sir Henry Head, who used it to
refer to a physical mechanism. Head was interested in certain types of
brain damage. One important area of impairment he identified was the
lack of an "ongoing postural model", or continuous awareness of bodily
position. By contrast with certain brain damaged patients, Head was
able to identify as an important function of the brain the maintenance
of an ongoing model or representation of the current position of the
body. Such a model was, of course, holistically or globally organised,
consisting not of individual memory "traces", but of a single
representation continuously modified by a process of feed-back. Head
called this model a "schema". It forms an actively orientated
organisation of past reactions organised to form a setting for present
experience .3
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Thought of in this way, the schema is a kind of continuously
updated and highly flexible bodily memory. In an activity involving
bodily skill, such as in a game of tennis, no two movements are
exactly the same. Each backhand, forehand or overhead shot is a
variation on a theme. Any particular game involves a large number of
shots, no two exactly alike. The essence of a bodily skill, such as
tennis, Bartlett believed, was the use of the body's ongoing postural
model continually to update the awareness of the position of the body,
coupled with the outwardly-directed intention to play the ball in a
certain way. Although in the course of a practice session, it is
possible to "work on" a shot by consciously paying attention to the
coordination of the movements involved, during a game such movements
are almost always unconscious, although intentionally directed. There
is, therefore, in the performance of a skill, a considerable tacit
element. This involves "knowledge" held by the body in the form of
schemata, the content of which is incapable of reduction to explicit
description.4 Michael Polanyi gives several examples. In terms of
explicit description, the ability to stay on a bicycle can be defined
by a complicated mathematical formula. But it is quite unnecessary for
the would-be bicycle rider to learn that formula. What is learned is
the art of keeping one's balance. The knowledge represented explicitly
by the formula is comprehended tacitly in quite a different way. By
the same token, Polanyi argues, the knowledge of the expert chef is
more than can be set down in a cookery book, learning to drive
Involves much more than simply reading the manual, and competence in
scientific investigation is not reducible to the explicit analysis of
justification .s
Bartlett's earlier work on the mechanisms of memory can
fruitfully be compared with that of Polanyi. It was he who, in his
book, Personal Knowledge, and many subsequent publications, drew
attention to the important role of tacit knowledge. Polanyi proposed
that perception be understood not as the passive contemplation of
objects but as a motor skill. Significantly, he used the sense of
touch, rather than sight, as paradigmatic for the understanding of
perception as a whole. With touch, the active, exploratory role of the
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perceiver is much more obvious than with sight or hearing. One
example he frequently repeated was the use of a stick in the dark or
by a blind man to feel one's way. The particulars of immediate
sensation are the movements of the stick, but the user is interpreting
these movements and the degree of resistance they indicate to identify
the unseen features of the surrounding environment. Polanyi used the
terms "proximal" and "distal" for the separate levels, contexts of
meaning or objects of attention. The "distal" term is the object of
exploration, the walls and floor of the surroundings. The "proximal"
term is the particulars of the movements of the stick. The user's
attention is directed "away" from the particulars of the "proximal"
term towards their joint meaning given by the "distal" term. By means
of this "from-to" structure of attention and inference, the particulars
are integrated and given meaning by the object of attention. The stick
becomes an extension of the user's body. The sensations conveyed by it
become a part of tacit knowledge; they are assimilated to the
structure of the sense of touch and used to comprehend the features of
the surface in the same way as a hand might be used. The meaning of
the particulars lies in what they jointly convey. To concentrate on the
particulars of the proximal term is to lose sight of the distal term,
and with it the meaning of the whole, in much the same way as a
proof-reader ceases to read for the meaning of the text in order to
concentrate on the details of the type.6
Tacit knowledge, therefore, has a physical basis. The body, says
Polanyi, is the one thing of which we are never normally aware as an
object.' In our knowledge of things, the body is always subject. The
tacit clues integrated in perception are bodily clues. Just as the
stick becomes an extension of the body, the whole apparatus of tacit
knowledge is an extension of the perceptual skills of the body. As the
body is "indwelt", says Polanyi, so, metaphorically, tacit knowledge is
indwelt. It becomes a tool for interpreting experience and the ability
to interpret experience is, like tacit knowledge, a skill. A skill has
no sharply definable boundaries or limits. It is the capacity to deal
with a relatively indefinite range of objects in a relatively
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indefinite range of ways. The skills involved in knowing always
involve more than can be reduced to description.
Tacit knowledge, then, is originally bodily knowledge. Memory
arises from bodily feed-back mechanisms. Tacit knowledge is "indwelt"
as the body is indwelt. The subject, which forms the fundamental
element in tacit knowledge, is essentially the embodied subject. It may
be that this provides a sufficient explanation of why such concepts as
causation and substance, without being derivable from experience, are
nevertheless present in all experience. We experience our bodies as
substance and as causes. It is also, perhaps, the bodily nature of
subjectivity which explains the priority of the global in perception
and comprehension, the reason why it is the whole which is the
primary level of meaning in any given context or situation, and the
particulars are to be understood by means of their relation to the
meaning of the whole. The body forms an original unity, integrating
the diverse particulars of sensation into a single meaningful
awareness of the present situation.°
Because we are embodied beings, the physical, psychological and
philosophical aspects of knowledge are all inter-related. A schema is
to be understood, therefore, in three different ways:
a) as a neural feed-back mechanism, for equipping an organism to
respond discriminatingly to the environment.
b) as the mechanism of memory: it organises the past in such a
way as to provide a framework for the comprehension of the present
situation.
C) as the unit of tacit knowledge: which, as we shall see, is
organised in a quite different way from the explicit knowledge with
which we are familiar.
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2.The Cognitive Domain: Exemplars 
A schema is the basic unit of memory and of tacit knowledge. It
is both the means by which knowledge resulting from past experience
is stored and by which it is made available in the present for the
comprehension of new experience. Within the cycle of interaction by
which information is perceived, understood and remembered for future
reference, schemata have a number of related functions.
1. A schema provides a conceptual framework to enable comprehension
and thus the assimilation of new information.
In any given act of comprehension, there will usually be a number
of schemata operating at once. In reading a book, for example, the
activity of reading depends entirely on the schema for reading, the
ability to extract meaning from print. This not inconsiderable
achievement must operate entirely unconsciously so as not to get in
the way of the real task, which is to understand the particular text.
But assimilating the information in the text depends on another
schema, that which expresses the reader's prior understanding of the
subject area. If the area is entirely unfamiliar, the reader may begin
by picking up information at random and endeavouring to make sense of
it by the use of some other related area which he or she understands
better. But quite early in the process the random pieces of
information begin to acquire some shape of their own, a rudimentary
understanding of the subject begins to form and a new schema is born.
The schema then begins to provide an outline of the subject, and new
information is assimilated to and helps to fill in the gaps in that
outline.
2. A schema generates a series of anticipations or expectations which
direct the understanding.
?lost people notice that as they become more familiar with a
subject, their speed of reading increases. The greater the familiarity
of a given subject, the more efficient is our comprehension. This is
because the schema, by providing a framework for comprehension,
actually guides the search for new information. It closes off
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alternatives which we grow to recognise are less likely. New
information begins to become more "predictable". This is why a good
writer must always clearly signal, by the way he introduces it,
information which is novel, which disrupts or goes beyond the
framework of understanding he expects of the reader.
The role of schemata in providing both a framework of
understanding and an expectation of what is coming next is seen more
clearly still in fiction. Take, for example, the following three
sentences:
1.Mary heard the ice-cream van coming.
2. She remembered her pocket-money.
3. She rushed into the house.
The fact that these three sentences describe a comprehensible sequence
of events is due to the role of schemata. These supply the facts which
are required as essential background, that people like ice-cream, that
ice-cream is bought with money and that money is often kept in
houses.9 In addition, we expect a story. We expect that the three
sentences will have something to do with each other, and on the basis
of this expectation we construct for ourselves a context which
includes motives and feelings. If, in place of "ice-cream man" and
"money", we were to read "teacher" and "homework", the motives and
feelings supplied might be very different. What is true in the case of
reading is also true in the comprehension of situations in life. Here
too, experience must be assimilated to a pattern of meaning before it
can make sense.
3. Schemata guide actions.
A visit to the dentist, for example, consists of a typical
sequence of events. After a few visits, we construct a schema, which
specifies the need to make an appointment, to check in a few minutes
before the appointment is due, to wait in the waiting room, to bring
something to read if we don't want to be bored, etc. The schema
supplies rules for actions and decisions, such as "If it goes on
hurting, contact the dentist". It also tells us the way the dentist is
supposed to carry out his role - firmly but with sympathy without
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being too apologetic, making light conversation but nothing too
personal, and so on. In this way schemata enable us to cope with life
by reducing its unpredictability and giving us a modicum of confidence
and control of our own destiny - even in the dentist's chairP°
Learning takes place whenever a schema is modified to take
account of a new situation or of new aspects of an already familiar
situation. Conversely, learning is to be understood as the modification
of schemata, and it is something which is taking place all the time.
The psychology of learning will be concerned, therefore, with the way
In which schemata change. But before we can study the way schemata
change, we need to know what they are like. The question at issue is
the way knowledge is represented in the mind. A schema is a "data
structure". If we want to know the form in which knowledge is stored,
what knowledge "looks like" in its tacit form, then the answer is to
be found in terms of the "structure" of schemata, the way in which
specific items of information are related to one another within the
overall schema.
Before embarking on the analysis of schemata, however, two
distinctions must be made:
1. A distinction between the form in which knowledge is
represented and the means by which it is processed. Tacit knowledge
may be understood either as a product, by concentrating on the way it
Is organised, or as a process, by looking at the way it is used. In
practice, this distinction is difficult to maintain, since schemata are
actively organised data structures in which the means of processing is
actually included in the way the knowledge is represented. However, it
Is important to bear the distinction in mind, so that, in
concentrating on the form in which tacit knowledge is represented, we
are not led to think of it as simply inert or reproductive.
2. A distinction between the cognitive or intellectual aspect of
mental functioning and the affective or emotional domain. In the
section to follow, we shall be concentrating on the purely cognitive
aspect of knowledge representation, but this is not to forget the
powerful effects of emotion on cognitive activity familiar from
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everyday life. Later in the chapter, it will be necessary to examine in
greater detail the affective domain and its relation with the
cognitive.
3. A question which emerges from the consideration of these two
distinctions is, What is the relationship between them? Is it possible
to divide the cognitive and affective domains of intelligence along
the same lines as the product and process aspects of cognitive
functioning, to see the form of representation as the cognitive aspect
and to identify affective factors supplying the motivation or mental
drive for the various acts of processing, such as recall and
comprehension? Such a simple division of function is to be avoided.
Just as representation and processing go hand in hand, so we shall
find both cognitive and affective elements on both sides of the
distinction.
A major contribution to the understanding of the way knowledge
is represented in the mind comes from the work of Thomas Kuhn."
Kuhn's central concern is the form of knowledge shared by a given
scientific community. His starting point is the assumption that what
defines a scientific community is the knowledge it holds in common.
Conversely, any group which holds a given body of knowledge as common
property is a scientific community. Such communities exist at
different levels, from all scientists, down through all biologists or
all physicists, to all nuclear physicists, to all working in a given
specialist field, to a particular laboratory team. Kuhn's concern was
to discover the form in which the knowledge which provides the
community's cohesion and identity is held, and the way in which it is
passed on to or learned by the novices or apprentices within the
community.
Explicitly, this knowledge consists in a set of formalisms, or
symbolic generalisations. Kuhn gives the example from physics, f=ma.
Another famous example might be e=mc-2. Apprenticeship in the
scientific community consists of the learning of these generalisations
and their application to concrete scientific problems. But it was at
this point that Kuhn found again and again that his students'
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understanding broke down. Having read and understood the text-book's
explanation of a new topic, they were, nevertheless, frequently unable
to do the example problems at the end of the chapter. The theoretical
relations were perfectly clear and coherent; it was their application
to reality which was causing problems. A full understanding of the
concept required more than the ability to manipulate certain formal
rules. It required also the ability to apply these rules to experience,
and this, Kuhn concluded, did not come automatically with the
understanding of the rules. Complete comprehension includes the
application of the tacit element in knowledge, the ability to "see" the
way the rules relate to experience.12
What Kuhn found was that students were frequently able to do the
problems they found so difficult, not by simply applying the rules
they had learned, but by spotting a resemblance between the new
problem and an old, familiar one. The problems given in textbooks, he
pointed out, are frequently variations on a few standard examples or
"exemplars". Students extend their knowledge, not simply by learning
new symbolic generalisations, but by increasing their stock of
exemplars. This is done by making connections between them, by
observing points of similarity, and so by extending the old, familiar
exemplar, by small steps, to cover new situations.
The student discovers, with or without the assistance of his
instructor, a way to see his problem as like a problem he has already
encountered, Having seen the resemblance, grasped the analogy between
two or more distinct problems, he can interrelate symbols and attach
them to nature in the ways that have proved effective before, The law-
sketch, say fmaa, has functioned as a tool, informing the student what
similarities to look for, signalling the gestalt in which the
situation is to be seen, The resultant ability to see a variety of
situations as like each other, as subjects for f=sa or some other
symbolic generalization, is, I think, the main thing a student
acquires by doing exemplary problems, whether with a pencil and paper
or in a well-designed laboratory,"
Kuhn went on to describe instances of scientific progress which came
about through the application of a generalisation originally worked
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out in one area to a new area of investigation. He gave as an example
the extension of the principle first worked out for the pendulum first
to an inclined plane and then to problems in hydraulics.14
An "exemplar" is a form of knowledge in its own right. In fact,
Kuhn hypothesises that the difference between scientific communities,
particularly between closely related communities, is a difference of
exemplars. Each community shares a slightly different set of working
examples which comprises its basic working knowledge. The ability to
acquire an exemplar, to add it to the stock of one's working
knowledge, depends on the perception of a similarity relationship. The
student learning to solve a novel problem is not so much applying
explicit rules from symbolic generalisations to particular examples as
looking for a familiar pattern in an otherwise jumbled or incoherent
scene. The student's situation is similar to that of the radar
operator, searching for a meaningful pattern of signals against a
background of "noise". But the ability to perceive such similarity is
independent of and prior to any explicit rules specifying similarity
with respect to what. The analogical sensitivity, or ability to spot
similar patterns is, Kuhn maintains, original, prior to explicit
formalisation.
Having established the relevance of exemplars to scientific
knowledge, Kuhn goes on to explore their place in everyday life.' s A
young child learns, by means of ostensive definition, how to group the
objects of experience into categories, how to differentiate water-
birds, for example, into the separate categories of ducks, geese, and
swans. In the course of this learning, he acquires the expectation of
being able to sort objects into "natural families", distinct categories
separated from neighbouring families by a "perceptual space". He
learns to expect to be able to place any new object in one of these
families, and not to find a bird half-way between duck and swan. The
existence of natural categories as a basic form of cognitive
organisation has been confirmed by the work of Eleanor Rosch and
associates. "Bird", for example, is a category with a large number of
members, grouped into sub-categories. Some of these, she found, are
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generally thought of as prototypical of the overall categories. In the
case of birds, robins are usually recognised as prototypical, while
chickens, although still classified as birds, are more peripheral
members. While distinct, however, natural categories are also open-
ended. Rosch found disagreement over whether pumpkins, for example,
ought to be classified as fruits or leeches as insects. 16 In different
cultures, there will be different "natural" distinctions. It is well
known that Eskimoes recognise 15 diferent varieties of what we simply
call "snow". Understood in this way, concepts are essentially "open-
textured". They are not firmly bounded by explicit definition, but
gradually and pragmatically organised by the accumulation of
experience.
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3."Frames" and the Structure of Schemata
For the further development of these ideas, it is necessary to
turn to the field of artificial intelligence, and in particular to a
paper by Marvin Minsky in which he introduces the idea of "framesu.'7
The particular subject of the paper is the use of computers to
simulate visual processes, but its potential application is much wider,
since what Minsky does is to propose a theoretical framework by which
to understand the way the knowledge required for the simulation of
vision is represented. What Minsky calls "frames" are comparable,
therefore, with exemplars or schemata, and Minsky explicitly states
that his work is to be seen as an attempt, in the tradition of both
Kuhn and Bartlett, to investigate the representation of knowledge in
memory.' s A "frame" is a data structure which represents a given
stereotyped situation. It includes certain types of information, in
particular information about how the frame itself is to be used,
expectations of what is likely to happen in a given situation and
possible alternatives in the case of these expectations not being
fulfilled.
The basis of the frame, in Minsky's terminology the "top level",
Is the information which is always true of the situation to which the
frame relates, such that if the expectations specified by this
information are not fulfilled, the frame is rejected and a new one
sought. In a frame for a room, for example, walls, floor and a ceiling
are mandatory. If they fail to appear, then the expectation, on opening
a door, of finding a room on the other side must be revised: a coal-
cellar, perhaps, or else a roof-garden. Similarly, if a restaurant is
expected, but no chairs or tables found, expectation switches to
something related, perhaps a bar or disco. Items at "lower levels",
however, are not specified. A room may be decorated and furnished in a
variety of different ways, according to its function. The frame for a
room leaves such items to be filled in, and they may serve as clues to
the function of the room in question. Conversely, expectations about
the function of a room lead to expectations about the appropriate
furniture and decor. Such expectations are termed "default
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assignments", items of information about the setting or situation
sketched in according to expectation rather than observation. We are
reminded here of Bartlett's experiments on perception, in which he
found subjects supplying missing information according to their sense
of what was appropriate. 19 Having discovered the bathroom on the
upstairs floor of a house, for example, we normally assume the other
rooms to be bedrooms with fair degree of probability. However, other
possibilities, based on past experience, are also supplied by the
frame, with varying degrees of probability. A study may have a high
probability, or a model railway layout, depending on what we know of
the occupant; an indoor swimming-pool is highly unlikely.20
The main problem of human cognition is the complexity of the
world. In order to understand at all, it is necessary to simplify, to
reduce the enormous range of experience to easily manageable
proportions, while remaining sufficiently flexible to deal effectively
with the novel and unexpected. This is what frames achieve. A frame
represents a portion of reality by stereotyping it, by specifying as
many as possible of the constant relationships while leaving the less
Important elements to be filled in. The basic level is relatively
inflexible with respect to the particulars and the relations which
make it up. A children's party is thus differentiated from an office
party, a street party or a house party. Each of these typical
situations or settings then generates a series of expectations for the
relevant variables, such as dress, food, entertainment, behaviour,
number of participants and so on. Stereotyping is thus similar to
"unitising"? The single unit which comprises a large amount of
related information performs the same function as the frame. It is a
device for bringing as much tacit knowledge as possible to the
comprehension of a given situation, within the limits of the capacity
of human intelligence. The frame thereby combines maximum flexibility
with a stable overall framework.
The degree of stability required of one's overall mental world
and the degree of flexibility one is able to tolerate will vary both
from individual to individual and within the same individual in
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different situations and at different periods of their life. In a
similar way, default assignments are open to individual peculiarities.
As Minsky observes,
Such default assignments would have subtle idiosyncratic influences on
the paths an individul would tend to follow in making analogies,
generalisations and judgements, especially when the exterior
influences on such choices are weak, Properly chosen, such stereotypes
could serve as a store-house of valuable heuristic plan-skeletons;
badly selected, they could form paralysing collections of irrational
biases ,22
Like exemplars, it is clear that frames are a description of the
cognitive aspect of what we began by calling schemata. Later papers in
this tradition of Al take up Minsky's ideas under a variety of
terminology, including "scripts" and "memory organisation packets",
but the terminology of "schemata" occupies a central position.23
Having dealt with Minsky's original paper in his own terminology, we
will, therefore, revert to the use of "schema". As Minsky makes clear,
frames or schemata are to be seen as parts of larger systems.
Schemata are both capable of division into sub-schemata and
themselves embed in larger dominating schemata.
For example, the schema GIVE has three basic elements:
GIVER, GIFT and RECIPIENT.
Each of these is a schema in itself.
Thus GIFT includes, as well as GIVE,
BUY	 and	 WRAPPING.
BUY includes, not only SHOP, or some variation specified in the
schema, but also	 MONEY,
with all the intricate ramifications associated with it.
The schemata, GIVE and GIFT are also controlled by the relevant
dominating schema, such as
CHRISTMAS, BIRTHDAY or WEDDING.
At the same time, GIVE is a variety of action, and is therefore
controlled by the more basic schema, DO. DO includes specific
variables such as
CAUSE and EFFECT, PURPOSE and RESULT,
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which must be specifically instantiated in the case of GIVE.24
Schemata are thus related to one another in a variety of ways. It is
not simply a case of a hierarchy of levels, or the embedding of one
schema within another, GIFT, for example, within GIVE. The relations
between schemata are multi-dimensional, these relations themselves
specified by more abstract schemata.
A further problem is the mode of representation of knowledge by
means of schemata. In giving schemata the titles, GIVE, GIFT and so
on, it might seem to imply that knowledge is represented in verbal
form. It has also been suggested that the mode of representation
•develops gradually through stages, from purely physical or "sensori-
motor", through images to the final stage of symbolic
representation.29 Neither images nor symbols are sufficient by
themselves, however. As Kant pointed out, the schema for a triangle
requires a much richer conceptual representation than the image of a
given triangle. It must be capable of generating the image of any
possible triangle. 29 In the chessboard experiment, described in the
previous chapter, the visual image was the same for all three
participants, but one had a much richer conceptual representation of
the meaningful games. Behind both pictorial and symbolic expression of
knowledge is propositional or conceptual representation. What is meant
here by "propositional" is not a given set of words but the conceptual
content expressed by those words. This content might have been
expressed by a variety of different sentences. Indeed, the composition
of a sentence usually involves a considerable narrowing down of the
potential meaning in the writer's or speaker's mind. It is possible to
know in conceptual form "more than we can tell", more than we have the
vocabulary to describe.27 It has been shown that children learn their
first language, not by learning a string of fixed word meanings, but
by first conceptualising a given situation and learning subsequently
to describe their pre-verbal conceptualisation in words. 29 This means
that, rather than remaining fixed, word meanings change in the course
of intellectual development. The learning of shared ranges of meaning
attached to words becomes the most powerful way in which the child's
intellect is socialised. 29 The representation of knowledge in the mind
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is thus closer to a description of an image than to an image pure and
simple, and it is this which accounts for the bewildering multi-
dimensionality of the relations between schemata.
The representation of tacit knowledge is, therefore, entirely
different from that of explicit knowledge. Explicit knowledge relies on
images or verbal propositions, while tacit knowledge is represented at
a more basic, pre-verbal, conceptual level. Kuhn wishes to make the
point that the relation between categories or exemplars is one of
similarity. Connections are made by means of the perception of
similarity, prior to and independent of any formal rules to specify in
what the similarity lies. First comes the analogical connection, then
the formal rule expressing the relation. Tacit knowledge, therefore,
does not require definitions or correspondence rules. Kuhn extends his
example of the classification of ducks, geese and swans to make this
point. To add to the cognitive representation of swans, as members of
a natural family defined simply by experience, an explicit definition
to the effect that "all swans are white" imposes rigidity on the
category by placing a boundary around it to exclude anything not
white. This rigidity adds nothing to the concept of "swan" which is
not already achieved by the perceptual space between it and other
types of birds, but it does make the category less useful as a
heuristic device for future experience. The discovery of what appears
to be a black swan forces the person for whom this rule is an
integral part of the concept either to abandon "swan" as a natural
category or to announce the discovery of a new family.3°
The effect of such rules, which are a feature of explicit
knowledge, is to distinguish between universals and particulars and
between form and content. The definition sets up a universal ("white"),
and adds a rule specifying its relation ("all") to the particular
("swans"). In contrast to the flexible, open-textured nature of tacit
knowledge, explicit knowledge is formalised by the division of formal,
universalisable properties, such as attributes, from the particular
content to which these universals (contingently) apply. Tacit
knowledge combines form and content in "natural" families, the
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representation of whose relationships is necessarily multi-
dimensional, to form the basis of a flexible "model" of reality.
Although necessary for hypothetical construction, form and content
are, therefore, abstractions from the underlying form of tacit
knowledge, which is essentially concrete.
"The logic of tacit inference" is thus essentially different from
that of explicit inference, because the form of representation of tacit
knowledge is different from that of explicit knowledge.3  We can
express this in a number of ways:
1. Whereas explicit knowledge requires a distinction between form
and content, universals and particulars, these distinctions do not
apply to tacit knowledge.
2. Whereas explicit knowledge is static, tacit knowledge is
always in process. Explicit knowledge is like a single frame from a
film compared, not with the film, but with the real thing.
3. Tacit knowledge is multi-dimensional. As a comparison, when we
use a word in a sentence, we qualify its meaning by its context. On
its own, the word has not only several possible meanings, but infinite
shades of meaning, nuances, personal associations etc. Explicit
knowledge is like a dictionary definition, while tacit knowledge is
like a person's accumulated experience of the use of the word.
The process of learning has two aspects, assimilation and
accommodation.32 In the course of interaction, new knowledge is
assimilated to the structure of the schema. In order to learn
something new, the learner must do something to the new knowledge. To
be learned, knowledge must be changed by assimilation to the schemata
of the learner. Not only is the new knowledge changed, however, but
the schema is also changed in order to accommodate the new knowledge.
Learning changes the learner. In general, there are three possible
stategies for dealing with new information:
1. Ignore it. This may be the result of a conscious decision. The
information may be deemed irrelevant or uninteresting. Or it may be
too threatening - the emotional or social consequences of attending to
the new information may be seen as too great. 33
 Alternatively, the
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information may be ignored because the individual is not capable of
assimilating it. There exists no schema by which he or she could make
sense of it. In this case, the information may not be noticed at all,
or if noticed, passed over as beyond comprehension.
2. Assimilate it to the structure of existing schemata. In this
case, there is the possiblity of "distortion" or "falsification". But
the criteria by which a judgement will be made as to whether
distortion has taken place can only be relative to a generally
accepted norm or expectation of what an individual should have learned
in a given situation. Standards for small children's understanding
regularly differ from those for adults, but even those for adults are
governed only by social consensus, and individuals like artists
frequently suggest new ways of looking at familiar things.
3. Accommodation to the perceived structure of the new
information. That is to say that a new structure is created or an
existing one modified in order to make way in the understanding for
what is clearly seen as something new and previously not understood.
This is, or is intended to be, the characteristic of formal learning,
but all experienced educators appreciate that in practice
accommodation is usually preceded by at least some degree of
assimilation, which must be allowed for and if possible made use of.
In practice, all three strategies are likely to be found in
differing proportions in any given learning event. In cases where the
individual is in charge of his or her own learning, either because the
learning is informal or participation in a formal situation voluntary,
there is likely to be a decision, wholly or partly conscious, whether
to ignore new information, assimilate it to previous understanding
(thus ignoring whatever cannot be so assimilated) or to make the
effort to accommodate and thus to change. Capacity to learn is thus
determined to a large extent by the perceived need and the desire to
learn, the factors that influence which are the subject of the next
chapter.
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CAnalogy and the Affective Domain: Salience
The previous two sections have dealt with the "cognitive domain"
of the understanding, the way knowledge is represented by means of
schemata with respect to classification and logical inference. But in
the course of this exploration, it has become apparent that the forms
of classification and logical inference proper to tacit knowledge
differ in fundamental respects from those familiar to philosophers and
logicians from their studies of explicit knowledge. The "logic of tacit
inference" must be understood to be fundamentally different from the
logic of explicit inference. Explicit processes are, in fact,
abstractions from the the concrete, tacit base of information
processing. The "confirmation" of a perceptual "hypothesis" is a
lightning-fast, semi-automatic and multi-dimensional process, unlike
the more laboured, conscious process of explicit inference and
conclusion. Polanyi suggests that the process of discovery is similar
to the process of perception. The scientist who brings coherence to a
set of experimental observations by proposing a hypothesis is
performing an operation similar to the use of "hypotheses" in
perception. He is proposing that a particular phenomenon be "seen" in
a certain way.34
The logic of tacit inference, it has been suggested, is
analogical. That is to say, it depends on the perception of similarity
relationships. The relationships in a particular given piece of new
information, or some of them, are perceived to be similar to those of
a familiar, previously comprehended situation or piece of information,
and on the basis of this similarity a schema is selected for the
comprehension of the new information. Thus, the science student works
out the answer to a problem in a new field by applying the principles
learned in the solution of an old problem, the scientist learns how to
predict and explain natural phenomena by seeing them as related to
and thus like situations for which a formula or generalisation already
exists, and people in everyday life learn to make sense of new
situations by seeing them as variations on situations with which they
are familiar.3s
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The similarity relationships by which tacit knowledge is related
exist, we have insisted, prior to the formulation of a rule stating the
respect in which two things may be said to be similar. First comes
the analogical connection and only subsequently, if and when it proves
to be necessary, is a rule sought to explain the similarity. As Kant
pointed out, there can be no rules for subsuming under rules, which
means that the faculty of judgement must be unanalysable, incapable of
reduction to explicit analysis. 3c. This, however, leaves a logical gap.
The place of explicit rules of inference is taken by "intuitive fit", an
unanalysable sense of the rightness of the analogical relationship
perceived. It has frequently been noticed that the process of problem
solution goes through a number of stages. First, the facts are
absorbed and then follows a period of uncertainty in which possible
solutions are tried out one by one. Frequently, all that results is
perplexity, a sense of being "stumped". Often, however, the answer
arrives in a "flash of inspiration" even at a time when the problem
itself has not been under direct consideration, and with the solution
comes a conviction, a "sense of rightness" about the proposed
solution.37
The explanation for these familiar features of the process of
tacit inference, the logical gap involved and its bridging by a sense
of "intuitive fit", is to be found in the affective domain. What is
proposed is that the information represented in schemata is not
limited to the kind usually included in the "cognitive" domain. It has
already been suggested that it includes also procedural rules for the
way the schema itself may be used. Here we suggest that, in addition,
schemata include information pertaining to the affective domain,
specifically a judgement of the information's importance or salience.
The effects of "perceptual salience" on the judgements of children
have been demonstrated in a series of experiments by Richard Odom and
co-workers. A typical experiment involves the use of cards carrying a
variety of designs with four key variables - the number, form and
colour of the designs and the position of each design on the cards.
Each subject in the experiment is pre-assessed for the readiness with
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which they respond to each variable, in order to obtain a measure of
the relative salience for each child of each of the variables. Odom
found that in problems involving logical tasks performed with the
cards, children systematically made less mistakes when the information
relevant to the task involved variables which were more salient for
them. In tasks where the information required for the solution
involved a variable which was less salient for the child, mistakes
were much more likely to occur. The ability of the child to
concentrate on the task in hand was affected by the presence of
salient but irrelevant information. On recall tasks related to logical
problems, salient variable were typically remembered better than
solution-relevant variables.°8
Odom's contention is that it is not simply the ability to handle
logical problems which develops with age, but the ability to process
an increasing range of information. To demonstrate this, he ran an
experiment in which an identical problem was given to 20 adults and
20 children. The problem, which was to be solved mentally from verbal
instructions, included a sentence irrelevant to the correct solution
suggesting the use of a judgement of probability. Of the 20 adults, 17
accepted the sentence as relevant to the solution, used a probability
judgement and, as a result, gave the wrong answer. Of the children, for
whom the concept of probability was not a salient one, 19 solved the
problem correctly. In a further test with 10 children, the salience of
the probability information was increased by rephrasing the irrelevant
part of the problem, and 9 out of 10 gave the wrong answer. This
supports the contention that it was not because the children did not
understand probability that they avoided paying attention to the
irrelevant sentence and so arrived at the right answer. It was
because, since they were able to handle a more restricted range of
information than the adults, the concept of probability was not as
salient for them as it was for the adults.39
Perceptual salience is also a factor in another, widely differing
area of psychological investigation, attribution studies. Such studies
form part of the field of social perception, which is itself part of
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the broader field of research into attitudes and attitude change. The
topic under investigation in attribution studies is the attribution by
experimental subjects of causal effectiveness to one or other actor in
a role-played situation. They are asked to make a Judgement as to
which person is playing the dominant role in the conversation. The aim
of the studies is to discover the factors which affect subjects'
attribution of causality, as a guide to the factors which lie behind
attitude and attitude change. The problem with perceptual salience is
that, from a logical point of view, it is irrelevant. It is an
unwelcome intrusive element in what the experimenter would otherwise
like to understand as a judgement governed by rational considerations.
However, a series of studies have shown that perceptually salient
features such as red hair, a loud shirt or a leg-brace worn by one of
the actors in the role-played situation has a systematically
distorting effect on perceptions of their role. Various attempts at the
manipulation of other factors showed that salience effects are not an
Isolated aberration, but a regular part of every such situation. The
problem, then, is to explain them. A "cognitive" explanation would
accept that salience is a part of the way information is represented.
It is incorporated in the schema the subjects use to make their
Judgements of causal effectiveness, and this can only be because it is
accepted as relevant by the schema. Experimenters unwilling to accept
this conclusion must suppose that only logically relevant information
Is included in the schema but that the salience effect is a feature of
the situation, which systematically interferes the "rational" operation
of making a judgement.
Initial supposition that salience is a "top-of-the-head"
phenomenon, characteristic of judgement under pressure, was shown to
be doubtful when salience effects refused to disappear under a variety
of different conditions. Nor were salience effects to be explained by
differential amounts of attention, as measured by observations of eye
movements. Although the salient actor did attract a disproportionate
amount of subjects' visual attention, Judgements of causality were
unrelated to the relative amounts of attention given to each actor. A
94
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
third possibility is that the influence of salience is mediated by the
relative ease of recall of perceptually salient information. However,
in circumstances in which less salient information is also recalled,
the salience effect persists. A modification of this argument proposes
that because visual information is relatively more salient, visually
presented information is exaggerated at the recall stage, at which the
attribution of causality is justified. But in order to have this effect,
visually presented information must be represented by a schema. Unless
the schema is capable of representing this information as "more
salient", it must fail to register or to be recalled.40
Despite a natural unwillingness on the part of the investigators
to allow logically irrelevant factors a permanent place in the
schemata for such attributions, it seems likely that perceptually
salient information is being registered by the schema as conceptually
important and thus tending to "bias" the schema in the direction of
"non-logical" attributions of causality. This explanation, in which
salience is a feature of the initial coding of information, is
supported by a related study by Smith and Miller on attributions of
causality in the comprehension of verbal material. They found a
salience effect in the comprehension of sentences describing causal
effectiveness which resisted modification by subsequent supplementary
information and was not diminished in later recall tasks. Smith and
Miller's conclusion is that comprehension of such sentences involves a
single conceptual representation of the contents of the sentence,
which includes the effects of the relative salience of the information
given.41
The main conclusion to be drawn from studies of perceptual
salience is that comprehension includes an evaluative element. The
representation of information by means of schemata includes not only
conceptual relationships but also an evaluative component. Dominance
or relative importance is an integral part of the conceptual structure
of the schemata. This conclusion is further supported by the extensive
work to have been done in the field of selective attention. The
earliest investigations concentrated on what was known as the
95
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
"cocktail party phenomenon". A guest at such a gathering has the task
of "paying attention" to one particular conversation in a room full of
sound. This is achieved by attending strictly to the words of the
speaker with whom he or she is engaged and "filtering out" the rest.
But if someone in another part of the room mentions the guest's name
or if a neighbouring conversation turns to a topic of interest,
concentration on the original conversation becomes more difficult and
the effort of selective attention becomes conscious. Experiments were
begun in 1953 by E.C.Cherry, who played recordings of different
messages simultaneously to participants over headphones, varying the
subject matter, voice and position of the messages between the right
and left ear. The subject was instructed to "shadow" one of the
messages, that is to repeat it, in order to divert attention from the
other message, and the aim was to find out what characteristics, if
any, of the "rejected" messages are retained. The results indicate that
in fact surprisingly few details of the rejected message even register.
"Crude physical characteristics", such as whether the voice is male or
female, can usually be recalled, but an account of the material in the
rejected message is hardly ever given. This, however, does not mean
that the rejected channel is not heard. "Highly probable stimuli", such
as cliches, the sudden appearance of something new, such as a new
voice, and "emotionally important stimuli", such as the subject's name,
frequently catch the attention.
Initial attempts to explain these results postulated various
types of filters, processes by means of which information was filtered
out at various stages of processing. The problem with these
Bxplanations is the difficulty of explaining the great variety of
information which may get through on the rejected channel if the
;conditions are right. In particular, it is variation in the task
iemands of the experiment, the information the subject is asked to
Listen for, which most affects the range of information to be
oerceived. In 1973, Neville Moray put forward an explanation, which
las still received little attention, based on the theory of sampling.
fhis is a model developed from the experience of aeroplane pilots, who
ire required to pay attention selectively to a wide range of
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instruments. The task requires the observer to construct an internal
model of the source of information, which must include the likely
importance of information coming in from various directions, and
continually to update this estimate of the relative salience of
different sources as the information is sampled. The observer
constructs a strategy for the distribution of attention based on past
experience of the characteristics of the various information sources.42
The idea of a hypothetical filter mechanism reflects an earlier,
information-processing, approach to cognition. Moray and Fitter's
theory moves in the direction of a broader, cognitive orientation,
drawing attention to the employment of dynamic strategies in the
search for information. Such strategies are directed by the relevant
schema, the one which includes the information relevant to the
situation in which the observer finds himself. A crucial and integral
part of the relevant information provided by the schema is the
relative importance of different parts of the environment or elements
of the situation. Like every other piece of tacit knowledge, salience
information is continually up-dated. Judgements of salience are and
must be flexible. The conclusion to which we are led is that the
representation of knowledge by means of schemata includes an
evaluative, or essentially affective element, an estimate of the likely
Importance of a given piece of information.
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irlissonance: A Cognitive Theory of Emotion
If evaluation is an integral part of the coding of information,
then evaluation must have a considerable effect on cognition. One
theory which offers the possibility of a description and perhaps an
explanation of this effect is the theory of cognitive dissonance. As
putlined by Leon Festinger in 1957, the theory is an attempt to
explain the phenomenon of "dissonance" and its effects by constructing
1 cognitive model. It is an attempt to explain affective factors
involved in Judgement and decision-making in cognitive terms. In
Festinger's terminology, a "cognition" is an item of knowledge. But
cognitions may include not only facts and concepts, but also such
things as beliefs, hopes, attitudes, likes and dislikes. Thus, if I
happen to like animals, this knowledge is expressed in the cognition,
"I like animals". Cognitions are related to one another in three
possible ways:
1. They may be irrelevant, which is another way of saying they
are not related at all, for example, "I like animals" and "My wife is
wearing a blue dress".
2. They may be consonant, for example, "I like animals" and "We
own a cat".
3. Or they may be dissonant, for example, "I like animals" and "I
believe that dogs are dirty".
A relation of dissonance is said to exist between cognitions when the
converse of one follows from the other. But dissonance is not the same
as logical contradiction. "I dislike cats" would be not only dissonant
with "I like animals" but logically contradictory. But there is no
necessary logical contradiction between "I like animals" and "I believe
dogs are dirty". The dissonance is not logical but psychological, a
definition much more flexible and difficult to define.43
Integral to the theory of cognitive dissonance is the proposition
that there exists an inbuilt motivational drive to reduce dissonance.
People tend to avoid dissonance, or, if it is impossible to avoid, to
do everything possible to reduce the dissonance. Take, for example, a
man who supports the Labour party, but whose wife votes Conservative.
98
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
If the man is at all interested or concerned about politics, the
cognitions, "I vote Labour" and "My wife votes Conservative" are
potentially dissonant. To reduce the dissonance, it may be possible
simply to avoid the issue, to come to an agreement with his wife not
to talk about politics. Alternatively, the man can change his behaviour
by voting Conservative, or seek to change his wife's behaviour.
Festinger quotes examples of experiments in which subjects were asked
to take part in "dissonant behaviour". They had to write an essay
justifying a point of view with which they disagreed. As a result,
many of the participants changed their point of view. Their attitudes
changed in such a way as to reduce the dissonance aroused by their
behaviour in the experiment. It is possible to argue that dissonance
had nothing to do with this result, that the subjects simply convinced
themselves of the merits of the opposite point of view. But some of
the participants were offered a large sum of money for writing the
essays, and follow-up tests found that these subjects had changed
their points of view much less if at all. To engage in "dissonant
behaviour" with the excuse of making money did not arouse feelings of
dissonance. These subjects were able to write their essays "with
fingers crossed". For the others, it was the dissonance aroused by the
experiment which produced the need to change their minds.'"
Dissonance, Festinger argues, is not an isolated occurrence, but a
regular feature of everyday life, and much of our behaviour can be
explained by the attempt to reduce the dissonance between cognitions.
Every disagreement and every decision involves an element of
dissonance. In rejecting the possible good results of one particular
choice in favour of its alternative, which may have a number of
possible drawbacks, one incurs dissonance, and one of the features of
subsequent behaviour will be to minimise this dissonance by taking
steps to persuade oneself that one made the right decision. The extent
to which this is the case will depend on the amount or magnitude of
dissonance. The magnitude of dissonance is affected by the salience or
Importance of the cognitions involved. The degree of dissonance
aroused by different political affiliations depends on how important a
person sees politics overall. A man and wife of different political
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persuasions may have heated arguments or they may simply not care.
The imminence or otherwise of a general election may also make a
difference.45
Dissonance theory, then, offers the possibility of a theoretical
framework within which the relation between affective factors, such as
likes, dislikes and attitudes in general, and cognitive representation
might be explored. A number of problems arise, however, in connection
with its application to experience. One of the most important is the
near impossibility of either defining dissonance or predicting its
occurrence. Although it includes logical inconsistency, dissonance is
not the same thing, and cannot, therefore, be so tightly defined. Nor
can dissonance be predicted simply by the observation of external
factors. Dissonance arises as a result of the interaction of the
individual and his or her circumstances. If, as a result of past
experience, a person has come to dislike dogs, then the experience of
being asked to look after a friend's dog is likely to arouse
dissonance. It is not the request itself which gives rise to the
dissonance, but the schema which says, "Dogs are dirty, potentially
fierce and a nuisance." Dissonance cannot be defined because it
depends on the individual's past experience.
This difficulty draws attention to the close connection between
dissonance theory and the features of cognitive theory discussed so
far. As well as being explicitly cognitive, the theory is also
implicitly interactionist. In particular:
1. It is the interaction between the individual's schema and the
external situation which decides the occurrence and the magnitude of
dissonance.
2. The strategies available for dealing with dissonant
information are closely related to those discussed in relation to the
learning of any new material. Dissonant information can be ignored, or
it can be reinterpreted in such a way as to reduce the magnitude of
dissonance (assimilation), or it can be accepted and the dissonance
reduced by a change in behaviour or in related opinions or beliefs
(accommodation).
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3. The "magnitude of dissonance" depends on the importance or
salience of the cognitions involved.
A second problem concerns the motivation for dissonance
reduction. The theory itself does not attempt to explain this; it
simply asserts such a motivation. In some cases at least, the very
existence of dissonance is dependent on motivational factors.
Festinger gives the example of a gambler who knows he is losing and
likely to continue to lose, and yet goes on playing. The cognitions, "I
am losing" and "I am still playing" are only dissonant given the
assumption of a third cognition, "I intend to win". 46 To explain the
supposed drive to reduce dissonance, another source of motivation must
be postulated. In other words, dissonance must be placed in the
context of a broader motivational theory.
It is not difficult to discern what this broader context must be.
To take another of Festinger's examples, the cognitions "I am a
smoker" and "Smoking is injurious to health" are dissonant only in the
light of a third cognition, "I am a rational person and intend to
maximise my own health". 47 In other words, the existence of dissonance
depends on a suppressed premise about oneself. The broader context
required by dissonance theory is a theory about self-perception or
self-image. This conclusion can be supported by the findings of the
series of experiments on the influence of dissonant behaviour on
attitude change. The tendency of subjects asked in the experiments to
tell lies or to express support for a point of view opposed to their
own subsequently to change their attitudes has frequently been
confirmed, but with the proviso that this change of attitude only
takes place when the subjects perceive their behaviour as freely
motivated. In cases where the subjects were able to attribute their
behaviour to some other factor, where, for example, a large sum of
money was offered, no such change takes place.48 This finding brings
dissonance theory into the field of self theory. The explanation of
motivation involved is the need to maintain coherent self-image and
high self-esteem .49
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6.Attitudes and Affective Processing
The coherence and stability of self-image is expressed in the
phenomenon of attitudes, whose defining characteristic is the
stabilising effect they exert over an individual's behaviour, opinions,
values and general orientation. An attitude was described by Gordon
Allport as "a mental and neural state of readiness to respond,
organised through experience, and exerting a directive and/or dynamic
influence on behavioue.60 William McGuire describes an attitude as a
heuristic, an informal empirical theory whose function is to
comprehend a given situation by means of generalisation and
simplification.'" An attitude is, therefore, a schema, an "active
organisation of past reactions", a means of simplifying or
stereotyping experience for easier comprehension. But an attitude is
also implicitly evaluative. By means of attitudes, situations are not
only comprehended but also evaluated and behaviour thus directed.32
An attitude is an affective or emotionally organised schema.
Take, for example, a man's attitude to his work. The schema will
include a number of beliefs and items of information of varying
degrees of salience. The job may be well-paid or it may be
particularly difficult or carry a certain amount of status. These are
likely to be salient items. The fact that he has flexible working
hours or congenial colleagues may be more or less salient. Other
items, such as the form of the works football team, may not figure as
important at all. Attitudes are based on the evaluation of the
attributes expressed by the most salient beliefs about a given element
of experience. The man's attitude to his work is based on his
evaluations of the salient set of beliefs. The attitude expresses his
relative evaluation of the different aspects of the job. He may either
resent the difficulty of his job or value this aspect highly for the
self-esteem it gives.63
The function of an attitude is to provide evaluative coherence in
a given situation. This it does by imposing an evaluative gestalt on
the various beliefs which comprise the situation. As long as the
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evaluation of the salient beliefs is favourable, a man may be able to
take the less desirable elements of his work in his stride. But some
change in the situation, a difficult new boss for example, might Jimp
quickly to the top of the salience league, downgrading the more
positive aspects of the Job and giving greater significance to the
negative aspects, previously overlooked.
To understand attitudes as affectively dominated schemata is to
emphasise the importance of the evaluative dimension in cognition.
Salience is to be understood, not as an extraneous biassing factor, but
as a fundamental component, without which cognition could not operate
at all. Without the capacity to make Judgements of relative importance,
such essential features of cognition as selective attention would be
impossible. The importance of affect in cognition is, moreover, well
supported in the literature. Bartlett's studies of the processes of
reconstruction in memory, for example, highlight the role of what he
called a global "attitude" as the basis around which the reconstruction
takes place. This "attitude" was an affective gestalt, which Bartlett
called a complex psychological state, difficult to break down. In the
process of remembering narratives after a passage of time, first would
come a salient detail as the key to the overall "feeling" of the
passage. Details would then be filled in in accordance with or even in
justification of the original feeling, with the result that any given
story would be retold in a wide variety of ways corresponding to the
various attitudinal reactions of the different hearers.s4
Further evidence for the importance of affective processing comes
from experiments concerning the phenomenon of "perceptual defence".ss
In these experiments, subjects were presented with words for visual
recognition and verbal response, but by measuring at the same time the
subjects' psychogalvanic responses, it was found that in the case of
some words, physiological reaction actually took place before the word
was recognised. The words where this pattern of response was noticed
were those with threatening or taboo associations. In these cases, the
affective reaction, apparent from the psychogalvanic response, occurred
more quickly than the cognitive processes necessary for recognition.
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Subjects appeared to respond emotionally to the taboo words before
they had had time to read them! This conclusion makes no sense if it
is assumed that emotional reactions must be subsequent to and
dependent on cognition. But if, as the evidence of Bartlett's
experiments suggests, cognitive processes are dependent on a
framework of direct, "global", affective processes, then the "perceptual
defence" hypothesis and other related findings fall into place. Not
only is affective processing fast and inescapable, but it forms the
framework for the cognitive aspects of communication. During the
course of a conversation, for example, affective messages difficult to
express in either words or conceptual form are conveyed fast,
accurately and for the most part subconsciously by means of bodily
and facial gestures.
These observations on affective processing help to explain the
way in which attitudes gather up a variety of cognitive material,
Including facts and beliefs, within an overall affective framework.
Schemata, it was noted above56 , are related to each other in a variety
of way's. In some cases, schemata "embed", in the sense that one schema
may form a sub-schema of another. By imposing upon a number of
beliefs and items of experience an evaluative gestalt, attitudes form
dominating schemata over the whole range of experience. In doing so,
attitudes affect cognition in fundamental ways. As John Hull comments,
The emotional value which is placed upon a construct must not be
thought of as a mere feeling which is so to speak painted on the
surface of an idea and which remains the same whatever colour it
has,„If I disapprove of fox hunting, I will place the construct in a
constellation together with bull fighting, bear baiting, gladiatorial
contests and other forms of inflicting cruelty for entertainment, If I
approve of fox hunting, I will associate it with healthy outdoor life,
the love of the countryside, the old English traditional values and so
on„,The fox hunting of which somebody approves is actually known in
quite different a manner from the fox hunting of which somebody else
disapproves,"
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Attitudes provide evaluative coherence in specific areas of
experience, but attitudes are themselves the sub-schemata of a further
dominating schema, the self. Attitudes mediate between the self and
specific areas of experience, such as work, family, members of the
opposite sex, politics, religion, foreigners, animals, sport and so on.
This is the explanation for the relative inflexibility of attitudes.
Just as the suppressed premise behind the experience of cognitive
dissonance was a particular self-image, an attitude to a particular
area of experience also reflects an implicit self-evaluation. The man
who is discontented with his job may consider himself capable of
achieving more in the way of satisfaction or financial reward. The man
who dislikes foreigners probably considers himself threatened in some
way by their obvious difference from himself. Attitude change is
difficult, because it involves a change also in the underlying self-
evaluation, and this may be the subject of strenuous defence.s°
Affective processing is the leading edge of cognition. It is fast,
inescapable, irrevocable and although pre-conceptual, is very
effectively communicated. Affective processing is independent of
cognition. Not only do studies reveal separate reaction times for
cognitive and affective processing, but attitude change is more
effectively brought about by the alteration of affective rather than
cognitive components, by changing the way a person feels about
something rather than the way he thinks about it.S9 Cognitive
organisation arises as a more differentiated intermediary within
affective processing. In the case of babies, all they have is affective
responses and limited but effective emotional communication. Cognitive
responses develop as mediators within the framework of such affective
response and communication, but they never replace it.s° The key to
the problem of "intuitive fit" is thus affective processing. The
analogical relationship accepted as appropriate to the situation or
problem to be comprehended is the one that "feels" right. Explicit,
rule-governed inference may enter subsequently to give an account of
the relationship, but it can never fully explain it.'"
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CHAPTER FOUR
Knowledge and Personal Identity
What creates in me a consciousness of self is the consciousness I have of a not
self, of an external world from which I firstly distinguish myself, which next I
observe objectively from without, and with which I enter into relationship,
Psychologists have described this birth of self-consciousness in the infant, There
is, then, a double movement, first of separation and then of relation, between the
self and things,
Next, what creates in me consciousness of being a person is entering into a
relationship with another person, the 'thou', Here again, we find the double
movement; the consciousness of being distinct from another person, and the
possibility of entering into personal relationship with him,
Paul Tournier'
We are not who we think we are;
We are not who other people think we are;
We are who we think others think we are,
Source Unknown
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1.rhe Social Context of Learning 
It has been established that the affective domain plays a
dominant role in all aspects of cognitive processing, including
learning. During the course of development, purely conceptual
relationships become increasingly important in the organisation and
acquisition of knowledge, but always within the context of global
affective responses, which they never entirely replace. The explanation
for this is to be found in the social context in which schemata
develop. The psychology of learning tends to concentrate on the
cognitive, but social psychology deals with the sphere of
relationships, in which it is affect which is the dominant factor.
In the previous chapter, learning was considered from the point
of view of the psychological changes which take place in the
Individual learner. In the present chapter, the focus of attention will
be the social context of learning. For the individual, mental schemata
provide intrapsychological coherence through the formation of
meaningful world models. But schemata or world models also both
express and contribute to social and interpersonal cohesion by the
provision of shared frames of reference. The psychological changes by
which learning takes place are the outcome and reflection of social
interaction.
Two men may work side by side, day after day, on the same
assembly line or workbench. Although from the point of view of the
non-involved observer, their situation is exactly the same, they may,
in fact, be inhabiting vastly different mental worlds, not in the sense
of the life of the imagination, but in terms of situational definition.
One may see his skilled job as an end in itself, a source of
satisfaction in its own right. The other may see it as a means to a
regular pay-packet and enjoyable leisure activities. Their attitude
toward their colleagues, the authority of management or the prospects
of promotion may all be quite different. "Situation" in this sense is a
psychological construct. It consists of an interpretation of the work
the individual is engaged in, which involves the memories, purposes,
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anticipations, hopes and fears each brings to the shared task and the
social interaction generated by it. Each man's response is to the
situation as he defines it.2
Despite the difference in the mental worlds of these two
individuals, however, communication between them is regularly possible.
This is because of the various means of socialisation operating both
within and outside the workplace, which tend to produce not just an
overlap between each man's situational definition but a common basis
of consensus. These include:
a) The shared physical environment, not simply at the workbench
and within the factory, but outside it, in the form of the physical
and geographical conditions shared by the community.
b) The firm's definition of the purpose of the enterprise. Recent
experience in some firms has demonstrated that the extent to which
this definition is effectively communicated is an important factor in
the commercial success of the business.
C) The Trade Union, or some other unofficial shop-floor
definition of the purpose of the job. Again, recent experience has
shown that a serious mis-match between this and the "official"
definition can prevent effective communication and lead to hostility
and mistrust.
d) Beyond these are various cultural definitions of work, money,
family, the particular product of the factory and so on. In Japan, for
example, such definitions are very different from those familiar in
Western Europe or the U.S.A. and the pattern of working and family
life consequently very different.
Such common definitions form the outline of shared schemata,
while leaving gaps to be filled by the particular individual or social
group. Thus, although one man may see his work as an end in itself
while the other values it only as a means of earning a living, both
these are options within an overall shared definition of working life.
The formation of such shared definitions or conceptual
frameworks and communication with others whose definitions may be
either slightly or vastly different from one's own, is dependent on
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the human ability to "take the stance of another". This is the aspect
of human understanding previously referred to as verstehen.3 It is the
ability, not to enter another person's whole mental world, with all the
implications of that for empathy with their own goals, hopes, fears
and so on, but more simply, to construct another person's point of
view for a given situation, and by doing so, to translate the terms of
one's own situational definition into the terms of the other's. The
extent to which this is possible varies from individual to individual
and from situation to situation, so that the term "taking the stance
of another" is to be understood not as full empathetic understanding,
but only as the first step towards such an understanding. The ability
of some individuals in some situations to move towards a full
empathetic understanding is dependent upon a number of factors. All
communication, however, involves the simplest levels of verstelen.
Learning is not simply a process of psychological change, but also a
process of socialisation.
The ability to construct the point of view of another is an
indispensable part of learning from the earliest age. That this is the
case has been demonstrated largely by experiments designed in
response to the work of Jean Piaget, who denied it. Piaget was the
dominant figure in the study of "cognitive development", particularly
In the 1960s and early 1970s, since when both his experimental
findings and his theoretical framework have come under increasing
attack.4 Piaget understood learning as the development of cognitive
competence due largely to the gradual physiological maturation of the
brain. Social factors, he believed, influenced only the speed, but not
the course of cognitive change. Piaget viewed the young child as
"egocentric", not in the moral sense, but in the sense that the child's
capacity to interact is limited to interaction with the physical
environment.a The child's ability to comprehend is limited by his or
her existing cognitive structures. Cognitive development is a process
of "decentering" away from these limiting structures to more adequate
structures. The final stage to which the child "decenters" is that of
complete objectivity, in which the child's constructions of the
environment match reality. This, Piaget believed, was generally
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achieved at the stage of "formal operations", usually at about the age
of 15 or 16. Socialisation is achieved at this stage, not by each
person taking the point of view of others, but by all sharing a
single, objectively valid, point of view.
The outcome of Piaget's theory, and the viewpoint of cognitive
developmentalism generally, is a lack of attention to the social
aspects of learning. On this account, the most important, causal,
factors in learning are purely intrapsychological, the growth and
development of internal structures. The supposed "egocentric" nature of
children's intelligence is the product of a theory in which there is
no place for social interaction and socialisation as causative factors
in children's learning.
One of the experiments by which Piaget hoped to demonstrate the
child's lack of ability to construct the point of view of another
involved a three-dimensional model of three mountains. 8 The child sits
at a table on which the model is displayed, and the experimenter
places a small doll at some other position around the table. The child
is then asked to describe, or else to select from a number of
alternatives a picture of what the doll can see. Below the age of
eight or nine, children can rarely achieve this, and below the age of
six there is a powerful tendency for the child to select or describe
her own view of the scene. The "mountain task" appears adequately to
confirm Piaget's hypothesis of childhood egocentrism. But this
interpretation is open to question. In a variation of the mountain
task, Martin Hughes replaced the mountain model with four walls
arranged in the shape of a cross. The child sits at the table as
before and two dolls representing a policeman and a "naughty boy" are
introduced. The dolls are placed in various positions relative to one
another and to the walls and the child is asked for each position
whether the policeman can see the boy. With careful introduction and
explanation, Hughes found that children as young as 3% could answer
correctly on up to 90% of occasions."'
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The results of Hughes's experiment tend to call into question
Piaget's interpretation of those he obtained from the mountain task.
The main significance of the experiment, however, lies in its ability
to suggest what and in what circumstances children can achieve. For
this purpose, the differences between the two experiments need to be
carefully noted.
1. The mountain task is much more difficult. It introduces
difficulties in addition to that of simply taking the point of view of
the doll. It is quite likely that for many of the children, the main
difficulty they faced was not that of "decentering", but of
understanding what they were meant to do.
2. The mountain task is an abstract problem, removed from the
children's actual experience. In the policeman task, by contrast, while
few if any of the children will actually have tried to hide from a
policeman themselves, the ideas of authority, guilt and hiding provide
a context of "human sense", within which the point of the problem is
readily grasped. In contrast to the mountain task, the policeman task
provides a comprehensible situation. It is a situation which, because
it "makes sense", can be readily internalised and represented in the
form of a schema, with the result that the supposed difficulty in co-
ordinating the point of view of another evaporates.
3. The fact that the experimenter introduced and explained the
task is not unimportant. For a young child, adults have a high degree
of salience. In an experimental situation such as this, the intention
of the adult, and the desire to comply is likely to be uppermost in
the child's mind, heightening the child's ability to learn from the
adult.
This explanation for the success of the policeman task
highlights the importance of the role of others, and in particular of
significant adults, in children's learning. Learning takes place in
shared situations in which the child and the adult attend to the same
thing, or in which the child helps the adult with a particular task, or
the adult the child. In the learning of language, for example, John
Macnamara and Jerome Bruner have argued for and demonstrated with
experiments a process in which the young child first constructs a
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preverbal representation or schema for a given situation and then
learns to fit names to various elements of that situation by watching
and listening to salient adults.° This process requires the child to
recognise in the adult the intention to give a name to her actions or
to objects in the shared environment, thus implying the ability of the
child to recognise not only the point of view but also the intentions
of another, and to differentiate these from her own.
Both this account of language learning and the comparison of the
policeman task with Piaget's mountain task highlight the importance of
what the Soviet psychologist, Lev Vygotsky, called the "zone of
proximal development". This is used to designate those things of which
a child is capable, given help from another. It lies in between the
things a child can do without help and those things she is unable to
do at all. From the teaching point of view, the concept is of vital
importance. Vygotsky suggests that to be maximally effective, the
level of instruction should aim at the zone of proximal development,
at capacities which the child has not yet developed, but could develop
with appropriate help.9 In this view, what the child learns non-
spontaneously, that is directly from others, is a particular way of
describing, analysing or structuring a given situation, a schema for
that situation or for a new element within it, which she then
internalises or makes her own, by integrating it with the structure of
her previous understanding. In the process the new schema begins to
restructure previous understanding, giving access to wider
applications and more powerful generalisations.'°
Children learn by taking over the schemata of salient others.
Schemata are learned in interpersonal joint action or, at a later
stage, by engagement with a text, and are internalised to become part
of the child's own cognitive apparatus." From his observations of the
transactions of mothers and children engaged on a learning task
together, James V. Wertsch has suggested a four-stage model of this
process. 12 The task which the mothers and the children were asked to
do together was to build a model of a truck and its cargo from pieces
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provided by reference to a model. The children were aged 2%, 3% and
4%. The stages Wertsch describes are as follows:
1. The child fails to interpret the mother's instructions. She has
no coherent definition of the situation, no schema by which to make
sense of the individual directions. Two separate "language games" are
going on and there is no common ground.
2. The child responds to specific instructions, such as, "Fit that
piece here," or "Put the green one next to the red one." She realises
that she and her mother are engaged in a common task, but has no
understanding of the task itself. It is as she carries out her mother's
instructions one by one that a schema for the task itself is gradually
formed.
3. The child is able to respond to non-specific instructions,
such as, "What do we do next?" (an implicit direction to look for the
next part of the task). The transition from other-regulation to self-
regulation has begun. The schema is shared to a limited extent.
4. The child does the task, but frequently repeats her moves out
loud, asking and answering her own questions. The schema is taken
over and the child has grown into the adult's perception of the
situation. What began as an interpersonal, shared task has become an
intrapsychological, internalised definition of the situation.
The importance of others, and particularly of adults and their
understandings in the child's appreciation of the situation, offers a
clear example of the way in which cultural definitions are passed from
generation to generation, not simply by formal education, but also in
a great deal of informal learning. But the transmission of culture is
itself only one example of a something more general. Learning takes
place in a social context. In the course of learning, schemata are
taken over from others and internalised. As a result, the schemata by
which an individual constructs his own individual world model are, to
a large extent, derived from the shared conceptual framework of his
culture and society.
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2.Psychosocial Development
For the young child, the process of learning consists chiefly of
taking over schemata or frameworks of comprehension from others. The
child works within the frameworks provided by adults and learns to
make those frameworks her own and to "indwell" them. The consequence
Is that the young child experiences the world largely as given. She
grows up in a world already structured by others. Her parents or other
immediate influences are the representatives of the wider and more
impersonal society or culture, although as individuals, they give this
their own distinct interpretation.
Primary socialisation consists of the internalisation of the
world of others. The child's father represents fatherhood in general,
her mother becomes her pattern of womanhood and specifically
motherhood. Significant others later extend to include siblings,
teachers and perhaps a favourite adult relation or friend. The earliest
matrix of socialisation, the family, is a context of high power and
high affectivity, in which the child is both physically and
emotionally dependent. It is within the family that her basic needs,
for food, warmth, security and love, are satisfied, and within which
she also experiences the command of others over rewards and
punishments.'3
The role of the family in primary socialisation emphasises the
importancy of affectivity in knowledge. Behind attitudes, which are
affectively structured schemata, are the basic values and goals which
express a person's relationship with the world, or with aspects of her
experience. These fundamental values and orientations are learned at a
stage of affective openness and dependence. "Give me a child until the
age of seven," Ignatius Loyola is reported to have said, "and he is
mine for life." Learning from others involves the ability to "take the
stance" of others, to infer from their behaviour the meaning for them
of a wide range of aspects of a given shared situation. Since
attitudes and values are the fundamental units by which the world is
comprehended and represented, these are readily internalised to form
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the basis for the child's own values and motivations. The existence of
"achievement motivation" in particular individuals, for example, can
usually be traced back to the expectations of their parents, whether
expressed overtly or not, and the evaluations of their performances
derived from their parents' comments and other behaviour.' 4 The
corollary of this is that fundamental attitudes and values can usually
only be relearned in situations of high power and high affectivity,
such as prisons and other "total" institutions.' 6 The fundamental
changes which take place in the course of religious conversion also
involve an element of resocialisation. If it is to be thorough and
lasting, conversion may be expected to involve a high degree of
affectivity and some degree of dependence.16
The relationships between the child and other members of her
family, especially with her mother, are extremely important for the
course of future learning. The relationship between the child and her
mother may work well or badly. In the ideal situation, mother and
child establish successful mutual regulation and the child develops an
immediate and lasting sense of security. The worst possible outcome is
where the child is neglected to such an extent that she dies. In
between these extremes is a continuum of possible outcomes, as a
result of which the child's sense of the regularity or trustworthiness
of the world in general and security about her own place within it
may develop well or badly. The acquisition or failure to acquire a
sense of basic trust then becomes the foundation for the ability to
cope with future stages of development. The ability of the mother to
provide a satisfactory nurturing relationship depends largely on her
own childhood experience and upbringing, as well as on the support of
society in general, both in terms of material provision and social
support, which represent the worth accorded to the experience and role
of motherhood."
The "crisis" of basic trust or basic mistrust is the first of the
stages of "psychosocial" development as explained by psychologist,
Erik Erikson. Psychosocial theory represents an attempt to place the
Insights of Freudian psychoanalysis in a wider, social context. It
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draws attention to the ongoing interaction between personal identity
and culture or society. Both the immediate family and the wider
society whose institutions support the family, are necessary for the
psychological growth of the individual. Without the support of the
social matrix, the fully functioning person is an impossiblity. A stage
of development is not simply a function of psychological maturation,
nor is it simply the product of social integration. Every stage
represents an interaction between the potential of the maturing
individual and the opportunity provided by society for the expression
of that potential.
The principle governing psychosocial development is "epigenesis",
or development according to a ground plan. The original Freudian
ground plan was psychosexual, and its theme the resolution of sexual
conflict, but in psychosocial theory the principle of epigenesis is
extended to include a much broader range of interaction between the
person and society. The stages described by Erikson, each with an
accompanying "crisis", are as follows:
1. Infancy
2. Early childhood
3. Play age
4. School age
5. Adolescence
6. Early adulthood
7. Adulthood
basic trust v. basic mistrust
autonomy v. shame and doubt
initiative v. guilt
industry v. inferiority
identity v. identity diffusion
intimacy v. isolation
genera tivity v. self-absorption
8. Old age	 integrity v. despair
The first five stages are based on the psychosexual stages of
orthodox Freudian psychoanalysis, the "oral", "anal" and "genital"
stages, followed by the periods of latency and adolescence. But
Erikson has interpreted the task of each of these stages in broader
social terms, rather than concentrating exclusively on sexual
conflicts. In addition, three stages of adult life are included. In the
first of these the task is the establishment of stable adult
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relationships, traditionally through marriage. The next is the stage of
productivity, whether in a career or in raising a family. Finally, in
old age, the imminence of death brings the need to evaluate the
outcome of one's life.
The principle of epigenesis means that the various elements of
personality can be understood only in relationship to the individual
as a whole. Each element is present as a factor in personality
throughout one's life. The need for self-evaluation, for example, is not
confined to old age, nor is the need to establish basic competences
solely the concern of the school years. Each element, however, has its
own time of ascendancy, the time when the potentialities for
significant interaction centre around that particular aspect of the
personality. A stage of development is defined by the particular
interactions and the related element of personality which is dominant.
Stages must occur in a proper sequence, each of which prepares the
ground for the succeeding stage. Each stage involves a "crisis", a time
at which the enduring effect on the personality of the experience of
the significant interaction will be settled. The term "crisis" refers
to the crucial period during which the lasting effects of the stage of
development will begin to take root. It does not necessarily mean a
time of turmoil or disruption. In this sense, the "crisis" of
adolescence may be smooth and uneventful. According to psychosocial
theory, adolescent crisis of identity is universal, whether or not it
is accompanied by psychological "crises", such as rejection of parental
authority, violent fluctuations in mood, etc. A crisis may be
successfully surmounted, providing a firm basis for the next stage of
development and tending toward the growth of a healthy personality, or
the crisis may be less satisfactorily resolved, leaving a deficiency in
a particular area of personality likely to affect the individual's
ability to cope with all the succeeding stages.'e
Knowledge of oneself involves a double movement of separation
and relation. A boundary is created by means of which one defines
oneself over against others, but the presence of such a boundary is
tolerable only so long as satisfactory relationships with others
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across the boundary remain possible.' 9 The creation of this boundary
and consequent definition of oneself is the task of the second stage
of development and takes place in early childhood, although the
maintenance and progressive definition of the self-concept continue
throughout the whole of life. The developmental crisis of this stage
is described as "autonomy" v. "shame and doubt". From the complete
dependency of infancy, the individual's task is to achieve an area of
autonomy or self-determination. It is the period of the "terrible
twos", in which the most commonly used word seems to be, "Nor The
young child must separate herself from her parents, by defining and
achieving her own area of self-determination, without thereby severing
herself from them entirely. The establishment of a tolerable boundary
requires satisfactory self-other relationships. If the child and her
parents are unable to create sufficiently good relationships such as
to allow the child to define herself separately over against them,
there will be a tendency for the boundaries of self to collapse,
leading to a sense of doubt or shame. The very definition of a
boundary creates not only the awareness of separateness, but the
possibility of invasion, and consequent fear of exposure, sometimes
expressed in adult life in dreams of being found naked or otherwise
exposed.2°
The second main stage in the development of the self-concept is
the "crisis of identity" during the period of adolescence. This is the
stage of social and psychological changeover from the largely
dependent relationships of childhood to the measure of independence
and self-determination expected of the adult. Mature adult identity is
based on a successful resolution of the "crisis of autonomy" during
early childhood, when the boundaries of the self, within which identity
is to crystallise, take shape. From that time, the child begins to
accumulate the unformed elements of personality, partial
identifications with significant others, whether peers or those in
positions of authority, interests and achievements, as well as typical
emotional responses and defences in a range of situations. The task of
adolescence is to integrate these into a mature self-image. Often, this
requires a social moratorium, a suspension of the relationships
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characteristic of childhood, often experienced as an attempt to
distance oneself from parents and to identify instead with the peer
group. The adolescent may need to "drop out" of society temporarily, in
order to cope with the re-emergence in more powerful form of the
social and sexual struggles of early childhood, played out this time
in relation not simply with parents and siblings, but with society as
a whole. Within the relative security of the social moratorium, the
individual must shed the reflexive and dependent role identifications
of childhood in order to re-integrate them into a greater whole, a new
gestalt, which is the emergence of coherent, independent identity.'
Although relatively stable in adulthood, identity is far from
fixed or static. In terms of psychosocial development, there are still
three adult stages left to surmount after the achievement of identity,
each one requiring further change and reintegration. Nor are these
developmental crises the only possible turning points for the
realisation of new aspects of the self. Experiences such as the
meeting of a particular challenge, requiring the discovery of new
talents or resources, the possibility of failure, the need to express
commitment, the performance of a new role, divorce, bereavement or
betrayal are all self-involving, calling for reflection and evaluation
of oneself and the possibility of a change in self-concept. Even
without the effects of unexpected or decisive events, many lives
follow a pattern of regularised status passage. A person in employment
may progress from raw recruit to employee with potential, through
promotion, the realisation of having reached the limit of one's of
achievement to eventual retirement and reorientation away from work.
Parents progress from the care of young children, to that of
teenagers, through the time the children leave home to the role of
grandparents.22
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3 .Self and Others 
Knowledge of oneself is a developmental achievement. It emerges
as a result of a process of development in the context of
relationships with significant others. From the time in early
childhood when the boundary is defined between self and others, within
which identity is to take shape, the self-schema, which expresses such
knowledge of self as has emerged from previous experience, becomes the
dominating schema for interaction and learning. The sense of identity
imposes coherence and direction upon experience, establishes a
relationship between past, present and future and between separate
areas of experience. But identity is not given ready-made. It emerges
and develops in the course of social interaction.
Identity is not only a developmental achievement; it is also a
social construct. The schemata which go to make up the individual's
world model are taken over from others. The same is true of the
elements which make up the self-schema. Knowledge of oneself emerges
in relationship with others, in particular such significant others as
parents, spouse, employer or friends, but including also those less
direct, more impersonal relationships with society in general, the
outcome of one's social background or occupation. The ability to "take
the role" or stance of others, to understand and respond to another's
point of view, including the values, goals, attitudes and opinions of
others, allows the child to infer others' evaluation of herself,
expressed as much in pre-verbal, affective communication as in
language and conscious actions.
The basic values and orientations which are to become the
foundations of identity are learned in the context of the family. In
particular, it is parents' evaluation of oneself which have greatest
significance. In the course of development, the experience expressed,
"I am loved," comes to be generalised as, "I am lovable." Unfortunately,
the reverse is equally true. Lack of the experience of being loved in
early life can lead to the inability to receive love as an adult. But
the family unit as the original matrix of socialisation very quickly
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becomes part of the child's wider experience. In modern society, where
children are exposed to institutional and peer group influences from
an early age, not to mention those of the media of mass communication,
the family is much less of a "total" institution than it might once
have been. Peer group influence begins virtually as soon as the child
meets others of her own age, but reaches its greatest importance
during adolescence. School teachers become significant others, with
powers of reinforcement and personal influence. The school itself
Imposes a particular set of values by institutional means rather than
by direct personal influence. Television provides a wide variety of
possible adult or peer group models.23
All these relationships, whether personal or impersonal, mediated
or direct, give the child the opportunity to observe a particular value
or set of values or a particular way of experiencing the world in
action and to try these out for herself by taking the role of the
other, reconstructing their values and applying them to her own
experience. The plurality of relationships in which the child is
involved presents the problem of inconsistent socialisation. The
values of home may differ from those of school or friends. The tactics
used to cope with inconsistent socialisation may have a considerable
effect on the development of personality. Depending on her own
strength of will and character and the attractiveness of the various
groups, the child may adopt one pervasive loyalty, or compartmentalise
her loyalty, taking on different value systems in different situations.
She may attempt to balance the various roles and loyalties demanded,
maintaining a psychological distance from any particular one, or she
may begin to reject the authority of all or some others. The ideal
adult solution is the integration of the various roles demanded into a
secure identity, which enables reciprocal influence in most, if not all,
reference groups, but this solution is rarely available to the child
and is by no means uniformly successful even in adulthood.24
One of the most important ways in which the development and
internalisation of values takes place is through play. In play, the
child is able to try out the role of parent, friend or some other
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model, as far as she is able to grasp it, vicariously expanding her
experience of life. George Herbert Mead drew attention to an important
step forward in the transition from "play' to "the game". Whereas in
"play", as he defined it, the child takes on or interacts with one role
at a time, in "the game" the participant must construct the role of all
the players simultaneously. She must respond to the game as such,
rather than to any one player individually. To achieve this requires
the construction of a generalised other, which embodies both the rules
and the purpose of the game.26
Ability to engage in the "game", governed by a corporate role, is
the foundation for one of the most important features of adult life,
membership of a variety of "reference groups".26 Reference groups may
be large or small, temporary or permanent. They include the family and
the state, regular workmates or the occupants of a railway
compartment. Some reference groups, such as history or "posterity",
may not even exist in the present. One individual plays many roles. He
may be husband and father, employee, committee member, club or church
member, citizen or sports enthusiast. Each role is corporately defined
by the members of the appropriate reference group, who through the
appropriate channels of communication, be it direct personal
communication, journal or mass media, define a generalised other for
the particular group. The generalised other is the representation of
the collective role, to which the individual responds. Like all
schemata, the generalised other includes certain elements as
mandatory, definitive of the role, others to be filled in according to
the preference of the individuals involved. A waiter, for example, has
a job to do, but the relationship he attempts to cultivate with the
patrons may be less tightly defined. Similarly, the role of a
committee chairman is made up partly of mandatory expectations,
partly of a range of options. He may be easy-going or a stickler for
procedure, authoritarian or democratic.
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A reference group has two components:
a) the people who belong to the group,
b) the perspectives which they share.
Membership of a particular reference group involves sharing a certain
definition of the relevant situation, at least to the extent necessary
for participation in the group. This definition forms the foundation
for the personal relationships which develop within the frame of
reference thus provided. A committee must share a definition of its
task, a club exists for the benefit of those who share the same
interests and the stability of a state requires a certain degree of
consensus. As a reference group, membership of the church involves
these two components, the members and the shared perspectives.
Belonging to the church means both sharing fellowship with a
particular group of people and sharing the perspective of Christian
commitment. Through the provision of a shared perspective, to which
all the members can relate, reference groups contribute to the
formation of individual identity. A person may express his knowledge
of himself as "The best 400 metre runner in my athletics club","A
valued member of the church choir", or An up-and-coming young
executive"?'
Each individual is the unique intersection of a number of
reference groups. Each person has many roles, each one defined by the
perspectives shared within a particular group. The fragmentation of a
pluralist society allows the possibility of social mobility and the
relative independence from all-pervasive social norms afforded by a
choice of roles and reference groups. It also introduces the
possibility of role and group conflict, similar to the problem of
inconsistent socialisation in childhood, but here a potentially
disruptive factor for adult identity. The task of maintaining a
coherent identity involves the resolution of potential conflict between
the norms or the demands of different groups. Reference groups differ
in power and attractiveness, with respect to both the shared
perspectives and the affective ties between the members. The degree of
dependence of a particular individual on the opinions of others will
depend upon the overall security of his identity and self-esteem.28
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4. Identity Formation as the Motivation for Learning
Each individual is a member of a number of reference groups,
each with its distinct frame of reference. Each group comprises what
Wittgenstein called a "form of life". The group's frame of reference is
what he called a "language game". The meaning of terms is defined by
their role in that particular language game or frame of reference.23
One of the questions raised by the recognition of the existence of
distinct forms of life is whether and, if so, how the terms of one
language game may be translated into those of another. The
translatability of terms between language games is not achieved by
means of explicit rules but by the synthesis of frames of reference in
the identities of individuals. The relationship between language games
and social worlds is unique to each individual. As the unique point of
intersection of many channels of communication, each individual
inhabits a personal "universe of discourse", and establishes a unique
relationship between frames of reference within his own identity. 3° A
person's universe of discourse is the equivalent of his world model. It
comprises the totality of his knowledge, organised by means of typical
roles or situations.
Identity, or the "self-scheme, is the dominating schema which
brings cohesion to all the separate roles, reference groups or
language games in which the individual is involved. The "self-schema",
which includes various items of information, one's appearance, personal
characteristics, capabilities, background, social roles, likes and
dislikes, motives and goals, is implicit in all cognition, but it is
the affective factors which dominate and provide its coherence:3 ' A
person may be only dimly aware of the tacit and affective
presuppositions of his own behaviour, of the underlying causes of his
reactions to particular situations.
Like any other schema. the self-schema is an item of tacit
knowledge. No schema is an inert body of knowledge waiting to be
drawn upon, like some kind of cognitive reference library. Schemata
are actively organised, such that evaluations and inferences are
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already implicit within them. Knowledge of one's appearance, abilities,
preferences and so on, is not simply recorded but referenced to
relevant situations, such as relations with the opposite sex, job, and
leisure activities. The self-schema enters cognitive interaction in the
form of the self-segment of the particular schema being deployed,
according to the situation. In general, then, self-knowledge remains
specific to social role. Knowledge of the self is a complex of
cognitive, affective and volitional elements arising within the
framework of personal interaction.32
This personal interaction is the social context for a complex,
intra-psychological process of self-relation in which identity is
formed and maintained, which was termed, by George Herbert Mead, the
"I-me" relationship.33 "Me" is the socially constructed "self" or
persona, the complex of others' attitudes assumed by the self in the
process of self-definition. "I" is the response of the individual to
those attitudes. In order to be a member of society, the individual
must take up certain roles, for which the standards of acceptable
performance are socially defined. He must accept, for the purposes of
performing the role, the perspective of the particular reference group
within which the role acquires its meaning. But a role is not
necessarily a rigid set of expectations. More often, there is a
continuum of acceptable responses. The waiter may be friendly or
formal, the committee chairman authoritarian or democratic, the
teacher strict or easy-going, the father aloof or involved. By
selecting a particular response, an individual not only takes but
simultaneously makes a role. The decision as to how to play the role
is that of the "P'. Role-taking is a practical example of the response
of the "I" to the socially organised "me". A person is "I" and "me" in
relationship.34
The "I-me" relationship is essentially an evaluative relationship.
The "I" evaluates the social self expressed in the "me" and responds
accordingly. The way in which a role is taken up expresses an
evaluation of the role. We may identify with it wholeheartedly or
attempt to distance ourselves from it as a necessary but distasteful
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part of social obligation. The "I-me" relationship is an expression of
self-evaluation. It is as if the presence of others automatically calls
out an evaluation of oneself. Since the "generalised other" is an ever-
present feature, at least of adult life, self-evaluation is potentially
continuous and all-pervasive.3s
It is this evaluative relationship, lying at the heart of self-
relation, which is the matrix of the learning process. The two related
aspects of learning are the development of a psychological world-view
or world-model and the formation of identity or a self-model. Of these
two related aspects it is the formation and maintenance of identity
which acts as the principal motivating factor in learning. The
priority of the maintenance of self-esteem, or evaluative coherence,
has been illustrated from the study of attitudes.36 Attitudes are
affectively organised schemata, which unify cognitions of a given
aspect of experience by means of an evaluative gestalt. They are,
moreover, resistant to change, and the source of this resistance lies
In the need to maintain and defend identity. The flexibility of a
person's psychological world-model, his ability to learn, depends on
the degree to which his identity is capable of change and
readjustment. If the accommodation of new information requires an
adjustment of identity which is regarded as too costly to evaluative
coherence, the new information may be rejected or distorted.37
Another example of the influence of self-worth and the priority
given to its defence is given by Richard Ecker in his account of the
sources of stress. °13 Stress, he contends, is not directly caused by
circumstances but indirectly, by the person's interpretation of the
circumstances. When a person interprets a particular situation as
likely to cause a threat to his stability or self-worth the result is
a stress response, in which the body prepares itself to combat the
Imagined threat. The reason for the faulty interpretation which gives
rise to the stress response is the perceived threat to conditions
which the person believes, either consciously or unconsciously, to be
necessary to self-esteem. Such a condition is most often the need to
maintain the control of an inter-personal situation. Very frequently,
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it will be the attainment of a standard of achievement necessary for
positive self-evaluation. The way to avoid stress, Ecker contends, is
to identify the condition for self-worth which is the source of the
faulty perception of the situation and seek to change or remove it.
Ecker's account of stress is an example of the fundamentally affective
nature of the "me" or self-schema and an indication of the deep level
of personality at which the "I-me" relation takes place.
A particularly good example of the relation between learning and
identity formation is the case of bereavement. The bereaved person,
particularly the bereaved spouse, has lost a part of his or her
identity with the death of the partner. In the months which follow, a
great deal of what Colin Murray Parkes calls "grief-work" must take
place, by means of which the bereaved person readjusts to life on
their own by recovering those aspects of identity lost with
bereavement. The bereaved wife may have to take on the role of bread-
winner, learn to drive a car, fill in tax forms and provide as much as
possible of what her children now lack in the absence of a father. All
these learning tasks contribute to and arise from the need to discover
a new identity - both socially, in regaining a satisfactory complex of
roles in society, and psychologically, in learning to do without the
support of friend, provider and sexual partner. The loss of a partner
is, moreover, only one type of bereavement. Other kinds of loss,
including the loss of a limb, the loss of a job and moving house,
require similar responses. The learning of new skills, new roles and
new identity is interwoven.39
The influence of identity formation can be seen most clearly in
the difference between adults and children in regard to learning.
Children typically learn much faster and more efficiently than do
adults, a finding which has puzzled many researchers. Most children
acquire their first language quickly and naturally at a very early age,
and yet the ability to speak a language is so complex that it defies
analysis. Throughout their schooling, children continue to learn
quickly, but with the arrival of adolescence, many begin to display a
marked reluctance to learn, and a questioning of the value of the
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information offered them. Although adults, especially those in
occupations which require them to do so, may continue to learn
throughout their lives, many fail to do so. Their learning becomes
predominantly task-related, limited to what is necessary to enable
them to fulfil social roles and occupations.4° The reason for these
differences between adults and children can readily be seen to be
attributable to the difference in regard to identity formation. For
children, not only is there an overwhelming need to comprehend the
environment in order to cope with it, but the role of learner is part
of the identity of a child. A child is willing to learn what parents
and teachers tell her she needs to learn, because she defines herself
as an aspiring adult, and her goal is to learn to be like them. The
adult, however, learns easily only those things required for the
maintenance and extension of her identity in those areas clearly seen
to be relevant to her. If the demands of occupational advancement or
of social role, such as having a baby, make it necessary, learning can
be just as quick and efficient as for the child. For both adults and
children, the extent of the ability to learn is dependent on the
process of identity formation and maintenance.
Identity is more than the formal link between the processes of
cognitive and of social interaction. Not only is identity the means of
psychological coherence and of social cohesion, it is the formation of
Identity which is the principle motivating factor in both processes.
It is the quest for identity, and the need to maintain and defend
identity which gives rise to the learning process. It is not simply
that learning and identity formation are two sides of the same coin.
It is identity which has the priority.
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knower" as an aspect of the proprium, When the essay was reprinted in 1968, he
explained in a preface that he had changed his mind on this point, Of the other
aspects, he commented,
All these functions can be, and are, objects of knowledge, In this
sense they comprise what James called the "empirical me"But the
nature of "the knower" - the process of knowing that we know - is
still elusive, and is not itself an object of knowledge„,Hence, in my
book Pattern and Growth in Personality I have separated the problem of
the knower (and consigned it to philosophy)„,
(Gordon and Gergen, p,25)
36, See above, p,102-105,
37, See also p,101 on cognitive dissonance, As an explanation of behaviour,
cognitive dissonance theory also relies on the assumption that self-related
premises form the context in which dissonance arises,
38, Ecker, Stress Myth,
39, Parkes, Bereavement,
40, See Knowles, Modern Practice, especially Exhibit 4, p,43-44,
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CHAPTER FIVE
Human Autonomy in the Process of Revelation
The best of workmen decided that that to which nothing of its very own could be
given should be, in composite fashion given, whatsoever had belonged individually
to each and everything, Therefore, he took up man, a work of indeterminate form;
and placing him at the midpoint of the world, he spoke to him as follows; 'We have
given thee, Adam, no fixed seat, no form of thy very own, no gift peculiarly thine,
that thou mayest feel as thine own, possess as thine own seat, the form, the gifts
which thou shalt desire„,Thou, like a judge appointed for being honourable, art
the moulder and maker of thyself; thou mayest sculpt thyself into whatever shape
thou dost prefer, Thou canst grow downwards into the lower natures which are
brutes, Thou canst again grow upward from thy soul's reason into higher natures
which are divine,
Pico della Miranddla'
Whoever I am, Thou knowest, 0 God, I am thine!
Dietrich Bonhoeffer2
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1. The Image of God
In the previous three chapters the mechanisms of the learning
process have been explored. The question now to be attempted is the
relation between these and the processes by which revelation is
received. Is there a continuity between learning and the reception of
revelation or a discontinuity? Are the cognitive processes used in
comprehending and responding to revelation those of natural human
learning or does the discontinuity between the natural and the
supernatural or between sinful men and women and a holy God
necessitate some altogether different means of understanding?
The account of learning requires for its coherence an overall
theoretical framework consisting of an "image of man" or explanation
of the fundamental nature of human beings. If the study of learning is
to be related to that of revelation, then the anthropology by which it
is undergirded must be theologically justified. Two aspects of this
anthropology are particularly relevant:
a) The image of the learner.
This includes a definition of the form of knowledge, as well as a
description of the way knowledge, skills and attitudes are acquired
and developed. It involves, in particular, an account of the sources of
motivation which control and direct the orientation to learning.
b) An account of men and women as receivers of revelation.
This includes the definition of revelation and its relation to
philosophical accounts of man, his significance, destiny etc. It
involves an account of the possibility of knowledge of transcendent
reality. But its most important element is an account of the
relationship between God and mankind within which divine
communication may be understood to take place.
Each of the others having been dealt with, it is the last and most
important of these elements which forms the subject for this chapter.
It is only comparatively recently that theological anthropology
has become a subject in its own right. Discussion of "human nature"
has always been implicitly an element in the understanding of the
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nature of sin or "fallenness", of the nature of the redemption
available in Christ and of the destiny to which human beings are
called. But in the second half of this century it is increasingly
recognised that anthropology holds the key to theology. With the
abandonment of the cosmological approach to God, the belief in the
possibility of using the creation as the starting point for the
interpretation of the divine nature and attributes, the anthropological
approach, the starting point from the question of human nature, has
had to bear increasing philosophical weight.3 Moreover, as David
Jenkins maintained, in a world which is everywhere threatened by
depersonalisation, concern with the nature and significance of persons
has tended to move towards the top of the theological agenda/4
The most important Biblical statement on the nature of humanity
is to be found in the account of divine creation in Genesis 1,
particularly verses 26-28:
Then God said, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and
let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of
the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every
creeping thing that creeps upon the earth," So God created man in his
own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he
created them, And God blessed them, and said to them, "Be fruitful and
multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it, and have dominion over the
fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living
thing that moves upon the earth,"
The statement that men and women are created "in the image of God" is
repeated twice more. Genesis 5:3 implies in addition that Adam passed
on the "image" to his son through the normal processes of biological
descent, and Genesis 9:5-6 reaffirms the dignity that goes with the
possession of the image in its prohibition of murder on these grounds.
Both these passages clearly imply that the possession and
transmission of the image survived the Fall, that the image of God in
mankind is not eradicated by human sinfulnis
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Although these passages in Genesis, all three from the Priestly
source, are the only references in the Old Testament to the image of
God, it is clear that what they convey is of great importance. They
sum up an evaluation of human nature which is everywhere implicit in
the other literature, and which, most significantly, is taken up in the
New Testament to express the significance of the Incarnation of Jesus
Christ. G It is not clear from these passages, however, in what
precisely the image of God in humankind consists. Its significance is
everywhere assumed, but nowhere explained. The best that can be
achieved is to attempt to infer from the context what it is to which
the "image" refers. Thus, several possibilities have been suggested.
a) It is assumed, in modern discussions, that the words "image"
and "likeness", in Hebrew, selem and demut, are to be taken as poetical
parallels, amplifying and explaining one another. This being so, the
term selem refers to a physical, plastic image, while demut means
predominantly abstract "appearance" or "similarity'. Commentators have
taken these terms to imply that it is the whole person, including the
physical nature which represents the image of God, and not some
particular aspect. This is reinforced by the insistence that throughout
the Old Testament, a person is understood as a spiritual-
psychological-physical unity."
b) In the Ancient Near East, it was the king who was regarded as
the earthly representative or image of God. By the application of this
phrase to all mankind, the human role as God's agent in creation is
stressed. The Genesis account twice links the creation of humanity in
God's image intimately with their commission to have dominion over
the world and everything in it. If the human vocation to rule over
creation is not included in the image, it is at the very least implied
by it.G
c) Karl Barth believed that the significance of the image was
explained by the words, "Male and female he created them." These
words, he argued, were to be taken as exegesis of the previous
statement. That the existence of men and women in community or
encounter is to be taken as essential to their being is suggested also
by the words of God at this point, "Let us create..." The male-female
relationship, Barth believed, was the archetypal encounter and the
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basis of all the other "I-Thou" relationships of which human life is
constituted .9
Each of these suggestions expresses an important aspect of
Biblical anthropology, but the significance of the use of the phrase,
"image of God" as a description of mankind's essential nature lies in
another direction. It suggests not only that human beings reflect the
nature of God, but that the nature of human beings is to be known only
in the light of the nature of God himself. There can be no knowledge
of mankind's real nature without a corresponding revelation of the
nature of God. Thus, the very fact that the human being is described
as God's image reinforces the conclusion of an earlier section that
the point of entry of divine revelation into human knowledge is that
unknown yet foundational "image of man" which lies behind every
person's consciousness of themselves and their world. The effect of
revelation, then, is to make sense of what we already know of
humankind from experience and reflection, to provide a framework
within which to interpret that experience. At the same time, it points
to the characteristics of God himself, insofar as they are revealed by
his dealings with mankind. The self-revelation of God occurs, in the
words of T.F.Torrance, within the "complex situation involving our
cognition of the world around us and of ourselves along with it."0
Human experience provides the context for the receipt of revelation,
as revelation reinterprets human experience."
The content of revelation, it has been argued, is itself an "image
of man", a vision of human being in relation to God and a disclosure
of the nature of that "image of God" which human beings share. It is
received at that level of human cognition at which definitive personal
Identity is sought, the elusive "I" at the heart of personality. Our
conclusion will be that the content of revelation is a Person, Jesus
Christ, through whom the image of God is revealed in the course of a
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human history. The revelation of God in Jesus Christ has three
aspects:
a) His life, death and resurrection.
b) The historical context in which they took place. The Old
Testament as the history of Israel provides the categories for
understanding the significance of Christ.
c) The outpouring of the Holy Spirit, which is a consequence of
the exaltation of Christ and enables the contemporary appropriation of
the revelation.
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2. The Elusive Agent
One of the most important aspects of the biblical account of
creation is the distinction between mankind and the rest of creation.
This distinction goes beyond the vocation to "have dominion" over the
animals. It is emphasised by the fact that at the point at which the
creation of man is described, the verb bat-a, used exclusively of the
divine activity of creation, signifying perhaps creation out of
nothing, is reintroduced and solemnly repeated:
So God creatsiman in his own image,
in the image of God he created him:
male and female he created them,
The implication appears to be that there is something distinctive
about human beings which is not shared with the rest of creation,
including the animals. This uniqueness is expressed by the author of
Psalm 8. "Man", he observes is only a creature, hardly significant when
compared with the grandeur of, for example, the heavens. Yet it is he
who is made "little less than God" and crowned with glory and honour.
There is a dignity given to men and women which is not shared with
any other creature. The fact that human beings are created in God's
Image implies that there is something unique and highly significant
about mankind, which distinguishes them from the rest of creation.'2
The first conclusion to be drawn from this distinction between
persons and nature is that Christian anthropology rejects the tendency
to reductionism of much, if not most, of modern social science. In this
context, "reductionism" refers to the assumption, implicit in the
"unity of science" hypothesis classically expressed by John Stuart
Mill, that the phenomena of human behaviour may properly be explained
In the same terms and with reference to the same underlying causes as
those of nature.' 3 This type of reductionism is philosophically
related to the reductionism of empiricism, as expressed in Quine's two
dogmas, through the methodological assumption that any meaningful
description of human behaviour could, in principle, be verified by
appealing to non-problematic empirical observation.'- Christian
anthropology tends, therefore, to support the "hermeneutical" rather
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than the reductionist approach to social science, the method of
Dilthey and Weber, in which the meaningful level of description of
human behaviour is that which takes into account the "agent's point of
view" and the correct method of understanding that which is termed,
verstehen.'s
While the Priestly writer of the first chapter of Genesis makes
use of technical, theological terminology in order to preserve the
distance between God and his creation, the Yahwistic narrative is not
afraid to express the essential distinction between nature and
humanity by means of a homely and frankly anthropomorphic
description.
Then the LORD God formed man of dust from the ground, and breathed
into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being,'
In contrast to the beasts of the field and the birds of the air, who
are simply formed from the ground," the man is not simply thus
formed, but receives also the divine breath or ruacl, with the result
that he becomes nephesh, a living soul or being. The continuity
between persons and nature, expressed here in his creation from dust,
as well as the words of judgement on their life uttered on the
occasion of his banishment from the garden,' e is not to be ignored. In
the last one hundred years we have become more aware than ever before
of the extent of what we share with the animals in terms of the
instinctive foundations of our behaviour patterns. But the picture in
which a person's life or nephesh originates with the breath of God
points to an essential distinction from nature not shared with the
animals, expressed, as in the Priestly account, in the dominion of the
man over the animals implied by his naming of them.'e
This essential distinction between nature and humankind emerges
in the phenomenon of human culture. Whereas for the animal kingdom,
the conditions of life are governed directly by their particular
ecological niche, for men and women, the environment is mediated by
both the creative and interpretative aspects of culture. The
distinction is expressed in the phenomenon of human subjectivity, the
fact that men and women are conscious of themselves as subjects,
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which has emerged repeatedly in the investigation of the learning
process. Cognitive processes, including perception, comprehension and
learning, require the activity of a subject. The subject acts as the
interpreter of experience, assimilating information selected for
attention to the structures of cognition arising out of previous
experience. The existence of subjects creates a logical oddity,
referred to by Gilbert Ryle as the "systematic elusiveness" of "I". It
is impossible to confine the subjective "I" within tightly defined
logical categories.2° As Ian Ramsey pointed out, the nearest it is
possible to come to a definition is to describe the sort of situation
in which speaking of "I" makes sense. 2 ' Despite raising the problem of
the "elusiveness" of "I", Ryle attempts to avoid the implication that
subjects actually exist as entities distinct from and irreducible to
the world which is capable of description. According to Ryle, the use
of "I" is an example of a "higher order action" which is a commentary
upon, and so refers to, another action. Since the action which is the
object of the higher order action must be in the past, the relations
between actions and higher order actions is simply one of temporal
series. The last act is at any given time the "P'. It is unanalysable
for the same reason that a diarist cannot record the act of recording
the last act in his diary, or a review be its own subject.22 Ryle's
theory may be understood as a logically expressed version of William
James's psychological argument that the "I" of experience was nothing
more than the stream of thought and not a metaphysical entity.23
The logical impossibility of a commentary being about itself is
not an adequate reflection of the dimensions of the problem. This
impossibility applies only to the level of description or syntax. At
the semantic level, every commentary is, implicitly, about itself,
because it is presented as a commentary, that is within the context of
intersubjective convention required for meaningful communication. This
context includes a set of conventions irreducible to description, which
are simply taken for granted, amongst which is the experience of
oneself as the subject of one's actions and judgements. There is a
qualitative difference between reflection on a past action and the
immediate self-awareness which is present in the act of judgement
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itself. This difference reflects the fact that the subject can never
become an object, an element of the world available to experience in
the same way as other objects. The interpreting subject cannot be
directly observed. Its presence is an inference from the process of
interpretation.24
The peculiar logical status of the subject of cognitive processes
is analogous to that of the "I" in the process of self-relation and
social interaction in which identity is formed. In the "I-me"
relationship, the "I" is the interpreter and evaluator of the self in
the multiplicity of its roles and relations. There is, in Erikson's
words, a need for a "central organising agency" as creator and
maintainer of the self. 26 Identity or "self" is that part of the person
which Jung called the persona, the "mask" which arises as a
compromise between the individual and society. 2G Paul Tournier calls
it the personage, which is distinguished from the underlying person,
or real self.27 The "self" is a social and psychological construct, an
abstraction from experience. "Identity", in this sense, is essentially
synthetic and provisional. But the existence of such a synthetic
identity seems to demand an underlying "real" self or person, of which
identity is the creation. It is the nature of this "I" which is at the
root of the problem of identity.
The distinction between human beings and the rest of creation is
reflected in a discontinuity in the pattern of explanation appropriate
to the natural world due to the presence of the interpreting subject.
This discontinuity is expressed in the process of decision. As Aurel
Kolnai puts it,
Action is not a 'resultant' of psychic urges pressures yearnings
cravings, attractions and repulsions forces or bents not an emergent
product of motives relevant to its context rather it is the execution
of a decree issued by something like a unitary self or ego or
'sovereign ruler' who consults those motives and is influenced
('inclined', 'pressured', 'instigated' or coaxed ) by them hut am
in its turn is in control of motility and directs its orings
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As we have observed, the intention of an agent can take the place of a
causal factor. Actions are to be distinguished from movements by the
fact that they can be seen to result from the intention of an agent
translated into purposeful movement by a process of decision. The
difference between, "I raise my arm," and "My arm goes up," is
precisely the intention of the speaker to raise his arm, which can be
said to cause the movement. 29 Advocates of the "unity of science"
argue that the "decision" could, in principle, be explained in terms of
the natural chain of causation, thus abolishing the need for Kolnai's
"self', 'ego' or 'sovereign ruler". If this were the case, however, such
a decision would, in principle, be predictable from a chain of natural
causation. For an agent to predict a decision would involve consulting
not the motive from which he expects to be acting at the time
concerned, but the causes he predicts to be operating upon him. This
is to blur the distinction between the theoretical and the practical,
to reduce all meaningful explanation to verifiable description in the
same way as logical positivism. Faced with the necessity of action,
the agent does not attempt to estimate the relative valency of causal
factors, but consults his motives and decides. This is what is meant
by saying that motives influence but do not compel.°°
The agent thus retains a measure of freedom of decision within
the natural world, without thereby invalidating the laws which govern
the course of nature. In fact, the agent's decision itself operates in
the same way as a natural cause, and more often than not the means by
which the agent's decision is carried out is his body, through which
he is himself a part of the natural, physical world. Thus, formed from
dust yet animated by the breath of God, mankind is both part of
creation yet stands over against it. Rather than subject to the one
executive will expressed in the universal causal laws of creation, each
person is a little executive, an independent centre of action.
The rejection of determinism poses the problem of the extent of
the freedom available to the agent. In the interactionist framework
proposed above, the choice between freedom and determinism is resolved
in favour of "situational choice".3 ' It has frequently been remarked
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that the extent to which it is possible for the agent to exercise his
freedom is governed by the extent of his knowledge. 32 The theory of
learning advanced in chapters 2 and 3 above adds to this the
observation that the individual's knowledge is situation-specific.
Comprehension is limited by the necessity to deploy a given schema,
which stereotypes the situation in a certain way. The individual's
response is to the situation as he defines it. The options available
are limited by the way in which situations of a similar type have
previously been understood and structured. Psychosocial theory offers
an example of this general approach. There, the way in which the
crisis of each developmental stage is resolved either imposes limits
on or offers resources for the resolution of future crises. 3 Finally,
the most important limitation on individual freedom is the power of
the agency of others. No individual is entirely independent of the
opinions and the esteem of others. There is, as Schleiermacher
observed, a degree of freedom and dependence in all our relationships.
As inhabitants of a shared world in which all cognitions are held as
those of a particular reference group, the power of the group or of
significant others is a major factor in the way the situation is
structured.34
If the agency of others imposes limits on the individual's
freedom of action, it is a feature of the relationship between God and
mankind as recorded in Scripture that God is able to accomplish his
purposes by means of human decisions without in any way limiting the
freedom of situational choice of those through whom he acts. That this
is the case is implicit in a wide range of Old Testament literature,
of which one of the most celebrated examples is the "Succession
Narrative" of 2 Samuel and 1 Kings. This document sets out to explain
how it was that Solomon became king in succession to David, a process
purposed by God from the day of his birth, but achieved with the
minimum of direct divine involvement. One of the principle features of
the "secular" world-view of the author, presumably a member of
Solomon's court, is the way in which God is seen to be at work in and
through the decisions of men and women. This feature is echoed
elsewhere, in the stories of Joseph and of Ruth, for example. In the
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prophets, Isaiah, Jeremiah and most notably Deutero-Isaiah assert that
God makes use of heathen nations in order to accomplish his purposes
for Israel. In the wisdom literature, the mind and decisions of kings
is said to be in the Lord's hands. The most telling and difficult
examples of this relationship between the purposes of God and of
people occur in the New Testament, first in the case of Judas, and
then in the case of Israel as a whole, whose hardening, Paul argues,
using the case of Pharaoh as an example, is a necessary part of God's
purpose of extending his salvation to the Gentiles.s
It may be correct to discern a parallel between this situation,
In which God works through human agency without limiting the freedom
of human decision and the way in which human freedom operates without
invalidating the natural laws governing the creation as a whole.
However that may be, there remains the question of the relation
between the dependence of men and women upon God as creator and the
sphere of human independence. Reviewing the situation in modern
theological anthropology, David Kelsey concludes that there are two
types of relationship between God and mankind which need to be
distinguished. The one is an unchanging and unchangeable relationship,
the relationship to God in creation and preservation, in which God
upholds the universe for the benefit of mankind. In this relationship,
humanity is radically dependent and cannot be otherwise. But this
relationship is logically distinct from any relationship constituted
by the possibility of the knowledge of God, or of sin and redemption.
"In modern theology," he concludes, however, "these two kinds of
relationships between persons as creatures and God have collapsed into
one kind of relationship, consisting in a mode of consciousness or a
conscious decision, and admitting of degree." What is required, Kelsey
concludes, is the recovery of a full-blown doctrine of creation to take
the weight of the dependence which is an unavoidable dimension of
human existence, in order to give men and women as agents their full
place in the account of sin, salvation and the knowledge of God, and
to allow for the modern consciousness of mankind as autonomous, self-
constituting and historically conditioned.36
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With the recovery of this distinction, the fact that persons are
agents, independent centres of decision and action within the created
world, is to be seen as the result of divine endowment. From this
follow all the features which govern the conditions of human knowledge
examined in the previous four chapters. The creation of a
psychological world-model through the essentially hermeneutical
process of interaction is the work of the active subject. The result of
this process is precisely that lack of a definitive "human nature"
which results in the necessity for self-constitution, on the part of
both individual and society, and which thus gives rise to the
historical nature of human self-consciousness. It is precisely this
proper autonomy of mankind in which the image of God consists.37
It is, moreover, a consequence of this interpretation that it
involves the interpersonal aspect of human existence as a further
aspect of the image. All knowing is a "knowing with". The fact that
learning takes place in a social context is not merely a contingent
but a necessary and integral part of identity formation. The
recognition of significant persons is a necessity for the creation of
schemata for the comprehension of the world. In particular, it is
impossible to develop a self-concept except in the context of close
relationships with others. The boundary between self and others is a
fluctuating and permeable one. It is possible for others and even for
things to become part of the self in the sense that they constitute
part of that area of experience which is loved and defended. 38 What we
call "me" is a particularly highly valued selection of the attitudes of
others. Knowledge arises within the evaluative frameworks generated by
relationships. Without others, there would be no self-evaluation, no
self-knowledge and no knowledge of the world. As a person exists
unavoidably in interaction with the world, so he exists unavoidably in
relationship with others. Awareness of "I" is awareness of being in
encounter.3*9
Finally, some account is needed of the estrangement from God
generally referred to as sin. It is a feature of virtually every
philosophical anthropology that it includes, as well as an assessment
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of the nature and destiny, a diagnosis of the essential problem of
mankind and a prescription for its solution. 4° There is a
contradiction at the heart of human existence whose effects are
inescapable, even though its cause, like the essence of human nature
itself, defies precise analysis. Like the nature of mankind, the
precise nature of sin requires revelation for its illumination, since
it has to do with the relation between God and man. Sin is a
distortion of value, a failure to act from the highest available value
in a given situation, usually because of the force of the competing
claims of some end of greater value to oneself. The salience of any
given object or goal, as reflected in the more or less stable attitudes
which form predispositions to action, is measured by its contribution
to the formation, maintenance and defence of personal identity. The
preference of some other good involves the costly sacrifice of some
preferred value, although this may be compensated for by the ability
to strengthen the image of oneself as a generous or altruistic person.
Even given the desire to promote the good of others, the individual is
compelled to work from within his own world-view or that of his
reference group.
At the root of this predicament is the lack of a definite image
of man or estimate of one's own true nature and value. In the absence
of any definite knowledge of the real Or uaderl3ims szli, all ''-
judgements are based on the need to construct and maintain the social
self, the persona or personage. Sinfulness and the lack of identity
turn out to have a common root. In respect of sin, without the
knowledge of God mankind is condemned to choosing on the basis of
lesser values. Without the possibility of knowing and choosing God,
his every act is unavoidably sinful. In respect of identity, man
without the knowledge of God becomes, in the words of Reinhold
Niebuhr, a "problem to himself", 4 ' The implication is that the
discovery of true identity allows the possibility of the choice of the
highest good. The person whose actions reflect a secure knowledge of
their own essential nature and value, though he may not avoid sin
automatically, is at least enabled to make choices which are no longer
dictated by the need to maintain an essentially inauthentic identity.4-2
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3. The Spirit of Revelation 
Like the cognitive processes of which it is the outcome, learning
involves the activity of the subject. In perception, there is a balance
to be observed between the constructive activity of the imagination,
expressed in the formulation of "perceptual hypotheses", and the
adjustment of imagination to the environment, expressed in the
confirmation of the hypothesis and adaptation of the underlying
schema to the information received. A similar balance is observed
between the processes of assimilation and accommodation. In the one,
the learner interprets the material in order to comprehend it in terms
of his previous understanding. In the other, it is the pattern of the
learner's understanding which is changed. The outcome is that the form
of knowledge differs from individual to individual according to the
circumstances in which and the process by means of which it has been
learned. If revelation is to be learned, it must not only be capable of
bringing about fundamental change in the believer, but it must be
capable also of becoming subject to the process of shaping and
alteration involved in assimilation without lasing thereby its
character as revelation.43
The activity of the subject observed in learning is the outcome
of the freedom of the agent. Restricted as it may be by the
constraints of social context, it is this essential freedom which is
expressed in the search for authentic identity, whose outcome is
learning. If revelation is to be received and understood by means of
the ordinary processes of learning then its form must reflect the fact
that the men and women to whom it is addressed are not only active
but autonomous. As the necessity of understanding salvation as due to
divine grace alone does not remove the necessity for insisting upon a
proper human autonomy, neither is this removed in the process of
revelation, which is, in any case, but one aspect of the gift of
salvation. Revelation must be understood in such a way as to take into
account these aspects of the learning process and the anthropology by
which that process is interpreted.
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The way in which this is to be achieved is by means of the
concept of "spirit" and in particular by means of an account of the
work of the Holy Spirit in revelation. On the one hand, the idea of
the human spirit is part of the terminology which expresses the
essential nature of mankind, closely related to the "image of God". On
the other hand, it is the Holy Spirit who is primarily responsible for
the subjective dimension of revelation", who speaks through the
prophets of both Old and New Testaments and who, it is promised, will
guide the believer into all truth. It is important that the doctrine of
the Holy Spirit not be simply "pulled out of a hat" at this point, as
the classic means of legitimation, in order to fill the gap left by the
Inexplicable. But on the other hand, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is
clearly relevant in this context. "Spirit" is a "bridge word", which
expresses the human relation with the transcendent. 4s What is required
is a coherent doctrine of the Spirit in relation to human nature, to
human knowledge and learning, and in relation to revelation, one which
will both explain and be illuminated by the model of learning and its
anthropological presuppositions presented so far.
It has been suggested that the description of the creation of
mankind in Genesis 2, in which God first, "formed man from the dust
of the ground," and then, "breathed into his nostrils the breath of
life," should be taken as a parallel to that which, in the first
chapter, is expressed by the creation of man in the "image of God".46
It is the breath or ruach of God which is pictured as the source of
human vitality, a vitality which, Reinhold Neibuhr insists, is not to
be confused with that which is proper to nature. The vitality of
humanity is a vitality of spirit. It is the spirit which upholds the
soul and enlivens the body, so that the unity of men and women as
soul and body is derived from and grounded in their dependence upon
God.47 The meaning of rvach in the Old Testament may be divided into
three groups:
1. wind
2. The force which vivifies men, the principle of life or breath,
and, derivative of this sense, the seat of knowledge and feeling.
3. The life of God, the force by which he acts and causes action.
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"Spirit" is not a category of substance, but of action or force, a
principle of energy." The "spirit" in man is thus the "seat of action"
or dominant disposition. It is possible to speak of a "spirit" of
Intelligence or of wisdom, a spirit of jealousy or of an "evil' spirit
from the Lord"." For this reason also, "spirit" is frequently a
parallel with "heart" where this refers to motive or intention.s°
The fact that the presence of spirit in men and women is
attributed to the breath of God implies that the distinctiveness of
mankind within the created order is due to a particular mode of
created relation with God. Exactly how this relationship is to be
described, however, is a point of controversy. On the one hand, the
conclusion may be drawn that the spirit by which a human being
subsists as a person is a partaking of the spiritual nature of God. As
Emil Brunner puts it,
Man can be person because and insofar as he has spirit, Personal being
is 'founded'	 in the spirit; the spirit is, so to speak, the
substratum, the element of personal being, But what is spirit?„,God
is spirit, man has spirit,51
Karl Barth, in his even more radical presentation, declares,
Man has Spirit. By putting it this way we describe the spirit as
something that comes to man, something not essentially his own but to
be received and actually received by him, something that totally
limits his constitution and thus totally determines it„,Man has
Spirit as one who is possessed by it,52
What Barth and Brunner have done, however, is to conflate the second
and third senses of "spirit" given above by subsuming the idea of
spirit as the principle underlying human life and consciousness under
that of spirit as the action of God. This has the effect of making the
very life of the person a divine action and removing the autonomy
proper to men and Women in their created relationship with God. It
also introduces the Holy Spirit unnecessarily into the relationship of
men and women to God as creatures. It is true to say that Scripture
speaks of the spirit of man as God's gift and under God's power, its
removal resulting in death, but the Holy Spirit, for whose return the
author of Psalm 51 prays, for example, is not the principle which
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upholds the psalmist's very life, but which upholds his relationship
with God, a relationship characterised by a "willing spirit". It is not
the Holy Spirit which animates the person as creature but the human
spirit, which, so long as he lives, is that person's possession. It is
only in the economy of salvation that a relationship between the Holy
Sprit and the spirit of man is effected.s3
It is the spirit, with which mankind is endowed at creation,
which is the source of human freedom, the foundation of human agency
and proper autonomy. "It is spirit that furnishes the key to the
Biblical understanding of man's self-transcendence; it is spirit that
keeps the relation between God and man essentially free and
personal."54 It is the same principle, the spiritual nature of mankind,
which governs both the essential nature of mankind and our
relationship with God. It is the spirit which gives a person the
capacity for a personal relationship with her creator, since it
preserves her essential freedom in relation to God. "A distinction
must be made between man's existential dependence on God, which he
shares with all living creatures and which applies to him as an
'ensouled body', and man's personal relation to God, which can be
realised only at the level of spirit.. .Man's relation to God, which
corresponds to the structure of his being as God's creature, can be
realised only by the free act of the human spirit."'56
When God intervenes through his Spirit in the affairs of men and
women, he does so by the infusion of a divine principle of action. The
Spirit of God "comes upon" particular people to enable them to carry
out God's will. This applies particularly to the judges, such as Gideon
and Samson, but also to such servants of God as Moses and Joshua,
Elijah and Elisha. With the establishment of the kingdom, the Spirit
is seen to be with the king in a particular way. In these instances,
it is by means of his Spirit that God is shown to achieve his will
through the actions of men without overriding their proper human
autonomy. The Spirit is given to God's servants as a principle or
spring of action enabling them to do God's will. By post-exilic times,
it had become customary to refer to the Spirit not simply as acting
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sporadically in and through particular men but as the means whereby
God had acted and continued to act throughout the whole history of
his people, in a way consistent with his personality, as well as the
mode of God's presence with his people.ss
There is, therefore, as Congar observes, a pattern of increasing
inwardness in Israel's understanding of her relation with God. When
God acts, it comes to be understood not simply as directed towards
the achievement of a certain political goal, such as military victory,
but towards the establishment of a relationship with such of his
people as he can find who are receptive. Initially, the scope of this
personal relationship is limited to particular chosen servants,
including the prophets, but by post-exilic times, it is seen as more
widely available, in particular to the "poor", such as those who speak
in such passages as Isaiah 63:7-14. It is the Spirit who supplies the
possibility of moral cleansing and of a holy life. In particular, a
time begins to be envisaged in which all will share in the personal
relationship with God which is the experience of the prophets, in
which all will participate in the Spirit, and in the book of Joel, this
hope is extended beyond the boundaries of Israel to embrace "all
flesh".s7
The f economy'„,to which the Scripture bears witness moves forward in
the direction of greater and deeper interiority: 'God all in all',
This progress is clear in the Old Testament, It reaches its conclusion
in the New Testament where it is connected with a more perfect
revelation and experience of the Spirit,"
The New Testament sees the fulfilment of what is foreseen under
the Old Covenant. The new age inaugurated with the coming of Jesus is
"the beginning of an eschatological period characterised by the gift
of the Spirit to a people of God with a universal vocation." 59 In place
of sporadic individual occurrences, the Spirit is given permanently
and fully in and then through Jesus Christ to lead each of God's
people to teleiosis, perfection or maturity.s° The fullness of the
Spirit is to be a characteristic of all Christians. In Galatians 3:14,
Paul writes that it is through the gift of the Spirit that the promise
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to Abraham is fulfilled.'" It was Lesslie Newbigin who pointed out the
existence of an important strand in the theology of Christian
experience which is frequently overlooked - the Pentecostal strand.
According to this strand, it is participation in the Spirit, which is a
definite and recognisable experience, which is the foundation of
Christian life and of membership of the Church. E.2
 The significance of
Newbigin's observation has been increasingly recognised since his
early work. According to James Dunn, baptism in the Spirit is the high
point of "conversion-initiation". The whole event involves repentance,
faith, forgiveness, union with Christ and the gift of the Holy Spirit,
but it is the gift of the Spirit which both completes and enables
Christian conversion and which demonstrates, both to the believer and
to others, that a genuine work of God, with the potential of bringing
about a changed life, has taken place.
€.3 As Hendry puts it, "The Spirit
is the subjective counterpart to the objective fact of Christ," 64 and
Congar writes, "The Spirit makes it possible for us to know and
recognise Christ. This is not simply a doctrinal statement. It is an
existential reality."65
The indwelling of the Holy Spirit introduces into the believer's
life a new centre of agency or principle of action, with the potential
of producing aspects of the divine character, expressed as the "fruit
of the Spirit", love joy, peace, patience, kindness and so on. 66 Given
at Pentecost, the festival at which was celebrated the giving of the
Law, the Spirit introduces a new law, the law of love, not as a written
code but, as the prophets foretold, as a centre of action in the human
heart.67
 But while the Spirit represents a new centre of action in
Christian experience, the believer is in no way constrained or
possessed by the Spirit. This is specifically the point of that
passage, beginning in 1 Corinthians 12, in which Paul deals with the
gifts of the Spirit in worship. It is, he maintains, the spirits of the
"dumb idols" which his readers previously worshipped which constrain
and possess. The Holy Spirit is not to be understood in this way, but
rather as working according to the character of God, which is love.
Rather, Paul maintains, in Galatians in particular, possession of the
Spirit brings authentic freedom, freedom from the constraints of the
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Law, which can only condemn, and freedom from the desires of "the
flesh", that orientation which is hostile to God and results in
"slavery" to evil desires. Possession of the Spirit is what enables
authentic personal choice against a background of sharp dichotomies,
light or darkness, faith or works, life or death and so on.ee To be
filled with the Spirit means not a replacement of substance but the
communication of an inner dynamism. "We become subjects of a quality
of existence and activities which go back to God's sphere of existence
and activity.""
It is the gift of the Holy Spirit which offers the believer the
possibility of the knowledge of God. It is the Spirit which enables
the ongoing process of revelation in the believer's life. "When the
Spirit of truth comes," Jesus declared, "he will guide you into all the
truth—He will glorify me, for he will take what is mine and declare
It to you." Knowledge of God, he declares, is the defining
characteristic of "eternal life".70 Revelation is a transaction between
the human spirit and the divine Spirit in which the Holy Spirit
touches, meets or "impinges" on the human spirit, to make God known at
a deep level of personaltty, 71 The Spirit witnesses 'with our spirits'
that we are children of God. 72 In revelation, God's self-consciousness
Is communicated by the Holy Spirit to the seat of human self-
consciousness, making the believer aware of his standing and
relationship with God. As Hendry puts it,
The Spirit constitutes the subjective condition which is necessary for
the apprehension and recognition of the objective self-manifestation
of God in Christ; for the Spirit is God knowing himself, and to
receive the Spirit is to participate in that knowledge,73
The most important passage in this context is 1 Corinthians 2:6-16.
There, Paul writes of the role of the Spirit in revelation and
explicitly draws an analogy between the human spirit as the seat of a
person's knowledge of his own thoughts and the Holy Spirit as the
communicator of God's own knowledge of himself. The kind of knowledge
available in this way through the Spirit is, Paul declares, unavailable
from any other source. The "unspiritual man", and indeed the "carnal"
Christian, cannot know the things of God, since it is only by the
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Spirit that they are made known. But the outcome for those who
possess the Spirit is the "mind of Christ". In the context of the
argument in 1 Corinthians, the "mind of Christ" refers to the
knowledge of the "depths of God", that wisdom which is available to
those who trust in Christ and so receive the Spirit. But the phrase
also carries overtones of another meaning, the "character" or
"attitude" of Christ, as for example in Philippians 2. The implication
is that the knowledge of God is something which works in a human life
from the inside out, beginning with the spirit, the seat of self-
consciousness or subjective identity and working outward through the
change in character enabled by the gift of the Spirit. Such "wisdom"
as does not arise in this way is, declares James, "unspiritual and
devilish."74
Knowledge of self and the world is the product of agency, that
power of choice and self-constitution with which men and women are
endowed in creation. In the same way, the subjective dimension of
revelation is the product of agency, God's own agency experienced by
the believer in the form of the indwelling Holy Spirit. Learning is the
outcome of a search for identity which is the expression of the God-
given power of self-constitution. Revelation, similarly, is the outcome
of the gift of a new identity as children of God on the model of Jesus
Christ, which is realised in the believer's life by means of the
Spirit. The source of revelation is supernatural, but the manner in
which it is appropriated is entirely natural. It involves the
mechanisms of learning and identity formation already in place as the
result of the created relationship with God which the believer shares
with all men and women. The experience of revelation is a process of
learning, but it is a process of a particular kind, one whose
distinctive characteristic is the centrality of Christ, whose Person
constitutes the objective datum of revelation.
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Phillips, I was curious, maybe even a little envious, about the
changes in his life, His explanation - that he had "accepted Jesus
Christ" - baffled me, I was tired, empty inside, sick of scandal and
accusations, but not once did I see myself as having really sinned,
Politics was a dirty business, and I was good at it, And what I had
done, I rationalised, was no different from the usual political
maneuvering, What's more, right and wrong were relative, and my
motives were for the good of the country - or so I believed,
But that night when I left Tom's home and sat alone at my car,
my own sin - not just dirty politics, but the hatred and pride and
evil so deep within me - was thrust before my eyes, forcefully and
painfully, For the first time in my life, I felt unclean, and worst of
all, I could not escape, In those moments of clarity, I found myself
driven irresistably into the arms of the living God,
(Charles Colson, Who Speaks for God? London, Hodder and Stoughton,
1985, p,138)
169
CHAPTER SIX
Learning Christ
Formation comes only by being drawn into the form of Jesus Christ, It comes only as
formation in his likeness, as conformation with the unique form of him who was made
man, was crucified and rose again,
This is not achieved by dint of efforts to 'become like Jesus', which is the
way in which we usually interpret it, It is achieved only when the form of Jesus
Christ itself works upon us in such a manner that it moulds our form in its own
likeness (Gal 4:19), Christ remains the only giver of forms, It is not Christian
men who shape the world with their ideas, but it is Christ who shapes men in
conformity with Himself, But just as we misunderstand the form of Christ if we take
him to be essentially the teacher of a pious and good life, so, too, we should
misunderstand the formation of man if we were to regard it as instruction in the
way in which a pious and good life is to be attained, Christ is the Incarnate,
Crucified and Risen One whom the Christian faith confesses, To be transformed in
His image (2 Cor 3:18, Phil 3:10, Rom 8:29 and 12:2) - this is what is meant by the
formation of which the Bible speaks,
Dietrich Bonhoeffer'
The function of Mister God is to make you like him, 	 Onna2
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1. The Approach to the Study of Revelatioa
The purpose of this thesis is twofold - first, to demonstrate the
close connection between Christian learning and the modes of learning
commonly employed as a feature of the ordinary processes of growth
and development; second, to examine the relationship between Christian
learning and the "subjective dimension" or mode of reception of
revelation. It is part of the nature of the task that these two
elements of the thesis are closely interrelated, involving the
investigation of "Christian learning" from both the theological and
scientific points of view. The conclusion reached at the end of the
previous chapter was that learning is the outcome of a search for
identity. Revelation, similarly, is the outcome of the gift of a new
identity, made available by the indwelling Holy Spirit. Thus, while the
source of revelation is supernatural, the manner in which it is
appropriated is entirely natural. It is necessary now to examine the
Implications of this position as regards the doctrine of revelation
which it entails.
In the early chapters, a detailed model of human learning based
on a thorough investigation of the social and psychological processes
Involved has been presented. In order to achieve coherence, the
Interpretation of these processes takes place within a single unifying
framework. This framework consists of a theological evaluation of
human being. In this way, it is claimed, the theology of human life is
enabled to draw on the results of scientific investigation and the
doctrine of revelation to be set in both anthropological and
epistomological context. This model has been used in the definition of
"Christian learning" in relation to the ordinary processes of human
learning. What remains is to bring the model to the study of
revelation, where it is to be used as the key to the interpretation of
the processes involved there.
The major theological assumption on which this method of
bringing together the investigation of revelation and human learning
Is based is that there exists a particular type of connection between
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the natural and the supernatural, or between nature and grace. This
assumption rests on the claim that the features of humanity which are
the outcome of divine creation are to be understood as being affirmed
rather than disregarded or superseded in the course of the divine
address to men and women. The action of divine grace, it is to be
maintained, involves accommodation to the conditions of created human
nature. The method of the thesis, by which the connection between
nature and grace is to be established, accordingly gives central place
to humanity. Anthropology, it is pointed out, is a feature of both
theology and secular philosophy. The role of anthropology, moreover, is
to supply that unifying framework which is required for the coherence
of the scientific investigation of human life. The role of theological
anthropology, therefore, involves precisely the establishment of that
connection between nature and grace which is a necessary part of a
theological evaluation of human being. But the thesis advances beyond
the use of a theoretical connection between nature and grace as a rule
of method to the investigation of the nature of that connection. It is
the relation between the Holy Spirit and the human spirit which, it is
claimed, constitutes the meeting point of grace and nature. The human
spirit is precisely that aspect of human personality which is "by
nature" open to the influence of divine grace, and the Holy Spirit is
the means by which such grace is made available. 3 To say that
revelation takes place in the meeting of Holy Spirit and human spirit
is to say that revelation constitutes an element in the relation
between grace and nature which takes place in the course of the divine
plan of salvation.4
The problems to be faced in writing about the knowledge of God
are of two kinds and may be termed problems of "text" and "conterM3
The "text" for the investigation of the knowledge of God is the
Church's attempt to describe and justify the process of revelation. Yet
here, at the heart of theology, no definitive unifying approach is to
be discerned. What is found is "a buzzing multiplicity of individual
Christian opinion". 3 The same lack of unity is a feature of Christian
education. Traditional transmissive approaches are to be found drawing
for their justification on traditional propositional views of
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revelation while more subject-centred "experiential" methods generally
rely on a contrasting experiential model of revelation.' Even the
definition of revelation is in question between these two approaches.
For one, "revelation" means a certain, definitive content, for the other
an experience of a particular kind.
Such uncertainty over the manner in which the knowledge of God
is available can lead only to a profound malaise in theology as a
whole. It has always been the case that theology offered several
different "paradigms", each with a different framework for the
interpretation of the relation between God and mankind and each one
continually modified by the work of successive generations of
scholars. But a "multiplicity of individual opinion" on the central
subject of the knowledge of God itself would seem to indicate the
breakdown even of such unity as the various paradigms and the
relatively well-charted relations between them may once have offered.
As a consequence, any approach to the problem of revelation from the
standpoint of theological "text" is subject to serious limitations. The
knowledge of God and the terms in which it is available constitute a
foundational aspect of any given theological paradigm and any
particular selection from theological tradition which might be used as
a starting point for the study of revelation depends for its own
authority and validity on the account of the knowledge of God which
underlies the particular paradigm from which it is drawn. In order to
avoid a vicious circle of this kind, the theological "text" and the
problems associated with it must be examined in their broader
"context".
The "context" for talk about God is the contemporary intellectual
scene, in which a "battle for explanatory control" rages between those
approaches which centre on the web of causal connections subject to
scientific investigation on the one hand and, on the other, those
which take as their point of departure the human experience of
subjectivity.° These different approaches were examined thoroughly
earlier in the thesis. Reasons have been given for preferring an
approach to the study of mankind and human knowledge in particular
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based on a view of human beings as agents with goals and purposes, of
which the construction of individual and corporate world-models by
means of which knowledge is expressed is an outcome. This approach
provides a coherent and theologically justified framework for the
Investigation of the relation between learning and revelation which
engages with the secular "context" of the study of the knowledge of
God by relating the theological discussion of revelation to the
problems involved in the study of human knowledge. It also provides a
solid theoretical foundation from which the theological tradition may
be examined and the various competing assertions to be found there
evaluated .9
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2. A Universal Knowledge of God?
One of the dominant influences on the treatment of revelation in
Christian theology is the distinction between natural and revealed
theology, a distinction brought into prominence by Thomas Aquinas.'°
The idea of natural theology as preliminary and preparatory to
revelation is still an important element particularly in Roman
Catholic theology, but for many, especially Protestant, theologians the
earlier distinction has been abandoned in favour of a distinction
between general and special revelation. The idea of general revelation
emphasises the revelatory character of any knowledge of God while
maintaining a distinction between the knowledge shared by all men and
women as an outcome of divine creation and that given as a result of
God's saving activity. Upholders of both natural knowledge and general
revelation subscribe to the idea of a universal knowledge of God. The
difference lies in the fact that "natural knowledge" is taken to be
reliable as far as it goes whereas the outcome of "general revelation"
Is usually taken to be a knowledge which is distorted because of
human sinfulness. Whereas revealed knowledge is taken to supplement
and complete natural knowledge, special revelation corrects those
Ideas of God which arise from general revelation. In both cases,
however, the act of God in revelation or special revelation is a means
of grace, an integral part of the offer of salvation, something which
cannot be achieved by either natural knowledge or general revelation.
The question for the present section is whether such a universal
knowledge can be said to exist and, if so, what is its character.
In Christian theology, the foundations for a belief in a
universally available 	 knowledge of God by whatever means are
threefold:
1. Arguments from experience: the universal experience of moral
constraint and the virtually universal phenomenon of religious belief.
2. Arguments from Scripture: certain passages appear to lend
biblical authority to a range of propositions associated with
universal knowledge of God, in particular: the availability of a
knowledge of God in creation and providence which may provide the
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basis for a human "search" for God, and a recognition of the universal
awareness of moral demand as the equivalent of divine legislation."
3. An argument from revelation itself: without a generally held
concept of God prior to revelation, revelation would be unintelligible.
Before the more particular ideas to be conveyed in revelation, such as
God acting in various ways for particular purposes, could be
understood, there must exist a generally held concept of "God" to
which such ideas could be referred, and this concept, it is argued,
could only arise as the result of a prior revelation.'2
Great difficulties arise, however, in specifying what this
universal knowledge of God could possibly amount to. Three possible
ways of understanding the
suggested:'2
1. A revelation of God in nature. The problem here is on the
subjective side. What is mankind supposed to understand from nature
and how? As Hume pointed out, the argument by analogy from human
creativity does not get us very far - it is as easy to ascribe the
creation of the world we experience to a committee of bunglers as to a
single omnipotent God." Without some divine illumination on the
subjective side any revelation conveyed by creation remains vague and
ambiguous.
2. A propositional revelation, given to all. But the diversity of
belief and expression displayed by the world's religions makes it
difficult to uncover the exact content of such a revelation.
3. The knowledge of God as a feature of human psychological
make-up. John Baillie was among those who argued for a kind of innate
knowledge of God or "mediated immediacy". 1E The knowledge of God, he
argued, is analogous to our knowledge of other selves. The existence of
another rational person is incapable of proof - some portion at least
of our belief in the existence of others with minds like ourselves
rests on intuitions which are incapable of logical explanation. In the
knowledge of others, intuitive and discursive elements combine. In the
knowledge of God there is, he believed, an intuitive and a discursive
element. God is known "in, with and under" other objects of experience.
There is an immediate, intuitive knowledge of God, corresponding to
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the intuition which tells us of the presence of another person, but
that knowledge becomes effective only as it is mediated by our
knowing of the world. In every act of knowing, he believed, four
subjects of knowledge are present together, the self, others, the world
and God. Thus, consciousness of God arises through experience.
The difficulties with all three of these attempts to give content
to general revelation arise from the fact that they depend on an ideal
of explicit knowledge. However, Baillie's analysis of the knowledge of
others, which has been more extensively discussed by philosophers
since he first wrote, moves in the direction of the concept of a
different type of knowledge.' s What is proposed here is that the idea
of a general revelation becomes intellible when such a revelation is
seen as an element of tacit rather than explicit knowledge. General
revelation is something rooted in the necessities of the human
cognitive make-up, an awareness of God not derived simply from
experience but from the need to set experience within a comprehensible
frame of reference. It is here that our analysis of human cognition
makes its contribution.
One of the roles of the schema in the process of learning is the
provision of a range of expectations." The schema represents "set" or
orientation - the predisposition to respond to those situations to
which that particular schema is applicable in a certain manner or
within a certain range of possible reactions. The schema provides an
"outline" of the situation, a readiness to respond to information or
experience of a particular type. If revelation is to be received by
means of the ordinary mechanisms of human cognition, what is required
is that there should exist for every individual a schema representing
a readiness for or expectation of God. This is the schema which will
come into play when revelation takes place.
The individual's total psychological world, within which all his
Individual schemata operate, is expressed by a model of what
psychologist of religion James Fowler calls the "ultimate environment".
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Fowler uses a dramatic metaphor to describe the "ultimate
environment". It is, he says,
The largest theatre of action in which we act out our lives, Our
images of the ultimate environment determine the way we arrange the
scenery and grasp the plot in our life's plays, Furthermore, our
images of the ultimate environment change as we move through life,
They expand and grow, and the plots get blown open or have to be
linked in with other
To the individual's ultimate environment there corresponds, for the
culture or perhaps for particular cognitive communities within a given
culture, the "symbolic universe. 19
 Symbolic universes are shared
schemata, which play the role of the perspective of the given
reference group, a shared "ultimate environment".
Such schemata provide a perspective on the unknown transcendent.
Apart from the positivist tradition, most philosophers have recognised
limits to the human ability to interpret experience. In the quest for
self-understanding, concludes Stephen Toulmin, the philosopher may
have to become a myth-maker, since it is in the form of myths that
insights beyond the range of theorising have generally been
preserved.20
 Such myths represent attempts to describe the nature of
what lies beyond the possibility of direct experience. Individuals and
societies must construct an image of the transcendent for themselves
on the basis of inference from what appear to be the salient features
of experience. 21
 Fowler describes the forms such constructions take in
a variety of ways. He draws attention to "centres of value", "images of
power" and, in particular, "master stories". He describes a
conversation in a taxi-cab with a man who told him, "The way I see it,
if we have any purpose on this earth, it is just to keep things going.
We can stir the pot while we are here and try to keep things
interesting. Beyond that, everything runs down: your marriage runs
down, your body runs down, your faith runs down. We can only try to
make it interestLW22
 This man's "master story" could be summed up,
Fowler suggests, in the word entropy. Such fundamental beliefs form
the backdrop against which the significance of life and of the various
commitments it entails are measured. They may be tacit and unexamined
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or explicit in story, symbol, myth, ritual, philosophical theory or
full-blown religious commitment.
One of the most important features of such master stories is
that they are self-involving. The need for over-arching explanation is
more than simply cognitive, but also emotional and spiritual. They are
the means by which men and women attempt to cope with the unanswered
questions of human existence such as the problem of evil and
apparently purposeless suffering, and the questions of human
significance and destiny. The "ultimate environment" or "symbolic
universe" expresses a particular set of beliefs about the place of the
individual or of mankind as a whole in the scheme of things. It
represents an orientation to the world as a whole along the lines of
Erikson's "basic trust".23 Since they are self-involving, master
stories form an element of the identity schema. The way individuals
and societies picture the transcendent dimension, and in particular
the nature of God, is an element in corporate and individual identity.
It follows that every individual and society can be said to have a
schema for God, not in the explicit sense of articulated religious
belief, but as a feature of tacit knowledge. It consists of a readiness
to respond to questions about the origin, significance and destiny of
the world and of a certain range of expectations generated by the need
for an orientation towards existence and experience taken as a whole.
The presentation of a model of this kind helps to ground the
various theological assertions relating to general revelation by
requiring their translation into the terms of a theoretical framework
for human cognition. Some of these assertions are thus seen to be
confirmed by the model and some rejected, in the sense that to
continue to maintain such a position would require a different model
of cognition from the one presented. Several theological propositions
can be thus affirmed and explained:
1. The existence of a universal sense of deity "indelibly
engraven on the human heart".24 This is to be explained in terms of
the universal recognition of problems requiring solutions which lie
beyond the terms of human experience.
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2. The distortion of such a sense of deity as a result of human
sinfulness.25
 The effects of sin on human cognition were described in
terms of the model of cognition presented here in the previous
chapter.29
 Its result is the confinement of each individual and
society within a relative point of view, such that final and definitive
knowledge is impossible. It could be achieved only as the result of
the realisation by an individual or group of their true identity, such
that the quest for meaning in the universe was brought to a definitive
end.
3. The physical and human creation may be affirmed as a witness
to the existence of God, in the sense that the superhuman power and
evidence of design involved require some kind of explanation, while
conceding, with Hume, that such evidence does nothing to compel belief
in a personal divine creator. The idea of a "natural theology"
consisting of the inference of reliable propositions about God from
the evidence available in creation is to be rejected.
4. The idea that all experience is to be seen as potentially
revelatory is affirmed in a particular sense. The identity schema,
which includes the awareness of the transcendent and the range of
problems associated with it, forms the ultimate context for all
experience, so that all experience may potentially be related to one's
"images of power" or "master story".
5. General revelation is to be understood as an outcome of human
creation in the divine image.27
 The image of God, in this model,
consists of the possession by men and women of an underlying "true
self", the creator of the identity schema. It is in the search of the
"true self" for its real nature that the requirement for the knowledge
of a transcendent ground and goal arises.
6. Every person may be said to exist before God in the sense
that their life is governed by a search for identity which is, at one
and the same time, a search for God. Men and women are thus
conditioned by their relationship to God even though the terms of this
relationship consist, on the human side, of ignorance. Brunner termed
this aspect of human existence "responsibility".29
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There are also a number of assertions from the theological
tradition to be rejected on the basis of this model:
1.The possibility of a "natural theology".
2. The idea of a universal belief in God or awareness of God.
This is expressed in assertions such as that of Paul Tillich: "God is
the presupposition of the question of God." 29 The idea is to be
rejected, at least in the sense which Tillich appeared to intend. There
is a sense in which the discovery of God is "the discovery of someone
we knew all along"90
 - it lies in the fact that we are created in his
Image. But the awareness which prompts the question of God is not of
God himself, but of the unknown transcendent.
3. The idea of the "categorical supremacy" of God. 91 The mistake
here is to identify God with the terms of a particular description of
the "ultimate environment". For Charles Hartshorne, for example, "God
Is a name for the uniquely good, admirable, great, worship-eliciting
betng,"2 while for Tillich, Truth is the presupposition of philosophy
and God is Truth.33 Paul Sponheim investigates the themes of the Real,
the Beautiful and the Good, moral and religious experience with a view
to ascertaining whether God's "incognito" is to be discovered in any
of these. In so doing, he is following the tradition Tillich calls the
"ontological" type of philosophy of religion, the search for signals of
the divine in human experience. This approach is an attempt to set
aside one of the fundamental insights of the Reformation. A
distinction has been made between the possibilities of natural
knowledge of God and general revelation. The difference lies in the
fact that while natural knowledge may be assumed to be a reliable
guide to the divine nature, such knowledge of God as remains as a
result of general revelation will be in error. Human ideas of Truth,
Beauty and so on do not serve as incognitos for the divine. They are,
rather the focus of what Richard Niebuhr called those polytheisms and
henotheisms which men and women admit as substitutes for the
knowledge of the true God.34
A distinction is thus to be maintained between the sense of a
question involved in human existence, with its corollary of a widely
shared search for deity, and the actual knowledge of God. The
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awareness of a transcendent dimension in human existence and of the
need for an explanation for that dimension is a feature of tacit
rather than explicit knowledge. In cognitive terms, it consists of an
expectation of a certain aspect of identity, that which places the
person or society in an overarching scheme of things and which
accounts for personal and corporate origin and destiny. Human
explanations of all kinds - including the philosophical systems with
which the early Christian apologists were faced, and the great world
religions which form an increasingly important element in the
experience of modern western men and women - may contain a
significant degree of truth, arising out of profound insight into the
human condition. But such truth does not, in itself, constitute
revelation. The natural world becomes a witness to divine creation
only in the light of a definitive revelation of divine truth. In the
same way, such truth as exists in the world's great religious and
philosophical systems is recognised as truth only in the light of
revelation itself. The awareness of a question of God or, in Calvin's
terms, that sense of deity engraven on the human heart, constitutes an
expectation of further revelation to come and a possibility of
receiving such a revelation. But it does not of itself constitute such
a revelation. Nor does anything in this state of things "require" a
revelation in the sense of compelling God to act. But "general
revelation", in whose interpretation all men and women err, requires a
"special" or definitive revelation for its completion. Such a revelation
can be expected both to complete and to correct ideas of God based on
general revelation. To the nature of that definitive revelation we now
turn.
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3. Jesus Christ as the Content of Revelation
The term "revelation" may be defined as an action of God, an
authoritative content or as a human experience. The existence of
competing models in which the definition of revelation fails to
embrace all three aspects is a problem for theology. The construction
of a model of revelation involves the harmonious integration of these
elements within a coherent understanding of revelation as divine
communication. This requires that the content of revelation be
understood in such a way as to be capable of and fitted to
communication by means of the processes proposed as being those of
both divine action and human reception. The detailed examination of
human learning and human constitution in the foregoing chapters forms
the background, therefore, for an examination of the content of
revelation. Of the points made there, the first to note is that
revelation is to be understood as a definitive "image of man". 35 It is
a tacit image of man which is expressed in any particular culture or
set of social institutions, which provides the unexpressed foundation
of every significant paradigm in the natural or social sciences and
lies behind the hermeneutical principles of historical or literary
interpretation. Behind the great questions of science, literature,
history or philosophy lies a pre-reflective understanding of the
nature of mankind finally irreducible to explicit expression. The most
sophisticated philosophical system fails to give adequate expression
to that elusive quality, "humanity", with the result that the
philosopher is obliged to look to the creation of myths for the
expression of the deepest levels of meaning in human life. The content
of revelation may be understood precisely as the information required
to set human speculation in a single unified framework.
The anthropological question at the heart of culture is
paralleled by the role of the elusive personal subject as the source of
cognitive and affective coherence. The attempt to elucidate the pre-
reflective image of man within a given culture is paralleled by the
quest for secure personal identity. This quest involves an openness to
the transcendent, expressed in the construction by an individual of an
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"ultimate environment". It is at this level, the deepest level of human
personality, that revelation is appropriated. This is the level of the
personal subject or unknown "I", where the quest for secure identity
takes place. As the definitive answer to that quest, revelation
consists of the gift of personal identity. But since it is given at the
level of the personal subject, the creator rather than the object of
the identity schema, revelation is given not as explicit but as tacit
knowledge.36
 Although never known directly, personal identity forms
the governing principle for the interpretation of experience. In the
same way, the content of revelation, giver, at the level of personal
identity, is not known directly, but must be gradually appropriated in
the course of subsequent learning as the "ultimate environment"
changes in such a way as to express the new self-understanding.
Before the content of revelation can be expressed, a process of
interpretation is required, in which the fallible schemata based on
previously incomplete or erroneous images of man, those of
contemporary philosophy and culture, provide the categories necessary
for its comprehension. The appropriation and interpretation of
revelation thus involves the twin processes characteristic of the
learning process, assimilation and accommodation. The content of
revelation, first received at the level of the personal subject as
tacit knowledge, is initially understood with the aid of and in the
terms of a prior understanding of the human condition. But the
assimilation of revelation to the categories of contemporary
philosophy and culture leads to the complementary process of
accommodation, in which those categories are themselves transformed
by the implications of revelation. The appropriation of revelation is
thus a progressive process, not immune from the possibility of error,
in which the individual, the community and, conceivably, the culture is
gradually formed in its image of man. 37
 The term "revelation" may be
used in a special sense to refer to the divine action by which a new
identity is made available at the tacit level. In this sense, the
"content" of revelation is the content of that new identity. In a
broader sense, "revelation" may be used to describe the whole process,
both individual and corporate, by which that identity, once given, is
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appropriated and understood. When used in this sense, "revelation" is
the equivalent of Christian learning and the "content" of revelation
consists of both responses and witness to that gift of identity which
lies at the heart of the wider process. Wherever possible, the term
will be used in the narrower sense to distinguish it from Christian
learning.
Like the normal processes of human learning, the appropriation of
revelation expresses the autonomy proper to human beings in their
relationship with God. Human autonomy is not abolished or eclipsed in
the reception of revelation, but upheld and established. The power of
agency characteristic of human beings is expressed by the possession
of spirit. It is spirit which sums up the essence of humanity, both in
Its distinction from nature and in the unique relationship of man with
his Creator. The spirit is the centre of both agency and self-
knowledge, the locus of that elusive "I" which is the seat of true
identity. The spirit is also that element of human personality uniquely
open to the influence of God by the Holy Spirit. It is through the
agency of the Holy Spirit that revelation is made available. Revelation
takes place at the deep level of the personality where the Holy Spirit
meets, touches or, in Noule's words, "impinges" on the human spirit.39
The relationship between Holy Spirit and human spirit is,
therefore, the hinge upon which the whole thesis turns. 99 It is on
this relationship, it is maintained, that the possibility of revelation
rests. A distinction is to be maintained between the created spirit as
the principle of human life and the uncreated Spirit as the principle
of divine life.40 It is this distinction which, in theological terms,
rules out the identification of the human quest for meaning and the
awareness of the transcendent resulting from it with the knowledge of
God. Knowledge of God does not belong to men and women by virtue of
their relationship with God as dependent creatures. It is given only
as a result of divine grace. A special revelation, the outcome of a
particular movement of divine communication is required.'" The Holy
Spirit is the agent of this special revelation; what, then, is the
content which the Holy Spirit reveals?
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Of the answer to this question, the New Testament leaves us in
no doubt. The Holy Spirit reveals Christ. The Holy Spirit is a new
form for the present age of the outreach of God to men recorded in
the pages of the Old Testament and brought to fulfilment in Jesus
Christ, a "perpetual extension of the Incarnation."42 The Spirit's work
is to enable men and women to know Christ. The Spirit is given as a
result of the completion of Christ's earthly ministry. Jesus is first
the unique bearer of the Spirit, the one upon whom the Spirit descends
and remains. His ministry is empowered and led by the indwelling Holy
Spirit. Having completed the ministry for which he received the
Spirit, Christ pours him out upon his disciples for the continuation
of that ministry in and through them. Since he is the fulfilment and
completion of God's purpose, the Spirit has nothing to communicate
except what is revealed in Christ. Christ is the incarnate truth, the
Spirit's role is to make him known.43
It is for this reason that there is so much apparent overlap
between the work of Christ and of the Spirit in the believer's life. To
be "in Christ" is to have the Spirit, not to have the Spirit is not to
belong to Christ." Cougar provides a list of Pauline texts in which
this overlap or duplication is apparent. 45 We are justified in Christ
and in the Spirit, we are in Christ and Christ is in us, we are in the
Spirit and the Spirit is in us, we have fullness of life in Christ and
we are filled with the Spirit, and so on. Despite the similarities,
however, there remains a clear distinction. We are, for example, never
called a Temple of Christ or members of the Holy Spirit. 46 It is
Christ in whom God was incarnate, he who reigns over God's kingdom.
The Spirit's work is to apply the benefits of the objective work of
Christ in the believer's life, to make his current heavenly reign an
earthly reality through the ministry of his disciples.
The content of revelation is, therefore, to be taken as the Person
of Jesus Christ. It is to be noted that his role, as it has frequently
been understood, answers precisely to the requirement that the content
of revelation be an "image of man". Christ may be described as the
"proper man" who reveals the nature of humanity as God intends it, the
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definitive image of man whose humanity and in particular whose
relationship with God serves as a pattern for human self-
understanding.47 This important aspect of God's action in Christ is
expressed in the New Testament in the use of the phrase "the image of
God" to refer to Christ. In the Old Testament, the phrase is used to
describe the essential created nature of humanity. In the New
Testament, although it occurs in its old sense in one or two places,
it is Christ who is, primarily and properly, the image of God. The
phrase is used to describe his singular dignity, the relation to God
the Father which is his alone, his divine Sonship. But secondly and
derivatively, the image of God is also that into which the believer
enters by virtue of faith in Christ."
Whereas in the Old Testament the image of God is unknown, in the
New Testament, it is definitively known in Jesus Christ. On the one
hand, Christ represents the embodiment of human possibility. But on
the other hand, he represents a decisive break, a new possibility
previously unknown to men and women. This new possibility arises as a
result of Christ's victory over sin. In terms of human psychological
make-up, the sinful nature of mankind is expressed by the loss of
identity, the result of which is that human knowledge is constructed
around and human action springs from a centre in the individual as an
expression of the search for authentic identity. 45 Christ, with his
personal centre in the love and the will of God the Father, breaks the
confinement brought about by the sinful condition of mankind. The
relationship with God made possible by this victory is spoken of in
the New Testament as a "new creation".50 In the new creation, the
terms of the human relationship with God are no longer based on the
image of God in its Old Testament sense, but on the New Testament
sense, in which the image is definitively revealed in Christ.
One of the most important passages to describe Jesus in this way
is Colossians 1:15f. Commenting on it, G.BLaird writes,
He is man as God from the beginning designed man to be, God created
man to be in his own image, reflecting his own character and
responding to his love, and intended that he should hold pre-eminence
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over the rest of creation (v,15), All that God has made,„belongs to
man's world and must be understood in relation to man and his destiny,
Christ„,is the embodiment of that purpose of God which underlies the
whole creation, and so he applies the principle of coherence and
meaning in the universe (vv,16-17), These staggering assertions can be
made about the place of the man Jesus in creation because in the
experience of the Church he holds precisely this place of supremacy in
the new creation, He is head over those who through his death and
resurrection are incorporated into unity with him, and he is the
source of their new life,s'
Three points in particular should be noticed in this exposition. First,
Caird supplies, as part of the theological background for the exegesis
of this text, the important assertion that the image of God in mankind
includes the supremacy of MEM and women in creation. That supremacy
is a vital element in the purpose of God in creation and provides a
key to the understanding of the action of God in salvation. Its effect
Is to allow the intervention of God for the restoration of the
relationship between creation and himself without the disruption of
the lawfulness inherent in creation. 52 Secondly, the place of Christ as
the image of God is an element of the new creation, whose relationship
to the old creation is that it both fulfils and supersedes it. As Caird
again comments,
In the life, death and resurrection of Christ, God the Creator had
again been active, not merely repairing the ravages of the Fall, but
bringing into existence, and that for the first time, that manhood in
his own image which it had always been his purpose to create,ss
Finally, the incarnation is of central importance. It is the "life,
death and resurrection of Christ" which are the instruments of the new
creation. It is the incarnate Christ who is the image of God, and the
incarnate Christ, therefore, who is the content of revelation.
This is a point which it is necessary to discuss at some length
because of the strong tradition of interpretation, particularly
associated with Lightfoot, in which the title "image of God" when
applied to Christ refers to his place in the old creation as the
eternal pattern of which mankind is a copy, rather than as the pattern
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of the new creation by virtue of his incarnation, death and
resurrection.s4 Lightfoot had argued that this passage, like the
similar ones in Hebrews 1:1-4 and John 1:1-4, is an example of "Wisdom
or Logos Christology", in which Christ is portrayed as the
personification of divine Wisdom. In that case, the position of Jesus
as image of God would be his by nature. But Caird points out that the
New Testament understands Jesus' relationship to mankind as his by
appointment. In particular, this applies to the title "the first-born",
used in Colossians 1 and derived from Psalm 89. In the psalm, this is
a title bestowed on the king as a result of divine appointment and
this is its meaning when used in the New Testament. Christ is
"designated" Son of God by his resurrection and elsewhere, including
verse 18 of the present passage, he is the first-born "from the dead".
Most important, in Ephesians 1:20-23, which may be taken as a parallel
passage to that in Colossians, written if not by Paul himself by a
disciple who was close to him and knew his mind, the cosmic supremacy
of Christ is clearly based on his manhood. Christ achieves by his
earthly life, death and resurrection, the proper lordship of mankind.
The Wisdom tradition, which lies in the background of the
passage in Colossians is not to be simply ignored, but it must be
placed in its context in the thought of Paul particularly and the New
Testament generally. The pre-existence of Christ lies always in the
background of Paul's thought. But it is always interpreted in close
relation to his redemptive work. Christ is the one who, at the right
time was sent by God for the salvation of mankind.ss The Church,
indeed, is chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world. ss It is
the redemptive significance of Christ which controls the understanding
of his eternal status rather than vice versa. Christ from all eternity
is God-for-us, the one destined both to bear and to share the divine
image. There is no need, then, to seek for a background in the
speculations of Hellenistic Judaism.57 Wisdom is to be understood,
despite the tendency to personification in some passages, as a divine
attribute. It is an attribute, moreover, which God intends to
communicate with men. It is not surprising, therefore, that the pattern
of humanity in the new creation should be a man in whom wisdom makes
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her home.s° And this is expressed in the fact that Christ is uniquely
endowed for his ministry with the Holy Spirit.
It is the incarnate Christ, endowed with the fulness of the Holy
Spirit, who provides that pattern of humanity required by human beings
as the key to human identity. It is in his relation to the Father,
displayed in his life, death and resurrection, that the questions of
human nature and destiny pursued in the course of learning and
identity formation find their definitive resolution. It is Jesus Christ,
therefore, who is to be understood as the content of revelation, the
exemplar for human identity.
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4. The Historical Christ
The conclusion of the previous section has been that it is the
incarnate Jesus Christ who is the content of divine revelation and the
exemplar for the formation of Christian identity. This position
involves a claim about the role of history in revelation and in human
and particularly Christian formation. The problem is not a new one.
Throughout the New Testament the assumption is to be found that
Christ, who even for the first Gentile converts was already an
historical figure from a semi-alien culture, was nevertheless available
as a focus of faith. The sense in which Christian revelation may be
said to be historical depends, however, on the status to be accorded
to historical knowledge. An account of historical knowledge can only
be given on the basis of a more comprehensive account of human
knowledge in general. For a justification of the place of the
historical Jesus in revelation, we turn, therefore, to the insights to
be gained from the preceding examination of cognition.59
One of the conclusions of such an examination is that history is
particularly appropriate as a medium for revelation. Of all the
sciences dealing with human life, history deals with men and women at
their most concrete.s° It is the whole person
abstracted aspect of personal life which is
examination. The material of history consists of
connections of particular kind. These connections
natural causation familiar to the natural scientist.
rather than an
the subject of
a web of causal
are not those of
They consist of a
complex interplay of psychological motivation, a "constant interaction
of conscious efforts." 61
 The web of historical causality is thus the
outcome of that elusive quality of human life, the power of agency, the
concept earlier shown to be central to the problem of human nature.
History is a mirror or extension of the form of human self-
understanding. One of the most powerful justifications of the
historical enterprise is its contribution to the study of human
identity, through the infinite variety of motivation and outcome which
forms its subject matter. History is the hermeneutical science par
excellence. Its goal is the discovery, by means of the structure of
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cause and effect in human affairs, of the key to the nature of human
action and human being. If the definitive image of man is to be
revealed, then not only is human history the appropriate medium for
its revelation, but the methods of the historian best suited to its
reception.62
As a further step, this relation of historical connection to
human agency provides the key to the understanding of the historical
nature of revelation. The involvement of God in human life takes place
at the level of agency. It comes about by means of the infusion of a
divine principle of action. The Holy Spirit is said to "come upon"
particular men and women to enable them to carry out God's will.63
Such interventions take place, however, without limiting the freedom of
human decision and thus without violating the laws of historical
connection.64 In the person of Jesus Christ, the man upon whom the
rid remains, this process is brought to fulfilment.Spirit descends a
The character and
particular human
historical enquiry.
purpose of God, displayed within the compass of a
life, thus become available to the methods of
Philosophy of history takes the form of comparison and criticism
of historical method. For this reason, its study is closely bound up
with both the writing of history itself and the examination of the
work of particular historians. 65 Two distinct orientations are to be
discerned. These form the subject respectively of substantive and
analytical philosophy of history. 66 In the case of the substantive
philosophy of history, the "meaning" of the historical process is
sought for in an overall interpretation of historical movement on a
broad scale. Such attempts to fit history into a general pattern fall
into two types, the cyclical, represented by writers such as Arnold
Toynbee, and the linear, represented by various versions of the theory
of historical progress.67 Alternatively, any such generalisations may
be eschewed in favour of allowing the events of history to speak for
themselves and their meaning sought in the pattern of internal
connections and the light thrown by such connections on human
character and motivation. The difference between the two approaches is
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a question of balance or emphasis. Neither orientation can escape the
dialectical relation between evidence and presupposition. While he
brings to his task a particular world-view, the historian must be
prepared for that world-view to be corrected and refined in the course
of engagement with the evidence itself. One orientation represents a
relative confidence on the part of the historian in his particular
view of human nature and destiny; the other a confidence in the
ability of the study of historical events to mould and correct that
world-view.
In terms of this typology of philosophical orientation, the
biblical writers belong to the first. Theirs is a substantive rather
than analytical philosophy of history, characterised by confidence in
a particular tradition of interpretation. The main characteristic of
this tradition, or set of traditions as they developed within the
history of Israel and were taken over by the Christian Church, is the
claim to interpret history from the point of view of the purposes of
God. The concern of the biblical writers was not to allow the past to
"speak for itself" in the manner of the ideal of the "analytic"
historian. Their purpose was to use an account of historical events as
a means to express the nature and purposes of God. At the same time,
they believed that certain events, in particular the deliverance of the
Israelites from Egypt and later the Babylonian exile, were themselves
the means by which God's character was revealed. The knowledge of God
becomes available in history as the outcome of a process of both
event and interpretation.se The involvement of God in events is a
product of the intervention of a divine principle of action in the
cycle of human purpose and outcome. But revelation is incomplete
without a similar divine involvement on the side of interpretation.
Biblical history is "prophecy", the result of the interpretation of
past and present events by men (mi possibly women) who claimed to
have "stood in the council of God"69 and whose work was further
refined and developed within the several traditions to which they gave
rise 70
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While biblical history is comparable to history as it is
understood in the modern age, in that consists of a pattern of event,
interpretation and reinterpretation, there is also a decisive
difference. The historian deals with his material with the aim of
discovering and/or commending a particular understanding of the human
condition. The biblical writers present their material in the
confidence that the events with which they deal and the interpretation
offered spring from and are themselves a part of the revelation of the
nature and purpose of God and his relation to men and women. In
relation to the modern historian, the Bible claims to offer a
definitive perspective on human nature. From the perspective of
revelation, Biblical history may be said to be the centre of world
history in that it furnishes the key to the understanding of all other
histar,)T.71
With the ground thus prepared, an evaluation is possible of the
role of the historical Jesus in revelation. The New Testament was
written from the standpoint of the Easter faith. The experience of the
resurrection and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit provide a framework
for the interpretation of the life of Jesus not available at the time
the events of his life actually took place. But this fact does not
make such a framework inauthentic. It is, in fact, a continuation of
the prophetic framework within which biblical history is written. The
work of the Holy Spirit in the Christian believer enables him to
interpret Jesus as "the Messiah, the Son of God" and fulfilment of the
Old Testament Scriptures. 72 The pattern of event and interpretation is
continued. The incarnation of Christ is the event in and by which all
previous revelatory events are fulfilled. But the interpretation of
this event is not now available only to a select group of inspired
individuals but to all who, as a result of their response to Christ,
receive the indwelling Holy Spirit.73
The incarnate Christ who is the content of revelation is thus to
be understood as a figure in history. Access to him is by means of
history. It comes through the written record of his life, his words
and his impact on those around him. Moreover, a process of historical
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interpretation is required in order to understand him better. His
actions and teaching can only be correctly understood in the context
of his own culture. The process of historical study continues to yield
valuable results in this direction. But no amount of confidence in the
significance of Jesus' life can render the judgements on which that
significance depends invulnerable to the possibility of
reinterpretation in the light of further evidence.
At the same time, Jesus is a super-historical figure. His life is
the culmination of a process of divine revelation, in the light of
which the meaning of history is disclosed. This means that any
interpretation of Jesus is, like the "master stories" in which
fundamental beliefs are expressed, potentially self-involving. The
gospel narratives have what Edward Farley calls "intrinsic facticity":
they present facts which involve the reader personally and require a
decision.74 "These things are written," concludes the Fourth
Evangelist, "that you might believe..."75 . Mark's gospel, it has been
remarked, revolves around the question, "Who do you say that I am?"
The question concerns not simply the identity of Jesus but of oneself
as well. The answer the reader gives will express not a disinterested
evaluation of Jesus, but willingness or otherwise to become a follower,
to re-evaluate one's own life in the light of Jesus' claims. 76 For the
reader who is personally involved, the question, "What is man?" which
lies at the heart of historical interpretation has become, "Who am I?"
The history is no longer impersonal and disinterested. It is, in
Richard Niebuhr's phrase, "internal history". 77
 The definitive self-
understanding offered by Christian revelation forms the framework
within which all history, including the history of Christ, is
interpreted. Within this framework, the particular historical facts of
Christ are capable of revealing, to the person whose own identity is
in the course of formation by means of them, a set of truths of
ultimate significance.78
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5. Conformation
While the Jesus of history is available to the historian in the
same way as any other historical figure, his availability to the
Christian includes an additional dimension, as a result of the
presence of the indwelling Holy Spirit. According to the writer of the
Fourth Gospel, the Spirit's work is to "glorify" Jesus, to "take" the
things of Jesus and "show them" to the disciples 79 It is he who
enables the Christian believer to understand the significance of the
events of Jesus' life, death and resurrection. He does this by making
available to the believer a pattern or exemplar of human identity
which is none other than the "image of God" in the shape of the
incarnate Jesus Christ. The believer may draw upon this exemplar in
the interpretation not only of the life of the historical Jesus but of
his own life. This exemplar of human life offers the believer a new
perspective on his own life and experience, enabling him to relate
them to the nature and purposes of God. However, such a perspective
takes form only gradually in the course of a Christian's ongoing
experience. What is given in revelation is not a whole new cognitive
make-up, a whole new set of schemata in exchage for the old and
fallible beliefs and values based on the believer's previous faulty
identity. What is given is simply the new identity, and that at the
deepest level of cognitive make-up, at which it is not itself open to
direct introspection. It is only in the course of Christian learning,
both informal and formally structured, that this new identity begins
to influence the believer's world-view, his attitudes, beliefs, values
and behaviour.
The consequence of this position is that revelation is to be
understood as an aspect of salvation. In Protestant theology,
"salvation", which can also be understood as "healing" or "making
whole", traditionally involves two aspects, "justification" and
"sanctification". "Justification" may be seen as "objective", involving
the restoration of a relationship between God and mankind and
conferring upon the believer a new status before God. "Sanctification"
Is "subjective", involving an actual change in the life of the believer.
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Without sanctification, justification is incomplete and inauthentic. A
merely forensic theory of the atonement fails to relate either the
need for or the means of amendment to the action of God in Christ. On
the other hand, without justification, sanctification is impossible. The
problem is to relate the two so as to show that they imply one
another as parts of the one process of salvation or making whole. It
is this which, it is claimed, the model advanced here achieves.
Insofar as it consists of an ongoing present process, the
implication of the model advanced here is that the "subjective"
dimension of revelation, involving the gradual conformation of the
believer to the image of Christ, is an aspect of sanctification. The
non-believer is trapped within an inauthentic self-understanding. But
with the gift of the Holy Spirit a new and liberating self-
understanding becomes available. This new identity must be
progressively worked out in the life of the believer making possible a
gradual change in both inward self-image and outward behaviour in the
direction of the character of Christ himself.91
 The pattern of such
change is that what the believer is before God by virtue of
incorporation into Christ he should gradually become before men and
women by means of inner transformation. The public self is to reflect
increasingly the nature of the new life which springs up from the
hidden depths of the personality, the inner person, where the Holy
Spirit dwells. Further, while the new status of the Christian and the
ongoing process of conformation to Christ may be said to represent
both a past and a present dimension, there is also a future aspect to
salvation and, with it, revelation. The new identity "in Christ" is
never known for itself, but only as it is reflected in the believer's
altered self-image. There remains, however, the expectation that at
some future time, in the words of St.Paul, "I shall know, even as I am
known 1180
The dynamic of this process of transformation may be illustrated
most appropriately by the experience of penitence. Repentance
constitutes the gateway to the Kingdom of God. It was repentance which
lay at the heart of the preaching of John the Baptist, of Christ
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himself and of the apostles. But genuine penitence for sin is difficult
to attain. Indeed, without the Incarnation and its extension in the
work of the Spirit, it may be claimed to be impossible. Christ,
however, shoulders the burden of a life of perfect penitence. Then this
attitude of penitence before God is made available to humanity by
means of the gift of the SpirW-Bi Penitence is that attitude toward
God which places a person in right relationship toward him. In terms
of the description of human psychology advanced above, it is to be
characterised not as one attitude among others but as a vital aspect
of self-understanding in relationship to God.
The experience of penitence suggests a dual role for the Holy
Spirit in the process of conformation. First, the Spirit enlightens. An
example has already been given of the result of the Holy Spirit's work
of conviction of the unbeliever and its result, the complete
reappraisal of life and values. e2 What the Spirit does is to make
available that view of the self in relation to God which is the source
of true knowledge. He thus enables a reorientation of the individual's
world-model such that the attitudes and values come increasingly to
represent those of Christ. Second, the Holy Spirit enables. The Spirit
makes available to the individual a divine centre of agency or
principle of action by means of which he is enabled to do things he
would otherwise find impossible.°3 Repentance is a continuing
necessity in the life of the believer as attitudes displeasing to God
are continually discovered, requiring continual dependence on the Holy
Spirit. While it is possible for the Christian to agree with God at
the level of the understanding, to change his mind about his actions
or motives, the underlying change in attitude which will make the
difference to his behaviour is beyond his power to accomplish, lying
deeper than voluntary control is possible. In these cases reliance on
the Spirit's power is a necessity. The believer can change his mind,
but this metanoia must lead to the prayer that God, by his Spirit,
would accomplish the necessary change of "heart". In making such a
prayer, the believer acknowledges the lordship or authority of Christ
over the particular area of life in which the sinful attitude or action
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was discovered, resolving to take the model and requirement of Christ
as his own.'"
What the Holy Spirit does not do is to take away human autonomy.
The divine principle of action which he makes available never becomes
a compulsion.es The preservation of human freedom over against the
Spirit allows the possibility of misunderstanding and rejection, of
differences of interpretation and degrees of obedience. The
enlightening work of the Spirit may enable a person to see with a
clarity otherwise impossible the need for change. But it is up to the
Christian at each juncture to choose whether to follow the demands of
Christian character or his own natural inclination. The experience of
forgiveness, for example, is to lead to the willingness to forgive
others, and faith in the generosity of a heavenly Father to the
ability to live without material anxiety and to give generously to
others. The extent of actual transformation reveals the genuineness of
his Christian commitment. Subsequent experience and subsequent
learning, whether formal or informal, will reflect the new identity
only to the extent that the individual and his teachers and mentors
are faithful to their profession. Even though its roots lie at the
tacit level, the initiative in Christian formation never passes from
the believer himself. It cannot be otherwise, since the preservation of
human autonomy is essential to God's ultimate purpose. Freedom is
essential to love; the creation of a race of beings capable of love
demands their autonomy.
There may be considerable barriers to personal change in the
direction of conformation to Christ. It has often been remarked that
lack of experience of a stable family during childhood prevents the
adult from relating satisfactorily to God as a heavenly Father.
Between intellectual comprehension of the biblical assurances of God's
paternal (and maternal) love and the testimony of the Holy Spirit at
the deepest levels of personality may lie a lifetime's accumulation of
attitudes to oneself and others which flatly contradict this
revelation. Thus, while Christian conversion and nurture is comparable
in many respects to secondary socialisation, in others it is more
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comparable to resocialisation. While some aspects of Christian growth
involve the relatively painless process of the addition of further
skills and insights, a process of gradual internalisation of Christian
norms, at other times, the complete reworking of previous areas of
personality and understanding is required.ee The pattern of this type
of change is one of death and rebirth, as former ways of thinking,
feeling and behaving are renounced in favour of a set of new
responses based on Christ as exemplar. e7 Like any process of
resocialisation, this kind of painful transformation requires a degree
of affectivity and corporate support. As the family is the matrix of
primary socialisation, resocialisation, involving change in deeply held
beliefs and attitudes, requires the support of a family-like community
for its success.ee
The process described here is, it is argued, the one about which
Paul writes extensively in his epistles. It is that which he describes
as being "Changed into his (Christ's) likeness, from one degree of
glory to another."89 The concept of "glory" is closely related to that
of the image as the outward and visible expression of an inner
reality. In the Old Testament, it is the property of God in revelation.
In the New Testament, Christ reveals the glory of God in his death,
resurrection and ascension. This glory, the character of God in
revelation, is to be shared by Christian believers. Mankind, as God's
image, is to reflect his glory, not simply by a process of continual
transformation, but eschatologically, in the inheritance of a spiritual
body and in the sharing of Christ's heavenly reign. 9° This
identification with Christ, to describe which Paul frequently uses the
shorthand phrase, "in Christ", is sometimes unhelpfully called "Christ-
mysticism", using a term originated by Albert Schweitzer and taken up
by C.H.Dodd to describe the "realisation" of the new age inaugurated by
the death and resurrection of Christ in the life of believers. 9 ' The
reality of this realisation, however, is not present only occasionally
in certain sublime moments of experience but is determinative for the
whole of Christian life. The Church's "objective" state of salvation
consists in the imputation to her members of the death, burial,
resurrection, ascension and reign of Christ. 92 As "Head" of the Church,
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Christ is both a corporate figure and the source of the Church's
life.93 These two aspects of reality are to be explained
psychologically by the gift to the Christian believer of a new
identity consisting of Christ himself. This new identity is both
determinative of the reality of the Church and provides the underlying
dynamic for a process of change described as renewal on the pattern
of the creator of the new nature.94
The final and crucial question to be addressed as the outcome of
this association of revelation with conformation to Christ is: What is
the nature of the knowledge of God which results from , revelation? To
answer this, it is necessary first to review the definition of
knowledge given in the earlier chapters. To know something does not
mean to receive an image or impression caused by the object of
knowledge. This rather simplistic definition has formed the basis for
the rejection by some philosophers and theologians of the possibility
of genuine knowledge of God. 99 To know something is to form an
Interpretation of the object of knowledge in relation to other relevant
existing knowledge. To know a person has an additional dimension. It
Involves not only the incorporation of that person into the world-
model by means of interpretation but also the acceptance of that
person as an actual or potential reference figure? 6 This requires an
evaluative judgement on the attitudes and beliefs shared with that
particular person and a decision on the relative importance of the
person in comparison to other reference figures and groups. The
acceptance of a relationship of whatever kind with another person
requires the acceptance of their influence to some degree over one's
own judgements, beliefs and values.
The sense of the biblical term "to know" when applied to the
knowledge of God has been described as "to have a formative
relationship".97 To know God includes this sense of accepting God as
reference figure in the same way as any personal relationship. This
acceptance takes the form of the continual requirement of decision
over whether or not to accept the power and direction of the Holy
Spirit. But the knowledge of God also includes the opportunity to form
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an interpretation of his character. This opportunity is provided by
the historical Jesus and the record of his life in the New
Testament.98 The knowledge of God thus includes both those aspects
seen to be involved in the knowledge of another person, the factual
and the formative, one represented by the incarnate Christ, the other
by the indwelling Spirit. The source of this knowledge, revelation, is
thus to be seen as bound up with the process of conformation to
Christ, a process whose twin aspects may be defined as revelation and
Christian learning.99
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6. Ideology and Inspiration.
Revelation takes place in the context of concrete human
situations with both social and psychological dimensions. It is given
to persons already in the process of formation through participation
in a given society and culture. That society provides the cognitive
framework by means of which experience is interpreted and
reinterpreted. When a person begins to receive Christian revelation,
the process of formation continues, but several new factors are
Introduced, including the Church as both historically based institution
and concrete local community. In sociological terms, the Church may be
described as a reference group whose defining characteristics include
not only the other members of that group but the perspective which
they share, a perspective whose elements include both Scripture and
Tradition. To describe the Church's tradition and teaching as the
shared perspective of a particular reference group is to say that it
constitutes an ideology which provides the interpretative framework
through which the member of that particular group understands both
his own experience and that of others. The framework is both cognitive
and affective, and many of its details are the subject of such
profound commitment as to be almost impossible to express.'°°
The introduction of the subject of ideology at this stage
provides an example of the overlap of possible theoretical approaches
to the same phenomenon. It is a basic tenet of the sociology of
knowledge that all knowledge is held in ways which relate to the
historical, political and social structures of the society within which
the particular belief system develops. The same feature of belief
systems is expressed by the analysis of reference groups in social
interactionism and by the way in which schemata have been shown to be
both culturally transmitted and formative of the outlook of the
subject. The description of the social context of learning and identity
formation presented in an earlier chapter involved the synthesis of up
to ten separate theoretical frameworks.'° Each one is to be seen as
an expression of the hermeneutical nature of cognition and of its
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outcome, those shared beliefs which constitute the "knowledge" of a
given social group.
In terms of the stages outlined by de Mey, 102 the theory of
ideologies as originally advanced and the practice of ideological
suspicion belong to the third stage, the contextual. The recognition
that all systems of value, and not just those of the ruling classes,
are ideological in character lifts the study of ideology to the fourth
and cognitive stage, at which the hermeneutical circle governing human
thought is recognised. The attempt to trace the connection between
revelation and the mechanisms of human learning raises the question
of the existence of possible constants behind the variety of value
systems which have succeeded one another throughout the history of
human thought. The answer to this question is indicated by the
recognition that any given ideology is built on some image of human
life which seems both feasible and satisfying.'° 3
 Revelation may be
seen as a "fifth stage", at which a definitive image of human life, the
source of absolute values, makes its appearance within the ideological
flux of human philosophical systems. In the context of the sociology
of knowledge, revelation is something which breaks in to the
historical and social structures through which knowledge is available
with a definitive apprehension of something universally true and
profoundly significant - the nature of men and women and their
relation to God.
If this claim is to be upheld, it will follow that, while
incorporating all the features of formation by ideology, formation by
revelation involves an extra dimension. The same position is expressed
by the claim that the appropriation of revelation involves all the
natural mechanisms of the learning process. The whole process is one
of Christian formation, in which the new identity given in revelation
is appropriated step by step in the course of Christian learning. This
process is not simply individual but corporate; it is not simply the
individual whose character is formed as the outcome of revelation and
response but the community and, occasionally, the culture of which
that community forms a part. Revelation is one aspect of the formation
204
LEARNING CHRIST
of Christian tradition. Any particular revelatory insight must be
interpreted, using the resources available within the tradition at the
given stage of its development. The process is one of assimilation and
accommodation, in which fallible and incomplete images of human life
and the character of God are corrected, adjusted and re-expressed.10 4
The formation of Christian tradition consists of a hermeneutical
process in which both revelation and ideological criticism and
reconstruction are present in varying degrees. The fragmentation of
the Christian community is to be recognised as an additional factor in
this process. There is no single recognisable "Christian ideology" but
rather a number of competing ideologies claiming to represent
authentic Christian understanding.
Discussion of the relation between revelation and ideology turns
in particular around the issue of the authority of Scripture. In the
perspective of the Christian community as reference group, the Bible
occupies a central position. Yet the authority of the Bible and the
correct method of its interpretation are themselves the subject of
dispute. These differences over the authority and interpretation of
Scripture both reflect uncertainty about the place of the Bible in the
overall process of revelation and express the ideological character of
Christian belief. The idea of "Christian Scripture", claims David
Kelsey, is logically related to the idea of "Christian Church". The
authority of Scripture is part of the Church's self-identity. A book
like the Bible is only "Scripture" in the context of a Church which
accepts it as authoritative and, conversely, part of what it means to
be the Church is to use certain books in certain ways. Thus, the
authority of Scripture is not something inherently present in the
books themselves. It is something conferred upon it by the Church as
an outcome of the role of these particular books in its formation.1°6
The strengths and weaknesses of Kelsey's analysis are those of the
philosophy of Wittgenstein on which it is based, a philosophy centred
on the relation between meaning and use. For Wittgenstein, the meaning
of the word "God" is whatever is distinctive about religious language.
The question of whether God exists or not lies outside the scope of
his analysis. 106 The accuracy of the Wittgensteinian analysis in its
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own terms and thus the relation between the authority of Scripture and
its use within the Church may be conceded, but without abandoning the
possibility of the Bible possessing some inherent authority as a
result of divine revelation. The relationship between meaning and use
is a feature of ideological enclosure: terms acquire their meaning only
within a governing ideology. Thus, the ideological aspect of the
acceptance of Scriptural authority may be accepted but without ruling
out the possibility of an independent source of authority in divine
revelation.
If the claim that Scripture possesses an inherent authority of
its own is to be upheld, however, the precise relation between
revelation and the Bible must be specified. A definitive resolution of
this issue lies beyond the scope of the present thesis, but some
suggestions are possible on the basis of the arguments developed here.
Revelation is to be understood as something which breaks into the
hermeneutical circle of human self-interpretation, offering a set of
truths which serve as the basis for the interpretation of all others.
This is precisely what is claimed, in the Calvinist tradition, for the
Bible. In Calvin's view, Scripture is God's providential remedy for the
lack of true knowledge of him within human experience. Because of
human sinfulness, the knowledge of God potentially available in
creation is distorted. Before men and women can truly know God, they
must be "enlightened through faith by an internal revelation from
God." It is the Bible which provides that necessary internal
revelation. The Bible acts as a "pair of spectacles" through which we
are enabled to interpret aright the signs of God in creation as well
as the history of God in redemption.'° 7 Thus, "revelation" is to be
understood as the process which led to the composition of the Old and
New Testaments and ceased with the formation of the closed canon.108
The problem with this position is that it fails to take account of the
task of biblical interpretation. The truth of Scripture itself is held
to be "as obvious as black and white. 109 The Bible is presented as an
"internal" revelation, a key to the interpretation of experience, rather
than as an element in a wider hermeneutical process. The consequence
has been the fragmentation of this tradition into a multiplicity of
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sects each claiming absolute authority for its own tradition of
biblical interpretation.
The fundamentalist position is buttressed by an appeal to the
"inward testimony of the Holy Spirit". There are, however, broadly two
alternative ways in which this doctrine may be understood, and the
difference between them is crucial to the outcome of the present
theory of revelation in relation to Scripture. For Calvin, the
testimony of the Holy Spirit takes the form of an internal witness to
the authority of Scripture. Conviction of the truth of Scripture, he
believes, rests not on human testimony, especially not on that of the
Catholic Church, but on that of God himself. While unaided human
reason may provide evidences of divine authorship, "the certainty
which faith requires" comes only from the Spirit."° The alternative
is to allow the Holy Spirit a role in the interpretation of Scripture.
In this understanding, it is the Holy Spirit who supplies the "inward
revelation" necessary not only for true self-knowledge and the
knowledge of God but for the interpretation of Scripture itself. The
testimony of the Spirit is not to the authority of Scripture directly,
but to Christ. Acceptance of the authority of Scripture is an indirect
result of the recognition in the pages of the Bible of the same Christ
to whom the Spirit bears witness as the source of the believer's new
Identity and relationship with God. As Emil Brunner maintains, it is
by a single act of revelation that there is created in the believer
both faith in Christ and confidence in Scripture.'" The principle of
Interpretation needed for the correct understanding of the Bible is
the incarnate Jesus Christ; it is to Christ that the Spirit bears
witness. The "inward testimony of the Holy Spirit" may, therefore, be
identified with the Spirit's role in revelation previously described.
The main question to arise from the acceptance of the second of
these alternatives concerns the relationship between Christ and the
Bible. Why is it that the act of revelation which creates faith in
Jesus Christ creates at the same time a confidence in Scripture? Is
the Church, in accepting the canonicity of a certain set of books and
rejecting others, simply conferring authority on those particular
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books or is it recognising in them an inherent authority which they
possess by virtue of a certain relationship to Christ? If the latter,
what is the nature of that relationship? The kind of answer offered by
the analysis of learning and revelation given here centres on the
process of assimilation and accommodation in Christian learning. The
Bible is to seen as the outcome of a religious tradition whose
formation represents a learning process in which the dynamic is
provided by successive experiences of revelation. Any given event in
which the character of God is revealed may be largely assimilated to
the existing thought-patterns of the community. Thus, the deliverance
of the Israelites from Egypt and the succeeding series of victories
over their enemies allows of interpretation in terms of an
aggressively partisan and militaristic deity. However, it also
introduces into the tradition of the community a sense of solidarity
based on a consciousness of election and a sense of the power of God
over other nations and their gods. These beliefs, having taken their
place as elements of the communal tradition, form the basis for the
appreciation, at a later stage and as a result of further experiences
of revelation, of the love of God revealed in election and the
universality of his power. These elements may then come together to
suggest the universality of God's love. The result of any given
experience of revelation is usually that the character of God is only
partially understood, but the cumulative effect is the formation of a
tradition in which sufficient resources exist for the understanding of
Jesus Christ by his followers, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit,
as both Messiah and Son of God.112
Such an explanation of the relationship between Christ and
Scripture demands a theory of inspiration by which the formation of
Israel's tradition in the correct direction may be explained. It is
possible to construct such a theory as a result of careful attention
to the meaning of the word "inspiration". 1 Terms such as this may
be applied to God by analogy from their everyday meaning, making such
changes as the nature and character of God require. The example which
may be given to illustrate the everyday meaning of "inspiration" is
the inspiration of a student by a particularly influential teacher. To
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say that a particular piece of the student's work was "inspired" by
that teacher does not mean that it was written by the teacher. It
means that it was a response by the student to that teacher. The fact
of inspiration by no means rules out the possibility of error. Not
only will the student's work reflect his own particular style of
thought and expression, it will reflect his cultural background and
the limits of his understanding. The influence of the teacher will be
limited by the capacity of the student both to understand what the
teacher intended to convey and to respond to it. It may not be that
the teacher deliberately sets out to inspire, but even if he is
conscious of the effort to influence the students, this is only done
by means of other actions, in particular explanation and
demonstration. The result may well be a considerable degree of
divergence between the work of different students, who may be more or
less inspired and who may comprehend the teacher to a greater or
lesser degree. Despite their differences, however, a degree of unity
between the students can be expected reflecting the intention of the
teacher.
In the application of this analysis of the term "inspiration"
analogously to the action of the Holy Spirit in relation to Scripture,
a number of close parallels can be accepted. While the possibility of
unconscious influence can be ruled out in view of the omniscience of
God, the idea of inspiration in and through other actions is to be
accepted as an important element in any doctrine of inspiration. Such
a doctrine, moreover, preserves that understanding of the Spirit's
operation previously seen to be vital, namely the preservation of
human autonomy. The differences in style and emphasis between biblical
writers can be seen to be due to the latitude allowed to human
autonomy in their response to the experience of inspiration. It allows
for the progressive formation of a tradition based on successive
experiences of revelation. As the written record of that developing
tradition, the Bible preserves descriptions of events taken to be the
result of divine intervention, of primary religious experience, such as
that of the prophets, and successive layers of interpretation within
the community. It is the record of a process of formation by means of
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successive experiences of revelation and subsequent interpretation and
reinterpretation, such that the tradition is progressively moulded,
deepened and enriched in the resources it contains for understanding
the nature of God and his relationship to mankind.1 '4
Christian learning, it has been argued, is that learning which
takes place within the sphere of revelation. There are two senses in
which this may be true of a given situation. Such learning may be
taking place within the sphere of revelation because it represents a
handing on of the tradition received and interpreted by the Church as
a result of past revelation. The learner may be said to be receiving
the ideology of the Church, although this will be an ideology in the
formation of which revelation has played an important part. The result
of such a process is likely to be what John Vesterhoff calls
"affiliative faith", a faith dependent upon the authority of the
community.' 5 Athough such faith is not necessarily to be despised,
its end result may well be a "dead" and defensive orthodoxy. The
second sense involves the present activity of the Holy Spirit in the
life of the believer. Such learning takes place as a result of the
outworking of the "identity" given to the believer in Christ by means
of the Holy Spirit in such a way as to form the self-image and
through the self-image, attitudes, values and behaviour. This process
of formation in response to revelation by no means excludes
straightforward ideological transmission and its accompanying
patterns of response but such ideological formation becomes part of a
deeper process in which the Holy Spirit is directly at work.' 16
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Inner Growth/Outer Change; An Educational Guide to Church Renewal, New
York; Seabury, 1979, p,7f,, and in particular, "Christian Education;
kerygma v, OidachaP , Christianity, Society and Education,
ed,J,Ferguson, London; S,P,C,K„ 1981, For further comment, see my
article, "Christian Education as Enculturation", British journal of
Religious Education 10, 1988, p,66-71,)
"Nurture" refers to the ongoing process of transmission of the elements of
the life of the community, its "understandings and ways", its symbols and shared
values, Conversion means the personal inward appropriation of these elements,
Conversion, however, cannot be nurtured, The process by which the individual
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internalises or "owns" the faith expressed in the church's corporate life is one
which cannot be controlled or planned for in the educational framework, There is a
discontinuity at this point between what Westerhoff sees as the inward and the
outward aspects of Christian experience, It is a discontinuity which is undoubtably
present in the process of Christian education, but one which it is important to
interpret correctly, The difference between "nurture" and "conversion" is not the
difference between what human effort can achieve and what the Holy Spirit alone can
accomplish, It is a characteristic of the human power of decision, which is at the
heart of the learning process, "Conversion' is more "inward" than nurture because
it represents a change in the person's identity schema, In the course of exposure
to Christian worship, teaching and corporate life, the combined efforts of men and
women and the work of the Holy Spirit will result in gradually increasing pressure
for change, for accommodation of the identity schema to acknowledge a particular
aspect of what it means to be a Christian, However, it is in the power of the
individual to accept or to reject the consequences for his or her identity of all
that has been learned, A personal response is required to enable the Holy Spirit to
apply the experience of both formal and informal situations at the level of
personal identity,
85, See above, p,150-151, 159,
86, See above, p,120, and 0,6,Brim and S,Wheeler, Socialisation after Childhood;
New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1966, p,20f, for the distinction between
resocialisation and secondary socialisation,
87, Sandford, op,cit„ p,3-22,
88, The family-like character of the Christian community is an important element of
faith-community theory in Christian education, See especially the work of John
H,Westerhoff III, in particular "The Church and the Family", Religious Education
78, 1983, p,249-274,
89, 2 Corinthians 3;18,
90, D,Cairns, The Image of God in Man, London: SCM, 1953, p,24-26, 37-41,
91, Ridderbos, op,cit„ p,29-31 1 39-41,
92, ibid„ p,58-60,
93, ibid., p,61-64, See also Caird, op,cit„ p,77-78, 180,
94, Colossians 3:10,
95, For example R,B,Braithwaite, An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious
Belief, Cambridge University Press, 1955; F,G,Downing, Has Christianity a
Revelation? London; SCM, 1964, much of whose argument is dependent on Braithwaite,
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96, See above, p,127-128,
97, Downing, op,cit,, p,42,
98, In §4 of The Christian Faith, Schleiermacher argues that God cannot be known in
the same way as another person because to know a thing or person implies a degree
of freedom in relation to the object or person, whereas we have no degree of
freedom in relation to God, As a result, God can only be "known" in a derived way
as a result of the consciousness of absolute dependence, The insight that a degree
of freedom is required in relation to something or someone before knowledge is
possible can be accepted, since knowledge requires the freedom to make an
interpretation, But Schleiermacher fails to make the distinction referred to
earlier (p,151f,) between the ontological relation between God and mankind, in
which men and women are wholly dependent upon God as his creatures, and the
relationship which arises as a result of the unique constitution of men and women
as responsible and autonomous, The degree of freedom towards God which is part of
the conditions of the creation of mankind thus allows the possibility of the
knowledge of God, and the accommodation of God to the conditions of human knowledge
in the incarnation of Jesus Christ makes this possibility an actuality,
99, See above, p,183-185 on the definitions of revelation and Christian education
used here,
100, This description of the ideological character of religious faith is based on
that of John Hull, 4/hat Prevents Christian Adkins from Learning? London: SCM, 1985,
p,51-58, J,L,Segundo makes a distinction between faith and ideology, In his early
work, Segundo describes ideology as a set of beliefs and values held on the basis
of argument, Faith, by contrast, includes those deep-seated beliefs held in a
manner analogous to personal trust, (J,L,Segundo, The Liberation of Theology,
Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1977, p,106,) More recently, this distinction is
further elaborated (Segundo, Faith and Ideologies, London: Sheed and Ward, 1984,
esp,p,3-28), Segundo distinguishes two anthropological dimensions: the dimension of
value and meaning, the sphere of faith; and the dimension of action and efficacy,
the sphere of ideology, Segundo defines ideology as a rationally worked out means
to the achievement of the highest value in each person's faith or value system, In
view of the analysis of cognition given in this thesis, especially with regard to
the relationship between attitudes and beliefs, it is doubtful whether this
distinction is sustainable, In the process of learning and identity formation, the
attainment either of clearly and freely chosen values or of rational procedures for
their realisation is the exception rather than rule, Segundo's position implies an
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artificial separation between reason and value in human development, Richard
Niebuhr, whose analysis of value and faith Segundo appears to overlook, makes it
clear that the espousal of one highest value is by no means a universal tendency
(See Radical Monotheism and Western Culture and The Responsible Self),
101, The theoretical approaches used in the preparation of chapter 4 include those
of Erik Erikson (psycho-social development), 6,H,Mead (social behaviourism),
symbolic interactionism and reference group theory, social learning theory
(eg,Albert Bandura and Walter Mischel), Wittgenstein (forms of life and language
games), Lev Vygotsky (zone of proximal development and the growth of word meaning),
James Wertsch (internalisation of mental processes), and Paul Tournier's synthesis
of psychiatric approaches, Also referred to are Jean Piaget (genetic epistemology)
and experiments designed to refute his theory, as well as Barry Schlenker
(impression management) and Gordon Allport (concept of the self),
102, Above, p,52,
103, Segundo, op,cit„ p,104,
104, See above, p,184-185 and page 33f,
105, D,Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology, London; SCM, 1975, p.89-
119,
106, See W,D,Hudson, Wittgenstein and Religious Belief, London; Macmillan, 1975,
107, J,Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, Philadelphia, Westminster
Press, 2 vols„ 1960, von, I,i,6,
108, L,Morris, I Believe in Revelation, London; Hodder and Stoughton, 1976, p,42f,
109, Calvin, op,cit„ I,i,6-7,
110, ibid.,
111, Brunner, Revelation, p,164-176, See also 6,Hendry,	 The Holy Spirit in
Christian Theology, London; SCM, 1957, p,72-90,
112, See T,F,Torrance, The Mediation of Christ, Exeter; Paternoster Press, 1983,
p,15-33,
113, The theory of inspiration advanced here is that of W,J,Abraham, See The Divine
Inspiration of Holy Scripture, Oxford University Press, 1981, especially p,58-69,
114. Several questions remain to be answered as a result of the suggestions
advanced here, In particular, the field of biblical hermeneutics, while obviously
relevant, lies outside the scope of the thesis, More directly, it may be asked
whether a connection exists between the two contexts advanced here in which
revelation plays a part in corporate formation, the growth of the tradition of
which the biblical material is a record and the formation of Christian tradition,
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in which the interpretation of the Bible itself forms an important element -
whether any continuity is to be discerned between inspiration and the inner witness
of the Holy Spirit, each of which is claimed in its own context to be the central
element in revelation, In answer to this question, it may be suggested that the
movement towards increasing interiority and universality discerned in the Old
Testament (see p,158), a movement brought to fulfilment in the New Testament
experience of the Spirit, provides an important element, So, too, does the
incarnation of Jesus, the result of which is that the Spirit of God is henceforth
identified much more closely with Christ, Another question concerns the part played
in the discussion by the place of Tradition in relation to Scripture and its
interpretation, Without pretending to deal adequately with this question, it may be
noted that both Yves Conger and Vladimir Lossky, to take two influential writers
from separate Christian traditions, appeal to the Holy Spirit as the ultimate
guarantor of the truth of Christian tradition, (Y,M-J,Congar, Tradition and
Traditions, London: Burns and Oates, 1966; V,Lossky, 'Tradition and Traditions", In
the Image and Likeness of Sod; New York: St,Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1974, p.141-
168.)
115, 6,K,Neville and J,H,Westerhoff III, Learning through Liturgy, New York;
Seabury, 1978, p,162f,
116, These points made briefly in conclusion to the argument given here lead on to
a detailed discussion of the scope, aims and methods of Christian education, Such a
discussion is extensive and complex and lies beyond the scope of the present
thesis,
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Reflection
At least two sorts of development seem to be called for, In classic theology claims
about the material dimensions were made in a doctrine of creation that declared the
actual physical contexts and dimensions of human life, whatever they may in fact
be, to be fundamentally good and supportive of human freedom„,The claims about the
material dimensions of personal existence could be made in terms of an ontological
relationship between all reality and God, This unchanging and unchangeable
relationship, we saw, was logically distinct from the relations constituted by
knowledge of God and by fall and redemption„,It may be that theological
anthropology will be unable to do justice to the material dimensions of human life
until it has recovered a full-blown doctrine of creation as a mode of relation to
God other than relationships in consciousness„,In addition, theological
anthropology may be able to deal with persons in their genuine concreteness only by
a second "turn", from the person as patient or subject of consciousness to the
person as agent,
David Kelsey'
Everyone's philosophical theology essentially includes within it the principles of
his whole theological way of thinking, Thus, every theologian should produce the
entirety of this part of his theology for himself,
Friedrich Sch1eiermacher2
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1. Interaction and the Cognitive Orientation 
The attempt to construct a theory of the relation between the
processes of revelation and those of human learning has involved a
wide range of theoretical fields. The variety of topics on which it
has been necessary to draw conclusions are all potentially the subject
of a thesis in themselves. These include the nature of the social
sciences, the nature of perception, the relationship between the
cognitive and affective aspects of learning, the mechanisms of
socialisation, the nature and significance of human subjectivity and
agency, the sphere of man's proper autonomy in relation to both his
creatureliness and his fallen nature, the work of the Holy Spirit in
revelation and in relation to the human spirit and the way in which
the relation between Christ and the believer is to be understood. The
main task has been not simply to bring these areas together and to
give an account of their relationship with Christian learning, but to
bring them together in such a way as to form one coherent overall
thesis.
A comparison may be drawn with the work of Dr.John Hull in his
book, What Prevents Christian Adults From Learning? In that book,
Dr.Hull presents material from a number of theoretical areas and
applies it to the problems of Christian learning. But his concern is
confined to the way in which the various psychological or sociological
factors with which he deals may inhibit Christian learning. The
limited nature of his purpose makes it unnecessary for Dr.Hull to
attempt a relation of the various fields on which he draws - it is
sufficient merely to show the influence of each area separately. But in
attempting a single overall theory of Christian learning, it is not
sufficient simply to demonstrate the contribution of each separate
area. The different fields must be brought together within a single
framework of interpretation and their relationship to one another
clarified.
The main problem posed by this requirement is the close
Interrelation of conclusions drawn from disparate theoretical fields,
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Revision of a conclusion drawn from one particular area would require
the reappraisal of the whole thesis. It has been necessary, for
example, to reject both philosophical empiricism and Piagetian theory,
and in each case the reasons have been carefully but briefly given.
Further evidence which seemed to require the acceptance of either of
these competing approaches would invalidate the entire thesis. In
particular, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit plays an important part in
the establishment of a relationship between nature and grace, human
autonomy and divine intervention, and learning and revelation. If
substantial reasons could be given for an interpretation of the work
of the Holy Spirit different from that put forward here, the
connection between revelation and learning would have to be
reinterpreted along different lines.
On the other hand, one of the most interesting aspects of the
attempt to establish connections between material in differing fields
has been the discovery of substantial areas of overlap and continuity,
in many cases between workers who appear to have been unaware of one
another's results. Ulrich Neisser, for example, shows no signs of being
familiar with Jerome Bruner's very similar theory of interaction.' The
reasons for these areas of continuity can be traced to philosophical
considerations. Vriters in different fields are faced with the same
basic questions concerning the mechanisms of perception and the
nature of human beings, and their agreement is due, in most cases, to
their selection of certain standard answers. The material from the
different but related subject areas presented here is held together by
a common philosphical orientation. The task of this final chapter is
to attempt to examine some aspects of the orientation behind the
theory presented here - to make explicit the theological and
philosophical approach which undergirds the thesis as a whole.
One of the most important elements in the theory is what has
been referred to above as the "cognitive approach" or "cognitive
orientation". In the context of the study of perception, the main
feature of the "cognitive approach" is the role of the "world model" of
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the perceiver in the processing of information. In the words of de
Hey, quoted above,
The central point of the cognitive view is that any such information
processing, whether perceptual (such as perceiving an object) or
symbolic (such as understanding a sentence) is mediated by a system of
categories or concepts which for the information processor constitutes
a representation or model of his world,4
It is only the categories involved in the perceiver's "world model"
which enable perception to take place at all. Without them, as the
experiments of Bartlett and Bruner amply demonstrate, recognition of a
given object of perception would be impossible.
A central feature of the cognitive orientation is the
hermeneutical nature of perception, recognition, comprehension and
memory. This general orientation is translated into a theoretical
model by means of the theory of interaction. Interaction is a
hypothesis which explains the results of numerous experiments, of
which the playing card experiment of Bruner and Postman is one of the
most celebrated. As a theoretical model, interaction plays an important
unifying role throughout the thesis.6
1. It suggests that both perception and learning are the outcome
of human agency. The ability of human beings to construct a
psychological environment is a reflection of the active nature of
perception and information processing.
2. The mode of understanding termed verstelen, by which men and
women understand and interpret the point of view of others may be
viewed as implicitly interactive. Verstehen is the foundation of the
Weberian or hermeneutical approach to social science, in which the
agent's point of view and interpretation of his actions is the
significant level of analysis.
3. Allied to Weber's approach are symbolic interactionism and
related approaches to socialisation based on the work of G.I .I.Mead, in
which social interaction is understood as the exchange of frameworks
of interpretation.6
4. Interaction is the foundation of an approach to learning which
interprets it as the outcome of personality as a whole, in which
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ability to learn, propensity to learn and direction of learning are all
outcomes of the formation of identtty.7
5. Interaction provides the foundation for the view of learning
as assimilation and accommodation which lies behind the recognition
of the need for teaching methods geared to active engagement on the
part of the learner.
In the social sciences generally, however, interaction is a highly
unpopular hypothesis. This is not only because it requires the
rejection of empiricism and, with it, the prevailing positivist
orientation, but because of the difficulties it throws in the way of
experimental precision. In order to obtain replicable results from
experiments on human behaviour, it is necessary to quantify the
stimulus and control the conditions of the experiment. If the value of
the stimulus and the way the conditions are interpreted differs from
individual to individual, this becomes extremely difficult.
The rejection of interaction for reasons such as these is to be
viewed as inadequate, given the complexity of the theoretical
foundations of experimental method examined in the opening chapter. A
difference in theoretical orientation is to be noted between the
natural sciences, where Kuhnian and related understandings are
increasingly accepted, and the empiricism and emphasis on
quantification still prevailing in many parts of the social science
field. It has been suggested that the choice is to be made between
these two approaches in favour of understanding all disciplines as, in
varying degrees, hermeneutical. Quantification may be accepted as a
small-scale and highly-defined approach within a larger field. The
work of Odom, described in connection with the theory of perceptual
salience, has demonstrated what can be done with the use of pretesting
to discover the experimental subject's initial interpretation of a
given stimulus.° Experimental work, such as that reviewed in chapters
2 to 4 of the thesis, may be understood as constituting "normal
science", the testing and extension of one particular framework of
interpretation from a number of possibilities.
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The cognitive approach to perception and intelligence generally
constitutes the "lowest lever, or level of abstraction nearest to and
most closely bearing upon the experimental data, of a set of closely
linked aspects of a broader orientation. The outcome of the cognitive
approach is a view of human beings as interpreters of the world
around them, as creators of psychological world-models and co-
creators of the human world, the product of and matrix for the
processes of socialisation. This view is interpreted, at a higher level
still, as the result of human autonomy and human autonomy given
theological significance in relation to divine creation. It is by a
process of careful relation of theological and philosophical
orientation such as this that theological statements, which, in
themselves, have a high level of abstraction, may be applied to the
concrete experience of human life and filled out in terms of a theory
of learning.
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2 Interaction and the Synthetic A Prior$
Founded on the contribution of the subject in perception and
comprehension, the cognitive approach is implicitly related to the
philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The development of the cognitive approach
in the context of philosophy of science and the study of cognition
represents a "turn to the subject" of the same kind as that exhibited
by Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. As such, it encounters the same
kind of problems as does Kant's philosophy. The task of this and the
following sections is to draw attention these problems. In many cases,
however, it will be suggested that the cognitive approach, and
particularly the theory of interaction, offers a contribution to the
solution of the difficulty. In particular, the use made of the
cognitive approach in the course of the thesis represents a two-fold
contribution to the interpretation of the philosophical framework
developed by Kant:
1. In the course of chapter 2 above, reasons have been given for
treating philosophical theories of knowledge and language as paradigms
to which psychological investigation of the same topics stand as
normal science. Philosophical models such as Kant's are to be taken as
general frameworks capable of experimental analysis and consequent
modification.9
2. Kant himself rejected the idea of revelation, preferring to
confine religion to the limits of reason alone. But in his comments on
the nature of philosophy itself, the possibility arises that the limits
of reason may not be sufficiently broad to allow a satisfactory
resolution of the problem of mankind's religious inclination. The true
subject of philosophy, Kant believed, was mankind, and the nature of
mankind was impossible to describe satisfactorily. Use has been made
of this position, in chapter 1 above, to attempt to establish the
relationship between revelation and the limits of human reason, so as
to allow a view of revelation which both interprets and takes account
of the limits on metaphysical speculation imposed by the Kantian
framework.
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One of the most important reservations of philosophers about
Kant's work concerns his use of psychological terms in the course of
the development of a philosophical position. The Critique of Pure
Reason repeatedly refers to psychological faculties or "functions of
the soul" - those of "sensibility", by which impressions are received
from the outside world; of understanding, by which a system of
categories is imposed on those impressions; and imagination, by which
the categories of the understanding are applied to the impression
received by sensibility by means of "schemata". Again, Kant refers a
number of times to the fact that the subject of his investigation is
specifically human understanding, the limits of that understanding
being the limits of human cognitive capacity. In the Transcendental
Deduction, he writes,
This peculiarity of our understanding, that it can produce a priori
unity of apperception solely by means of the categories, and only by
such and so many, is as little capable of further explanation as why
we have just these and no other functions of judgement, or why space
and time are the only forms of our possible intuition°
This feature of Kant's work has frequently been the subject of
criticism. Strawson, for example, objects to its "psychological idiom".
It is, he believes, only one of several possible "idioms" for the point
Kant wishes to make." Strawson's objection springs from the
conviction, shared by empiricist philosphers in general, that logic and
psychology are distinct and separate fields. Popper's strongly and
repeatedly expressed conviction that the psychological processes
leading to a particular scientific discovery have no bearing whatever
on the logical processes of its justification has already been noted.12
So also has the belief of Hamlyn, Hirst and others that the psychology
of learning has no bearing on the logical status of what is learned.
Grounds have been given for rejecting this position as mistaken. 13 In
the study of knowledge, philosophy and psychology have complementary
and related roles. There is, in Stephen Toulmin's words, "a dialectical
succession of logical priority" between questions of psychological
development and of logical justification.'4
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Further, this demarcation between logic and psychology was not
accepted by Kant himself. The most important aspect of Kant's
philosophical position is his "turn to the subject". As a consequence
of the turn to the subject, Kant sets out to analyse not propositions
but Judgements.' s His starting-point takes for granted, therefore, a
human action, the action of judgement, and an action requires human
capacity, in this case psychological capacity. In this respect, Kant's
Critique is closely comparable with Wittgenstein's Philosophical
Investigations. There, Wittgenstein begins by pointing out that
language has its origin in the action of speech. 16
 There thus arises a
distinction between speech as a human action and language as a set of
propositions, which is exactly parallel to the distinction arising
from Kant's Critique between judgement and propositions. It is a
mistake, therefore, to refer to the psychological orientation of Kant's
work merely as an "idiom". For Kant, logic was a reflection of the
working of human cognition and the limits of logic were the limits of
human cognition. This dependence of logic upon psychological capacity
could be argued in detail. The main outlines of the position appear
implicitly in the course of the thesis.
One of the most frequent and damaging criticisms of the Critique
Is the commonly accepted observation that, in his attempt to delineate
the full extent of the categories of the synthetic a priori, Kant was
dependent on Euclidean geometry, classical logic and the Newtonian
world-view, all of which he accepted as axiomatic and all of which
have since been shown to require substantial modification and
supplementation. In effect, Kant assumes an historically constant
"human nature" and takes no account of historical changes in human
consciousness. The discovery of time-scale and the effects of
historical process in the nineteenth century made Kant's outlook
obsolete. Toulmin calls his work, "The last great a-historical
synthesis of human thought and achievement." 17
 The demonstrable
inadequacy of Kant's description of the synthetic a priori tends to
call into question the viability of the concept as a whole.
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The modification of the Kantian framework in the present work,
however, presents a means of incorporating the influence of historical
development into that framework. The essence of this modification is
the replacement of the relation postulated in the Critique between the
active faculty of the understanding and the passive faculty of
sensibility by a process of interaction in which "understanding" and
"sensibility" are mutually conditioned. In Kant's original scheme the
understanding is only ever active and sensibility only ever passive.
The relation between them is achieved by the capacity of the
imagination for the formation of schemata, a schema being a "third
thing", homogeneous with both category and intuition. 16 Since
understanding is only ever active in the process of Judgement, it can
never be affected, and the categories consequently modified, by the
influence of the intuitions. In the process of interaction, however,
this is precisely what takes place. The "categories of the
understanding", which in this model are the schemata themselves, are
continually being modified as a result of experience. In Kant's
original description, moreover, the understanding supplies the form of
any given Judgement, while the intuitions of sensibility supply the
content, and in this way "objects" are made "to conform to our
knowledge". It is of the essence of the process of interaction,
however, that the distinction between form and content does not apply
to the organisation of tacit knowledge. It is, rather, a necessity of
explicit, logical, inference, the kind on which Kant relied in the
process of working out his account of the categories.
The influence of culture and history is not only allowable under
this modification of Kant's theory but axiomatic. It has been
demonstrated at length in the course of the thesis that the categories
of the understanding are formed as a result of experience. This
experience may be either corporate or individual. A considerable
proportion of human learning consists of cultural transmission,
whereby the individual grows into and makes his own the forms of
experience common to his particular culture and society. Within this
process of socialisation, however, there is plenty of room for
distinctive individual experience and interpretation. It is, in fact,
232
REFLECTION
the possibility of individual differences of experience and
interpretation which prevents a culture from ossifying. The outcome is
that "human nature" may be said to be both historically conditioned
and yet also the outcome, in each individual case, of a process of
self-definition.
It has sometimes been supposed that the recognition of the
deficiency of Kant's attempt to describe and delineate the categories
of the understanding must lead to the complete rejection of his
framework. But this need not be the case. The rejection of Kant's
description of the categories leaves untouched the arguments he
deployed in the "Transcendental Deduction" to show that we do, in fact,
apply categories to intuition to arrive at concepts. As Stephen Korner
writes,
I take the view that even if Kant's proof of the complete list of
Categories was not successful he may still claim to have established
that we do apply Categories in making objective empirical judgements,
This is an important fact about our thinking which Kant's empiricist
predecessors did not or would not see,'9
The attempt to give a complete list of the categories is logically
dependent on the more fundamental argument of the "Transcendental
Deduction". The main argument, therefore, is not affected by the
overthrow of the subsidiary one.
In addition to this logical point, there is the evidence of the
experiments of Bartlett and Bruner, to which a great deal of other
similar data could be added, to the effect that perception is
dependent on the application of categories.2° Kant's theoretical
epistemology is to be taken as a paradigm for the psychology of
perception and cognition. The hypothesis is that perception is to be
understood as the result of the application of categories to sensory
data, and the evidence adduced above is overwhelmingly supportive of
the hypothesis. What is required to make the Kantian framework
plausible is an account of the nature of the categories said to be
applied. This will take the place of Kant's attempted proof, the
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failure of which makes his theory appear implausible. It is this which
is attempted in chapter 3 of the thesis.
The replacement of Kant's list of categories by the description
of tacit knowledge in chapters 2 and 3 above leaves to be resolved
the question of what features of human cognition can be said to be
innate. In Kant's original presentation, the whole of the categories of
the understanding are required to be innate, because they can never be
modified or formed by experience. Under the theory of interaction, on
the other hand, a very large proportion of "tacit knowledge" is the
result of experience. Yet the principle remains that without some
initial concepts as a framework of interpretation, perception itself is
impossible. Some proportion of tacit knowledge must, therefore, be
innate or inborn and not the result of experience. Kant's contention
that there must be a synthetic a rTloT4 of some form, whether or not
it is of the logical form he ascribed to it, must, therefore, be upheld.
In an interesting article on the relation between human cognition and
the functioning of artificial intelligence, Z.Pylyshyn designates this
area as "functional architecture" or the equivalent of the computer
programmer's "virtual machine", the capacity of the basic level of
software required for the machine to operate. 21 In linguistic
philosophy, this area may be taken to represent what Stuart Hampshire
calls the "necessities of discourse", those assumptions which underlie
the possibility of language.22 Exactly what is comprised by this area
of innate understanding will be the subject of a subsequent section.22
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3. Imagination 
There is no clearly recognised shared understanding of
"imagination" in modern psychological study, and in philosophical
epistemology its definition has varied through the years. 24
 In Kant,
the imagination plays a particularly important role. Imagination is
responsible for the essential process of "synthesis", or the
application of the categories of the understanding to the sensible
manifold, a process without which knowledge would be impossible:
Synthesis in general„,is the mere result of the power of the
imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without
which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are
scarcely ever conscious,25
The important function thus ascribed to the imagination was taken up,
among others, by Coleridge as a central feature of his explanation of
the poet's craft.26
One of the most important of recent thinkers to give an
Important place to the imagination is Michael Polanyi. Imagination
plays a key part in Polanyi's explanation of the process of scientific
discovery. He was fond of quoting instances of scientists, of whom
Einstein was his favourite example, whose distinctive contributions to
science had their roots in "Intuition". Thus Einstein was intuitively
aware from the age of 16 that there was something missing in
Newtonian physics, but had to work for many years before he discerned
what the solution was. Discoveries such as Einstein's theory of
relativity are examples of what Polanyi describes as reintegration of
the "particulars" or "clues" to form a new whole. A new general theory
is proposed, after the manner of a Kuhnian paradigm, to explain the
existing known facts, some of which, previously overlooked, may become
vitally important under the new theory.27
For Polanyi, this process amounts to a change of "vision" and the
process underlying it is an extension of perception. Thus while, for
Kant, imagination is an integral part of perception, Polanyi's theory
of imagination is modelled on a theory of perception. A person who
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puts on a pair of inverting spectacles initially has a difficult time
finding his way about. But in time the brain gets used to the inverted
image and he is able to function normally. Only when he eventually
takes the spectacles off will he have to take time to readapt to
normality. In the same way, says Polanyi, imagination reintegrates
familiar particulars to form a new "vision" of reality.
Several times in his writings, Polanyi refers to Plato's dialogue,
Keno, in which the difficulty is raised that the awareness of a
problem is impossible without a sense of the solution. If all
knowledge were explicit, no problem could be recognised before its
solution were discovered! But if the awareness of a problem is part of
tacit knowledge, then knowledge of a problem and the clues to its
eventual solution may be given together. The same observations which
indicate that a problem exists provide the clues to its solution. All
that is needed is the reintegration of these clues into a new and more
satisfactory picture. "To know what to look for," Polanyi writes, "does
not lend us the power to find it. That power lies in the
imagination."28 Imagination is the faculty employed in the deliberate
attention to the problem, the attempt to "see" the solution. Intuition
is a deeper, spontaneous, non-deliberate faculty, which may be
activated by the application of the imagination to reintegrate the
particulars into a coherent whole.
Guidance in the search for a solution is provided by what
Polanyi calls a "gradient of deepening coherence". The best solution is
the one which explains the known observations most coherently. Two
assumptions must be made, both of which Polanyi espouses, and which
form important elements of his work. The first is the existence of an
independent and coherent reality, whose coherence leads the scientist
on in the attempt to picture it. Scientific theories may then be
envisaged as provisional models, best attempts to describe the nature
of reality. The second is the independent reality of the values
expressed by the scientist in the search for scientific truth. These
are to be taken as expressions of a common human reality, whose
deepest level is expressed in the person. Thus it is "personal
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knowledge" which acts as the underlying integrating level in all
attempts to discover the nature of reality.
No theoretical approach which makes use of the terms "tacit" and
"personal knowledge" can fail to acknowledge its debt to Polanyi's
work, and, indeed, much of Polanyi's vision is to be found, whether
tacitly or explicitly, incorporated in the present work. Polanyi was
one of the first to challenge the philosophical framework which
dominated post-war science, to describe perception as an heuristic
skill, and to look in the direction of psychological experiments for
the solution to the philosophical problems of perception. More
important still is the move toward an alternative framework for the
understanding not simply of scientific discovery but of perception as
a whole. "What Polanyi does," writes Daniel Hardy,
is to move decisively away from the mechanical model of early modern
science, where reality was seen as residing in the object or in the
laws which appeared to govern the object's behaviour, and to move
toward a dynamic or interactionist model, where reality is perceived
in the relation between the object and its knower,29
Despite Polanyi's insistence on the independence of the real world and
its important role in guiding the process of discovery, the outcome of
his position is that what we know is to be taken only as an
approximation to that reality, a model which is the creation of human
Imagination.
For all Polanyi's significance, his important work was written
between 20 and 30 years ago, which in scientific terms is a long time.
In the construction of the thesis, his work has been supplemented from
a number of sources. Chief of these is Thomas Kuhn, who adds an
Important historical dimension to the description of the processes of
scientific discovery, but more important still, an interpretative
dimension more specific in its description of the logical structure of
Induction. As early as 1959, N.R.Hanson suggested that the "logic of
scientific discovery" might be analogical in character.'-'° Over the next
10 years or so, Kuhn succeeded in demonstrating that this was the
case. Kuhn's description of the "logic of tacit inference" is more
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detailed and satisfactory than the "from-to" of Polanyi's account of
tacit integration:3 ' Whereas Polanyi takes the work of the Gestalt
psychologists as his starting point, Kuhn goes behind Gestalt
psychology and demonstrates the reasons behind their observations. In
cognitive science, the work on the structure of schemata reviewed
earlier carries forward that of both Kuhn and Polanyi in the direction
of greater accuracy, although leaving a great deal of progress still to
be made.32 The drawback of this work is that it is carried on without
Polanyi's awareness of the effects and implications of his own work
not simply for the philosophy of science but for philosophy in general
and for theology and religion.
What Polanyi described as the imagination and as the spontaneous
work of intuition has been analysed in the present work in terms of
"schemata". The usage of the term "schema" to describe a component of
tacit knowledge is related to Kant's use of the term. Kant describes a
schema as the means by which synthesis takes place. It is a "third
thing", homogeneous on the one hand with the category, and on the
other with the appearance. It must be at the same time "intellectual"
and "sensible".33 The modern use of "schema" is not derived from Kant
at all. It came into cognitive science from Sir Frederic Bartlett, who
derived it from Sir Henry Head. Nowhere in Remembering does Bartlett
show awareness of Kant's use of the term, and references to Kant in
the modern literature are practically non-existent. 34. In both Kant and
in modern usage, however, a schema is what must be applied to
perceptual data before recognition takes place. It is the means by
which the "manifold of intuition", the constant flow of diverse sense-
impressions, is sifted and interpreted. The difference is that in
cognitive theory there is no need for pure, unschematised categories
of the kind which Kant painfully works out according to the rules of
logic. Schemata are derived from experience, applied to experience and
modified by experience. This change makes a great deal of difference
to the use of the term "imagination". In Kant, the term is quite
clearly defined as a third faculty operating as mediator between
sensibility and understanding. But in modern theory no clear line of
demarcation can be maintained between the functions of what Kant
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called "understanding" and "imagination". The formation, modification
and application of schemata is the subject of cognition as a whole.
As far as the form of the schemata is concerned, Kant gives an
excellent description of the problem, one which has rarely been
equalled in the modern literattire. 35
 According to Kant, the schema for
a dog must include all the information necessary for the correct
classification of any given dog. It cannot consist merely of an image
of a particular dog nor yet of all the images of all the dogs so far
encountered by the individual. Neither of these would allow him to
recognise a previously unfamiliar example as a dog. A schema must
include "rules" for the recognition of objects sufficiently flexible to
allow of modification in the light of specific instances. Kuhn's
description of "exemplars" as cognitive categories may be understood
to meet these requirements. Exemplars are undefined categories based
on similarity. The introduction of explicit definition introduces
rigidity in the form of boundaries which are superfluous for the
functioning of tacit knowledge. The relationship between exemplars is
based on perceived similarity. The broad category "bird" includes some
"central" examples such as "robin", others more peripheral, such as
"turkey" or "ostrich". The basis of their connection is analogy and
their relationships multi-dimensional. Whether the appropriate
connection for "robin" is "raven", "aeroplane" or "Christmas" depends
on the context of the discourse in which it appears:36
This description of the way in which the schemata function as
the elements of tacit knowledge points to their extreme complexity - a
complexity which defies complete analysis. As Kant himself wrote
The schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances
and their mere form, is an art concealed in the depths of the human
soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to
allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze,97
While interpreting the progress nuule in the study of schemata in
cognitive science as a development within and clarification of the
Kantian framework, it must be conceded that important questions
remain to be answered. According to the earliest workers in the field
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of Artificial Intelligence, complexity was the only obstacle to the
complete description of the processes of human cognition. Their
optimism is philosophically related to that of the early social
scientists, such as who believed that the complete
description of human behaviour by means of scientific laws of cause
and effect was only a matter of time - the only obstacle being the
extreme complexity of those laws. In the course of the thesis reasons
have been given for the rejection of this posit1on. 39 The analogical
structure of the relationships between schemata, it is maintained,
points to the need for an explanation for "intuitive fit", an
explanation which is to found in the realm of affect, • which is, in
turn, a reflection of the role of intention, not only in the direction
of action but in the processes of cognition as a whole.39
The evidence assembled strongly indicates the role of goal
orientation in cognition - the selection of information is based on
what is deemed relevant to present purposes; comprehension involves
intention; attitudes are predispositions to action based on
constellations of values; and so on. All this points to the role in
cognition of human agency. Most psychologists, it is to be
acknowledged, resist the intrusion of the concept of agency into the
search for the explanation of cognitive processes. The agent is
equated with a homunculus or "little man" in the head, used as a
ready-made explanation in place of a convincing, if hypothetical,
process. The rule governing work in the empiricist tradition is that
no additional entities are to be introduced to make the proposed
mechanism "work". Thus Bartlett, for example, successfully avoids using
the term "self" in this way, defining it instead as the interplay of
appetites, instincts, interests and ideals, and "temperament", and
"character" as due to the order of predominance of perceptual
tendencies.40 The same concern lies behind the search for a mechanism
to account for selective attention so as to avoid the introduction of
purpose." In another context, perceptual salience, Barber and Legge
avoid the use of the term "purpose" by subtituting "motivational need
state of the organism". 42 In Artificial Intelligence, the euphemism is
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"executive routine", the assumption being that such routines must
ultimately be reducible to process explanation.43
The position proposed here is that while it is possible to model
intentionality by the use of processes, hypothetical or actual, such
processes can never explain intentionality. Purpose and intention are
the contribution of the human agent, whose explanation must
necessarily be of a different order.'" This is because certain
elements in the interpretation of a given situation are to be taken as
presuppositions of the act of interpretation and communication, and
could never be deduced from experience alone. They include the tacit
recognition of a distinction between language and the world which
language describes. It is these elements which allow the possibility
of meaning in any given situation and they arise from the fact that a
person is an acting subject. The meaning of what it is to be an acting
subject can, therefore, never be exhausted in description.
The philosophical orientation of the thesis as a whole requires
the conclusion, therefore, that the process of cognition can never be
exhaustively explained. Imagination remains, "An art concealed in the
depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is
hardly likely ever to allow us to discover." Herein lies a potential
weakness. This weakness can be partially offset in the theological
sphere. In defence of the consignment of the human agent to a special
order of logical explanation, it can be argued that humanity is of a
different order theologically to the rest of creation. This position,
adopted in chapter 5 of the thesis, will be explored in a subsequent
section.45
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4 Transcendental Idealism and the Status of the "Real"
One of the problems associated with Kant's philosophy is the
difficulty attending his concept of "transcendental idealism". Kant's
starting point was the empiricist description of experience as
consisting of separate and fleeting impressions received by the
senses. It required the application of the categories of the
understanding in the process of synthesis before these fleeting sense-
impressions could be made to yield an intelligible concept. The
outcome is that our knowledge can never be of "things-in-themselves",
or objects as they exist in the "real world". Such objects must be
presumed to exist as the source of the impressions received by the
senses, but the concepts which we have of objects are those produced
by the process of synthesis. Those concepts conform not to the objects
themselves but to the categories of the understanding.
In working out his "transcendental idealism", Kant was
consciously steering a middle path between two extremes, the extremes
of empiricism and rationalism, represented by Locke and Leibniz
respectively. "In a word," he wrote,
Leibniz intellectualised appearances, just as Locke,,, sensualised all
concepts of the understanding, i,e, interpreted them as nothing more
than empirical or abstracted concepts of reflection, Instead of
seeking in understanding and sensibility two sources of
representations which, while quite different, can supply objectively
valid judgements of things only in conjunction with each other, each
of these great men hold to one only of the two, viewing it as in
immediate relation to things in themselves,46
Precisely the same dichotomy exists potentially between "data driven"
and "concept driven" information processing. While the one, taken by
itself, requires that all mental concepts conform passively to the
objects of the external world, the other, taken by itself, runs the
risk of losing contact entirely with the external world and resulting
in "controlled hallucination." What is required is that data driven and
concept driven processing interact to produce a concept which is not a
passive copy but an interpretation of the external world.47
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The outcome of interaction is, therefore, the same as for Kant's
theory, namely that the objects of the "real world" are to be taken as
empirically real but transcendentally ideal. They are empirically real
in that they produce impressions which are really disclosed to the
senses and must therefore be assumed to exist independently of our
concepts of them. But they are transcendentally ideal in that our
concepts of objects are the result of interpretation to fit in with our
overall "world model". We do not know objects in themselves, only what
we make of them.
As it stands in Kant, the theory of transcendental idealism is
open to certain grave objections. One of these is the anomalous
position of space and time. One of the earliest objections was that of
Jacobi in 1787. Kant assumes that perception is caused by things-in-
themselves. But causation, as we understand it, must take place in
space and time. Kant maintains, however, that space and time exist
only as forms of our understanding and not for things-in-themselves.
If that is the case, the question to arise is: how is it possible for
things-in-themselves to produce impressions?de
There are several examples in the natural sciences of theories
which survived initially because of the recognition of their potential
explanatory power, despite a number of apparently weighty objections,
which were subsequently shown to be misconceived. It is suggested here
that the apparent contradiction to which Jacobi drew attention is an
example of a similar case in the history of philosophy, which it has
taken the discovery of the relativity of space and time and the theory
of interaction to overcome. According to the theory of interaction, the
concept we have of any real object will be different in some degree
from the way that the object exists in itself but the concept
nevertheless owes a good deal to the way that the object actually
exists. Because of the replacement of the purely active role of the
understanding by the process of interaction, the same may now be said
of space and time also. The form of our understanding of space and
time may be said to owe something to the way space and time actually
exist, even though their real form remains unknown to us. Objects may
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thus be said to exist and to cause sense-impressions in space and
time, but the form of space and time in which they exist may well be
very different from space and time as we understand them. This is
precisely the situation revealed by the discovery of the relativity of
space and time. With the theory of relativity and the advances in
theoretical physics based upon it, the possibility is opened up that
space and time may involve many more than the three spacial
dimensions and one temporal involved in the form of our understanding.
It is in this multi-dimensional space-time continuum that sense-
impressions are caused, but the outcome of our interpretation of these
impressions is the "human world" with which we are all familiar. The
theory of relativity is counter-intuitive because it appears to defy
the experience of space and time with which we are familiar, even
though it is analytically sound and appears to have passed the test of
empirical experimentation so far.
Kant's suggestion was that we may have more success in the tasks
of metaphysics, "if we suppose that objects must conform to our
knowledge." Polanyi insisted that the "gradient of increasing
coherence" came about as the result of the gradual conformity of the
scientist's ideas with the structure of reality. s° Under an
interactionist scheme, these statements are complementary descriptions
of the same process. The transcendental idealism of the Kantian
framework is retained in that what we know is never the world "in
itself" but only a model or interpretation of the world, based on
experience. But that framework is modified to allow the real world to
arbitrate, in the course of experience, between a good model and bad
one. A person's world model is a "best approximation" to reality.'"
The same may be said to apply with regard to the status of
scientific theories. The "research programmes" described by Lakatos
are "best possible approximations" to be understood as analogous to
reality. A research programme is a "way of seeing" with the power to
suggest potentially fruitful avenues of research, expose new problems
requiring solution and generate progressively more adequate subsidiary
models. A research programme extends itself until sufficient anomalies
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arise in the research generated to expose its inherent limitations and
the search begins for a better and more adequate model. The same is
true of Kuhnian paradigms. Of the two possible meanings of the term,
exemplar and disciplinary matrix, the second is closely comparable to
Lakatos' research programmes. It is, in the words of Margaret
Masterman, a "crude analogy" of finite extensibility, which fails when
pushed too far due to the weight of anomalies generated in the course
of "normal scilmlle.s2 According to Lan Hacking, the parallel between
Kuhn's paradigms and Lakatos' research programmes is now widely
accepted.E•3 Both can be seen as implicitly theories of scientific
progress towards increasingly adequate descriptions of the "real
world". This "real world" lying behind and controlling the direction of
scientific progress, in Just the same way as that described by
Polanyi, is empirically real, in that it discloses itself to the senses
- it gives measurable observations. But it remains transcendentally
ideal in that while scientific theory may approach, in asymptotic
manner, a genuine description of reality, the time can never arrive
when that reality can confidently be said to have been fully
described. It can be known only through the scientist's model.
The same may be said with regard to the "critical realism"
described by Lan Barbour.64
 Rejecting naive realism, positivism, and
instrumentalism, Barbour maintains that scientific theories are both
representations of the world and the product of the imagination. While
they intend to describe the real world, models and theories are
incomplete and selective. They are to be taken as provisional, and yet
requiring commitment - the commitment of the scientist to the model
as the best available description of the world. Scientists, Barbour
insists, are actually critical realists. They think that that what they
are trying to understand is the real world, but their models are only
tentative descriptions of reality. Like Kuhn's, his theory is not a
prescription for the way scientists ought to behave, but a description
of the way they do behave. The fact that this one position can be
labelled both realism and idealism indicates the scope of
interactionism - its ability to unite the respective roles of nature
and scientific imagination in one coherent theory.
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5 Necessities of Discourse
One of the problems to arise from the account of knowledge given
here is that of communication. If the world each person inhabits is a
psychological model of his own construction, how is mutual
understanding and social co-operation possible? In the course of the
thesis, two overlapping solutions have been proposed; it is the task
of the present section to reflect on the philosophical aspects of
these possible solutions:
1. Verstehen. Individuals possess the ability to "take the stance"
of another. It is possible to construct for ourselves the point of
view of another with regard to the whole or a specific part of a given
situation. By doing so, it is possible to understand the other person's
intention and the meaning he assigns to his own actions. This ability
makes possible the construction of shared frames of reference, within
which successful communication can take place.6s
2. Socialisation. Socialisation is the general name for the great
variety of formal and informal processes by which individuals
harmonise their respective world models with one another. Each
reference group, whether large or small, formally or informally
constituted, temporary or semi-permanent, requires a shared frame of
reference, understood, if not necessarily subscribed to, by all the
members of the group.s6 A school, for example, has both a set of
formal rules and an "ethos" or "hidden curriculum", broader in scope
than the rules, which expresses the "way things are done". This may
include the boundaries of acceptable relationships between teachers
and pupils, expectations of pupil behaviour and guidelines for
relations between the sexes.
The construction of shared frames of reference by means of which
communication becomes possible should not be seen as an additional
facility, separate and subsequent to the creation by each individual of
a psychological world-view. It has been stressed, in the course of the
fourth chapter, that the social context in which th individual learns
to name and to value the items of his experience is inescapable. Each
person encounters the world already structured by parents and other
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significant authority figures, whose systems of meaning he is likely
to internalise without significant reflection. Claims to knowledge
based on observation take place only within culturally defined systems
of concepts expressed in language. Even for the description of
necessarily private experiences, such as the sensation of pain, each
person relies on the means of expression provided for him by the
language itself. The act of naming an object or sensation cannot be
taken as the basic level at which language makes contact with reality,
since descriptions even of private sensations attain meaning only
within the context of shared frames of reference.
This feature of experience and language was seized upon by Peter
Winch as the main point of his book, The Idea of a Social Science.
Winch took over from Wittgenstein the term "form of life" to describe
a social and cultural context, which, like a reference group, may be
large- or small-scale, temporary or long-lasting, and within which
rules and criteria for meaningful action are publicly recognised and
rational communication is possible. It is "forms of life", Winch
argued, which constitute the link between language and the world it
describes. 67
 (Whether Winch has interpreted Wittgenstein's use of the
term "form of life" correctly is open to question. An alternative
understanding will be referred to in the next section.) However, if the
meaning of language is the outcome of forms of life, the question
arises as to how communication between forms of life is possible.se
Must every term be translated at the boundary between forms of life
or is there some universal characteristic of human life which makes
cross-cultural communication a possibility?
"Forms of life" are supposed to provide definitive contexts
within which language can be used to apply to the world. However, at
an earlier point in the thesis it was remarked that the relation
between language and the reality it describes is itself irreducible to
the terms of a description.59 The essence of a form of life must,
therefore, remain beyond the reach of explicit formulation. It has been
established that the relationships between items of tacit knowledge do
not depend on logically explicable rules or conventions but upon the
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recognition of similarity relationships prior to the explicit
formulation of a rule defining in what the similarity consists. 6° This
feature of schemata may be understood as due to the fact that, as
vehicles for classifying and storing knowledge of the world, they
constitute an extension of the mechanism used by the body for the
continual monitoring of its own position. Nor is the mechanism of
memory the only aspect of human cognition firmly rooted in bodily
existence. The means of perception likewise consist of physical
mechanisms, and the interpretation of the data from the various
different senses to form a unified impression of the position of the
body in relation to the immediate surroundings is very much a bodily
skill.
It is bodily mechanisms which supply the link between the world
and the concepts by means of which that world is described. Thus, the
presence of the body, as an object among other objects, must be taken
for granted in any description of the world.6 ' The existence of the
body is a presupposition for experience rather than an inference from
it. So, too, is the independently existing physical world in which the
body locates itself and from which it receives perceptual data. The
activity which Kant describes as "synthesis" is not, in origin, a
conceptual but a bodily skill. It is at the level of bodily mechanisms
that the application of a schema converts the judgement, "This feels
heavy," to "This is heavy," thereby conferring "objectivity" upon the
object of perception by designating it an independently existing
thing.62 Thus, the existence of oneself as a subject and of a real
world independent of one's perception of it are both presupposed in
the fact of experience.63
A further essential feature of the background of convention
necessary before it is possible to describe the world is the nature of
language as a means of communication.64 The background to the naming
of an object is a shared activity. A distinction is thus to be made
between speech, which is an action with a specific purpose, and
language, whose structure is a reflection of the variety of human
purposes expressed in speech.66 Examples may be given of the way in
248
REFLECTION
which the structure of language reflects the activity of speech. One is
predication, based on the structure of topic and comment which is an
underlying feature of attention. Another is case-grammar, reflecting
such features of action as the agent, the object of the action,
recipient, location, possession and so on. Jerome Bruner has suggested
that these features of non-linguistic convention provide the key to
the task of language learning. Young children first construct a given
situation for themselves pre-linguistically and then learn to
symbolise it by means of language, first in non-standard forms and
later in grammatically correct sentences.66 In this way, they gain
access to a system of communication whose formal rules defy explicit
analysis. This is because the rules are pre-linguistic, irreducible to
exhaustive description, consisting of the complex interplay between
human beings. The presence of other human beings as rational agents
with purposes similar to our own is thus a further element of the
universal human situation.67
Three important elements have been isolated by
the preconditions of shared knowledge. These are the
self, the reality of other selves and the reality of
shared physical world. Together, they form the fixed
the background of which the construction of any given
place. Following Stuart Hampshire, they may be called
discourse", features of the human situation without
itself is impossible.69 It is, by implication,
inference from
reality of the
an independent
points against
situation takes
"necessities of
which language
impossible to
demonstrate any one of these features of human existence by means of
inference from experience. Attempts to do so may usually be found to
take one or both of the other two for granted. 69 But behind these
necessities of discourse lies the fact of the bodily basis of
experience. Earlier, it was suggested that such common and seemingly
inescapable features of cognition as, "Every event has a cause," may
reflect the fact that knowledge arises through the medium of the
body.7° Here, it may further be suggested that knowledge of ourselves,
of the independent world of objects and of other selves is mediated
through the body.
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The argument of the previous section took as its starting point
the "problem" of communication. That communication can be posed as a
problem is an outcome of the subject-object framework of the thesis as
a whole. Within this scheme it is the possibility of the knowledge of
objects and the communication of such knowledge that appear
problematical. The presence of the knowing subject, by contrast, is
axiomatic. However, whenever the knowing subject has become the
subject of enquiry, it has been necessary to draw attention to its
peculiar logical and metaphysical status:7 ' The problems associated
with the use of the concept of the subject must now be examined.
Given the broadly Kantian framework of the thesis as a whole the
appropriate starting point of this examination is the transcendental
ego of Kant's Critique. Kant maintains that it is impossible for the
subject to become an object of knowledge. What can be known about it
can be known only indirectly, by inference from its effects. From the
activity of synthesis, in which unity is imposed on the sensible
manifold, Kant argued that we are entitled to assume the existence of
a continuing, single self, or "I think".72 Moving on from Kant to the
evaluative response to the social self, which emerges from the study
of social interaction, the presence is suggested of an agent with
goals and purposes, in particular, the maintenance of self-esteem and
the pursuit of social acceptance." There is, it is argued, an
awareness of the underlying subject which is of quite a different kind
from the knowledge of objects of experience. Such an awareness, writes
H.D.Lewis, is "immediate". Awareness of oneself as subject occurs in
the experience of other objects, in the knowledge that this experience
is my experience. Reference to "I", writes A.S.Ayer is different from
reference to any particular hypothetical description. But, "It is a
difference which defies description." "What" I am is the subject of a
description of personal history, but every detail of such a personal
history might have been different without affecting the "Who" whose
history it is. Reference to "I" is simply demonstrative, an
identification of the subject of a particular history.74
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Despite the logical difficulties associated with it, the presence
of the active subject is an indispensable feature of the argument
presented in the thesis. In Kantian theory, the existence of the
transcendental ego is an analytical consequence of the Transcendental
Deduction, which philosophically underpins the whole approach7 s
 The
addition of the social context as a new dimension to the knowing
process introduces the idea of continuous interaction between the
subject and the self-schema as a basic feature of the dynamic of
personality formation. The importance attached to the acceptability of
the image of self presented in social interaction is a reflection of
the human quest for secure identity which, the evidence presented in
the fourth chapter suggests, provides the dynamic for the learning
process. This feature of the human situation is further illuminated by
the reasons advanced in the first chapter for regarding the basic
nature of human beings as an unknown factor, the quest for which lies
at the heart of the theoretical systems of both philosophy and the
social sciences. Finally, a theological perspective is introduced in
the examination of the significance of the phrase "the image of God"
as the biblical designation of human nature. It is precisely the
consciousness of oneself as a free and active subject which, it is
argued, constitutes an essential part of the image of God in men and
women. The image of God, otherwise the essential nature of the subject,
remains unknown until revealed in Jesus Christ.76
Precisely because of the centrality of this account of the
subject to the thesis as a whole, it is important to consider the
objections which might be made to it. The argument based on Humean
empiricism, to the effect that the idea of the subject as an
independent existent is a reification of what is, in fact, only an
element in the process of perception, has been examined in earlier
chapters.77
 The conclusion reached was that this argument depends
upon the characterisation of perception as an essentially passive
process. It was rejected on the grounds of the considerable body of
evidence which seems to indicate the presence of an active subject.
Another, and possibly stronger, counter-argument remains to be faced,
whose essential feature is an objection to the whole subject-object
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framework within which the thesis has been constructed. This subject-
object framework gives rise to a duality of inner reality and outer
reality, of personal psychological and shared physical worlds. Within
this framework, the autonomous subject is said to be the source of
independent purpose which is expressed in communication and in action.
The counter-position turns this basic framework more or less on
Its head. Rather than actions resulting from the presence of
autonomous subjects, it is action which gives rise to subjects.
Language, the mediator of a shared reality, enshrines a system of
concepts, within which the individual is enabled to differentiate his
own point of view. Self-knowledge is the creation not of the inner
subject but of the shared environment. Within this alternative
paradigm, the difficulties inherent in the concept of the subject are
allowed full weight. The subject is a logical oddity, a mysterious,
non-substantial entity, an occult existent impossible to locate.
?filch of Wittgenstein's later philosophy was devoted to liberation
from the metaphysical illusion he believed to be enshrined in the
subject-object framework, to exposing the bewitching effect of the
Inside-out way of thinking inherited by Western philosophy from
Descartes and Kant. Instead of the existence of the knowing subject, it
is "life" which is taken for granted and "forms of life" which
constitute the basic, the given. 79 Forms of life are not to be
Interpreted as social or cultural contexts, but as basic human
interactions, such as conveying anger or pity. Such interaction,
Wittgenstein appeared to believe, constituted a level of communication
at which human beings are transparent to one another. The ability to
feign anger, pity or some other emotion is parasitic upon this basic
level at which the personal experience of the emotion and its
expression in bodily and facial gestures are inseparable.
This apparent equation of emotion with its expression has led
many to label Wittgenstein as a behaviourist. This reaction is even
less surprising when it is realised that many of the essential
features of his theory were anticipated by the work of George Herbert
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Mead, who termed his own position "social behaviourism"." Mead
insisted that the private experience of meaning is an abstraction from
the social, which is the primary level of meaning. Language, he argued,
is the means of the transformation of the biological organism to the
minded organism or self. Social interaction is a conversation of
gestures, each gesture having as its function the determination of the
next action or gesture. Thus, the meaning- of any given gesture is
simply the action to which it gives rise. Mind emerges only when the
individual becomes conscious of the meaning of his own gesture by
taking the role of the other. In this way, the individual becomes
conscious of himself as a source of meaning.
This environmentally orientated theory of meaning is echoed in
the work of social scientists in various fields, notably that of James
and Eleanor Gibson in the field of perception. It is an important
aspect of the work of William James, the psychologist most quoted by
Wittgenstein, whose theory of the self was mentioned in an earlier
chapter.e° In relation to the subject, its main feature is the
emergence of the subject from social interaction rather than vice
versa. "I" becomes a point of view and "consciousness" simply the
appearing of the world. The meaning of one's actions to oneself (the
foundation of the Weberian approach to the study of social
Interaction) emerges from rather than forming the basis for their
meaning to others. In this perspective, the reality of others ceases to
pose a problem for philosophy; instead the presence of the other is
axiomatic, in much the same way as the reality of the subject in the
subject-object framework. What we have called in the previous section
"necessities of discourse" cease to be "presuppositions" of the subject
and are to be seen as abstractions from the forms of life,
translations of the conditions of social interaction into categories of
mental meaning. But, "Nothing is more wrong-headed," Wittgenstein
insisted, "than calling meaning a mental activtty."el
It is significant, however, that the "I-me" relationship forms a
central feature of Mead's theory. Although it might be argued that as
a behaviourist Mead failed to break free from the dominance of
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Cartesian thinking, it might equally be asserted that the idea of the
emergence of the subject from the experience of social interaction
fails to do justice to the evidence for the extent of the role of the
subject in perception and the formation of the self. Whilst admitting
the weaknesses of the concept, it still seems possible, even under the
alternative "outside-in" framework we have been exploring, to retain
the idea of the independent subject, first as at least a grammatical
feature of experience, then as designating a unique point of view, and
from these concessions to advance to the idea of a centre of action,
of the possibility of freedom of purpose and decision within the
constraints of the shared environment.
Even within the strictest Wittgensteinian framework, there exists
the requirement of a capacity to relate. "To understand language as a
form, or rather as a multiplicity of forms, of expressive activity, as
Wittgenstein encourages us to do, is to rehabilitate the self as a
responsive agent in vital connection with others of the same kind."3
The lack of a capacity to relate, or a capacity to relate only in ways
so totally different from those we know as to be absolutely
unintelligible, would set the individuals concerned outside the human
community. The idea of the capacity to relate as the basic meaning of
the "I" is precisely what we have seen to be involved in the "image of
God".93 The bodily nature of human beings and the social context in
which human life is carried on were both seen to be integrally related
to the divine image. Thus, despite the questions raised against the
concept of the subject by the existence of an alternative paradigm for
the understanding of the self, it seems possible to retain the idea of
the individual "I" as a responsive agent.
The rehabilitation of the responsive agent takes us once again
into the realm of human freedom and beyond exhaustive categorisation.
In theological terms, the situation is expressed by maintaining the
ultimate mystery of persons. The nature of the subject, or "who 'I' am"
is a spiritual reality, something to be known only in relation to God.
The image of God in men and women, expressed in relatedness and
capacity for relationship, is intrinsically and significantly related
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to the possession of spirit, which is the essential characteristic of
human beings. The possession of spirit is expressed in a relatedness
to God of all men and women, each of whom thereby participates in a
universal general revelation, and a capacity for relationship to God,
the possibility of which is mediated by Jesus Christ.
Probably the most significant attempt to construct a theological
system which takes account of the insights of Kantian philosophy is
that of Friedrich Schleiermacher. The outcome of Kant's thought
appeared to be that talk of God was to be understood either as idle
metaphysical speculation or as a reflection of one of the regulative
principles of either pure or practical reason.e4
 What Schleiermacher
attempted to do was to make room for the awareness of God as an
Integral feature of human life. As he pointed out in the Brief Outline,
one of the tasks of the theologian is to justify the place of the
Church from the point of view of human experience.
Unless religious communities are to be regarded as mere aberrations,
it must be possible to show that the existence of such associations is
a necessary element for the development of the human spirit,85
The way in which Schleiermacher proposed to make room for a
transcendent possibility in human life was by drawing upon
contemporary human studies in order to suggest an expansion of the
transcendental ego to include the realm of "Feeling" or "immediate
self-consciousness". s	 The	 "Immediacy"	 of	 self-consciousness
characteristic of the realm of Feeling may be compared with the
"immediacy" of the "knowledge" of oneself as subject in the course of
either knowing or acting. Thus, Schleiermacher points out, joy or
sorrow are immediate, as states of feeling directed wholly outward, in
contrast to self-approval or self-reproach, in which the consciousness
of an objective "self" is present. Feeling, he argued, supplies the
connection between Knowing and Doing. The same circumstances may give
rise to a difference in action between individuals, depending on their
state of immediate self-consciousness. His analysis of the relation
between the three is reminiscent of the way in which situations are
interpreted and translated into action by means of attitudes.e7
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Piety, Schleiermacher went on to explain, is a particular
modification of immediate self-consciousness. The consciousness of
being in relation to God is the common element in piety which
distinguishes it from all other states of Feeling, and it is an element
of immediate self-consciousness. The "awareness" of God available to
human beings is thus of the same kind as the immediate awareness of
oneself as subject. As a further stage in the argument, a new factor
is introduced in order to explain the particular content and character
of piety. This is the relationship of immediate self-consciousness to
the social context in which Knowing and Doing take place,
characterised by degrees of activity and receptivity, freedom and
dependence. The development of receptivity is a normal part of
consciousness. All existence, Schleiermacher writes, is existence
"along with an Other". In the pursuit of piety, it is God who is the
Other, whose existence "along with" us helps to form our understanding
of and response to experience. In ordinary receptivity, there are
degrees of freedom and dependence. In all relationships, even those of
a child with his father, there is some degree of freedom. But in our
relationship with God, says Schleiermacher, there is no degree of
freedom. Thus, the consciousness of being in relationship with God
will be a consciousness of "absolute dependence". This is the state of
immediate self-consciousness which constitutes the highest state of
piety.
The evidence Schleiermacher had to draw upon in support of his
characterisation of piety as the feeling of absolute dependence would
have included his own experience of piety and religious community. But
in the context of his argument the value of this experience is limited.
Observation of immediate self-consciousness itself is impossible,
since it is part of the realm of the transcendental subject. All that
is possible is the interpretation of what are taken to be its effects.
It is the argument from the presence of degrees of freedom and
dependence in relationships with other men and women which is most
important. But this argument is by no means beyond dispute. What
Schleiermacher has done is to run together the two types of
relationship with God referred to earlier, the ontological
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relationship, in which men and women as creatures are entirely
dependent, and the relationship involved in the fall and redemption, in
which, we have concluded, a degree of freedom is possible by God's
deliberate gift.89
The idea that the state of Feeling characteristic of Christian
experience is one of absolute dependence is to be rejected. There
remains, however, a close comparison between the way in which
Schleiermacher maintains that God is to be known, in immediate self-
consciousness, and the position advanced here with respect to the
relation between the Holy Spirit and the human spirit. In particular,
it has been suggested that what takes place in revelation is the
communication to the believer of the "identity" of Christ by means of
the Holy Spirit. The particular level of human personality at which
this communication takes place is that which Schleiermacher termed
immediate self-consciousness. The content of the revelation, however,
is not absolute dependence but the character of Christ. The presence
of Christ in immediate self-consciousness or identity is answered by
the knowledge of the incarnate Christ available from the biblical
record. What took place in the incarnation was an accommodation of
God to the conditions of human knowledge in which, in the Person of
Jesus Christ, he established a relationship with human beings
involving degrees of freedom and dependence. While the identity
offered to the Christian might be said to include the supremely potent
"God-consciousness" of Christ, this is to be understood not as
historically mediated by the Christian community but as a direct gift
of the Holy Spirit.
In describing the relationship between the Holy Spirit and the
spirit of the believer, no attempt has been made to advance beyond the
reticence of Scripture itself or the limits of the philosophical
framework within which the theory as a whole moves. It has been
suggested that the work of the Spirit is both to enlighten and to
enable the believer, to provide a new centre for the evaluation of self
and others and a new centre of agency. It has been argued that the
presence of the indwelling Holy Spirit constitutes no limitation of
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the agency of the believer but rather an enlargement of her freedom.
It has been explained that the progressive modification of attitude,
value and self image which ought to be seen as the results of
Christian learning come about only as a result of the engagement of
the Christian with the world on the basis of the new identity
available in Christ, and that the choice of such engagement remains
with the believer herself. The capacity of God to effect this kind of
change in the life of a human being by means of the Holy Spirit and
the manner of the relationship remains a mystery. Revelation takes
place, it has been argued, where the Holy Spirit meets, touches or, in
Moule's words "impinges" on the human spirit. 90 But the argument that
this is what takes place in revelation does not rest on the direct
examination of the process. Its basis is the whole theoretical
framework advanced here, within which specific effects of the Spirit's
work in individual Christians may be interpreted. This framework,
Kantian, interactive, and involving the evaluation of persons as
autonomous agents, is one in which the personal subject or
transcendental ego has a logically indispensable place.
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7. The Purpose of God in Creation 
Throughout the thesis, the idea of the "image of man" or doctrine
of humanity has played a central role. Such images or doctrines may
be, and frequently are, explicitly formulated. For example, researchers
in the Freudian tradition, or in that related to behaviourism often
referred to as "learning theory", work to an explicit and definite
estimate of the essential nature of men and women. 91
 In other cases,
the dominating "image of man" may be covert and unspecified.
Nevertheless, even a tacit and unacknowledged image is likely to play
an important guiding role in scientific research. It is the
researcher's tacitly held theory of human nature by which attention is
directed to potentially significant features of the evidence and which
arbitrates between alternative lines of further investigation. The
theory supplies those values which lie at the root of what Polanyi
calls personal knowledge and are expressed in the quest for
significant new insight into the human condition.92
There are thus two ways in which revelation may play a role in
the social sciences, corresponding to the two types of "image of man",
the explicit and the tacit. Certain aspects of the content of
revelation, expressed in a theological doctrine of man, might
consciously be used as a "research programme" by a theologically
orientated social scientist. On the other hand, any person whose
upbringing and education have taken place within a tradition which has
been formed, partly or wholly, by Christian revelation will inherit a
tacit "image of man" reflecting, to some extent at least, a Christian
doctrine of mankind. Such a view may then colour his response to the
task of research. 99 The quotation from Brunner given on page 31 above
is intended by the author as a description of the consciousness of the
"man in the street" of his own day. But the accuracy of Brunner's
portrayal is dependent on the degree of influence to be ascribed to
Christian doctrine in the formation of the culture he describes. The
modern-day grandchildren of those Brunner intended to describe might
be found to be very different in their tacit assumptions about the
conditions and purpose of human life, even though the presuppositions
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of tacit knowledge require the recognition of the transcendent
dimension of human existence in some form.
Despite its centrality to the understanding of human existence,
the doctrine of human being is also extremely problematical. Two
reasons have been suggested for this, one deriving from the conditions
of creation, the other from the "fallen" condition of humanity. Partly,
the uncertainty is due to the nature of men and women as autonomous
agents capable of development and self-definition. Partly, it is a
result of sin, classically understood as estrangement from God. Just
as, on the individual level, the "I" is the creator of a "self-model",
at the level of culture and scientific paradigm, humanity is its own
evaluator. The knowledge of one's own true nature is something which
can only be reflected from the consciousness of another. Lacking an
authentic knowledge of God, men and women lack also a definitive
awareness of their own origin, destiny and value. It is not the "image
of God" which is lost at the "fall", but the knowledge of the original
of that image and, with it, the ability to interpret the image both in
theory and practice.94
Despite the possibility, inherent in revelation, of a definitive
appreciation of human nature along with true knowledge of God, the
doctrine of humanity is equally problematical for the theologian. The
reason for this is to be found in the conditions of the reception of
revelation:99
 Revelation is understood only against the background and
with the aid of prior understanding. A full appreciation of all that is
given in revelation concerning the nature of mankind is achieved only
as a result of a process of assimilation and accommodation, in which
the categories of a prior understanding are slowly and perhaps
painfully altered. If these categories are allowed to remain immune
from such a process of revision, the process of formation of a
doctrine of mankind fully reflecting the truth given in revelation will
remain incomplete.
Reference has been made earlier to the suggestions made by David
Kelsey as to the course of fruitful future development in the theology
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of human being.96 First, he suggests the need for the recovery of a
"full-blown" doctrine of creation. This will be a doctrine in which two
kinds of relationship are recognised between God and mankind. One is
an ontological relationship, in which men and women are seen to be
dependent upon God, who provides and upholds the means of life. The
other is a relationship constituted by knowledge of God. While the
second is subject to variation through sin and redemption, the other
remains constant and unbroken and forms the background for any
appraisal of the relationship of God to human life. Second, Kelsey
suggests the need for a recovery of the vision of men and women as
agents - actors rather than acted upon by circumstances outside their
control. This, he believes, might be achieved as a result of liberation
theology with its human scale and central concept of "praxis". Or, it
might result from the revival of a conceptual scheme in which agency
plays a central role.
The most difficult problem to arise from this programme is that
of reconciling the autonomy involved in human agency with the radical
dependence upon God required by the doctrine of creation. The idea of
human agency itself seems to be threatened by observation of
developments in the contemporary world. On the one hand, it is
difficult to reconcile the stress on the autonomy of the human subject
with those approaches which emphasise the determination of human
behaviour by factors outside conscious control, whether they be social
or psychological. Equally difficult is the maintenance of a vision of
human autonomy, implicit in the idea of self-constitution, with the
degrading poverty of such a large proportion of the world's
population, the result of which is that material survival becomes the
main goal of existence.97
The reconciliation of human agency with the dependence required
of a creature is achieved by the separation of the two kinds of
relationships, the one involving autonomy as an element of the divine
constitution of mankind in creation, the other involving continuing
dependence. The belief thus sustained in men and women as agents first
and foremost acts as a check to threats from the various kinds of
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reductionism. With its emphasis on the hermeneutical nature of
cognition, the cognitive orientation integrates a wider set of
determinants of human behaviour than those provided by the
determinisms of sociology and psychoanalysis. In this view, behaviour
is a response to an interpretation of the situation in which factors
are weighted according to a person's predispositions based on past
experience. Such a view undergirds the possibilities of
conscientisation and praxis through which, by reinterpretation of
their situation, individuals are enabled to take control of their
circumstances and become makers of their own environments.
Two further questions arise from the development of the view set
out in this thesis, the key to whose resolution may lie in the
recovery of a doctrine of creation as the governing context for the
view of human nature on which the interpretation of the reception of
revelation depends. The first concerns the relationship which has been
postulated between the natural mechanisms of learning and the
supernatural operation of the Holy Spirit. The position which has been
maintained is that revelation is received by means of the natural
processes of learning and the question is whether the "naturalism" of
this position is undermined by the involvement of the Holy Spirit. The
second is the related question of interventionism. The concern is
whether the supposed action of God by means of the Holy Spirit,
arresting and redirecting the learning process, constitutes an
intervention in the course of human life for which no theological
basis of understanding exists.
The construction of the thesis has taken place with the first of
these questions constantly in mind. Its purpose is precisely to
demonstrate the plausibility of a relationship of this kind between
the natural and the supernatural. If the reality of revelation is to be
maintained then some kind of relationship must be postulated between
nature and grace. The position advanced here is that this relationship
is established by means of the contact between the Holy Spirit and
the human spirit?e
 The possibility of such contact without disrupting
the naturalism inherent in the description of the learning processes
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involved in the reception of revelation depends on the kind of
doctrine of creation outlined above. One of the most important
outcomes of the doctrine of creation is the intrinsicality to human
nature of a relatedness to God.99 Men and women can be said to exist
in a relatedness to God characterised not simply by dependence but
also by free personal response, even where that response consists of
hostility or estrangement.'°° It is within the parameters of this
relatedness, distinctive to human beings, that the work of the Holy
Spirit in revelation takes place. Examples have been given on pages
150-151 above to show how the Holy Spirit is to be understood as
acting without diminishing the essential autonomy of the human agents
through whom God's purpose is achieved. The same is true, it has been
suggested, of the process of inspiration. Finally, the effect of the
work of the Spirit in the believer is to uphold and enlarge the
freedom which is his in the divine purpose.10'
The second of these two related questions has already been
partly answered in the discussion of the first. An estimate of the
propriety of any particular action within the cosmos ascribed to God
depends on a doctrine of creation. There is an enormous difference
between a view of the universe as contingent and dependent for its
operation on the continual direction of a divine Creator and one in
which nature is governed only by its own immanent lawfulness.' ° 2 From
the perspective of the latter view, the actions of God in redemption
and revelation are alien intrusions, redirecting the course of a self-
sufficient system. From the point of view of a doctrine of creation,
however, the position may be advanced that the universe exists for a
particular purpose and, further, that the lawfulness displayed by the
universe Is a reflection of and means to the achievement of that
purpose. Against this background, the plausibility of divine
"Intervention" may be maintained if it can be shown to uphold that
lawfulness and achieve that purpose. The whole aim of this thesis has
been to show that the mode of divine revelation which has been
proposed is one which maintains the lawfulness of the created
universe, rightly interpreted by means of a doctrine of human nature
in which men and women are constituted by God as agents. As a
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supplement to this position, it may further be proposed that such a
revelation is an element in the divine purpose for mankind. It is
suggested that this consists of the re-establishment of the
sovereignty of men and women over creation and of the possibility of
a free and loving relationship with God and with one another. 103
 This,
it is maintained, is the purpose of the incarnation of Jesus Christ
and the gift of the Holy Spirit, a movement from God towards mankind
in which revelation is an integral element.
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